

The Role of *dr̥ṣṭānta* in Dignāga's Logic

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0. Dignāga discusses example (*dr̥ṣṭānta*) and pseudo-example (*dr̥ṣṭāntābhāsa*) in his *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti* (henceforth PSV), chapter 4.¹ Most of his discussions in the *svāmata* section can be traced back to his earlier work, the *Nyāyamukha*. In the *paramata* section he criticizes the views presented in the *Vādaividhi* attributed to Vasubandhu as well as those of the Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas.²

¹ The first part of my presentation at the panel in Lausanne, 1999, which dealt with Dignāga's theory of *trairūpya*, has appeared under the title of "Dignāga on *trairūpya* Reconsidered: A Reply to Prof. Oetke," in Festschrift for Dr. Hiromasa Tosaki, *Indo no Bunka to Ronri* (Culture and Logic in India), ed. by Akihiko Akamatsu, University Press of Kyushu, Oct. 2000: 241-266.

² A synopsis of PS/PSV/PST chapter 4:

1 Dignāga's own views (*svāmata*) on *dr̥ṣṭānta* and *dr̥ṣṭāntābhāsa*

1.1 Dignāga's own views on *dr̥ṣṭānta* (Derge8b4-9a4/60a2-63a3/212b3-226b3)

1.1.1 The *dr̥ṣṭānta* statement expresses the second and the third characteristics of a valid reason (*hetu*)

1.1.2 Two kinds of *dr̥ṣṭānta* and their proper formulations

1.1.3 Necessity of the two kinds of *dr̥ṣṭānta* in a single proof

1.1.4 Purpose of *dr̥ṣṭānta*; components of a proof: reason, pervasion (*vyāpti*) and proposition to be proved (*sādhya*)

1.1.5 *dr̥ṣṭānta*'s independence from the reason

1.1.6 Relation between the reason and *dr̥ṣṭānta*

1.1.7 Critique of *Nyāyasūtra* 1.1.34

The aim of this paper is to present a summary of Dignāga's discussions on *dr̥ṣṭānta* in the *svamata* section, from which we will be able to draw some conclusions about the role of *dr̥ṣṭānta* in Dignāga's logic.³

1. Introducing PS 4.6, Dignāga assumes the following process of 'inference for oneself' (*svārthānumāna*, 'inference' in short):

(1) First we ascertain the presence of an inferential mark (*liṅga*, e.g., smoke) in the object to be inferred (*anumeya*, e.g., the top of a mountain); this is the confirmation of the first of the three characteristics (*trirūpa*) of a valid inferential mark, i.e., *pakṣadharmatva*.

1.1.8 Critique of *Nyāyasūtra* 1.1.35

1.1.9 Necessity for the pervasion to be expressed in *dr̥ṣṭānta* statement

1.2. Dignāga's own views on *dr̥ṣṭāntābhāsa* (Derge 9a5/63a3-b1/226b3-227b3)

2 Dignāga's critique of the views held by other schools (*paramata*)

2.1 The *Vādaśāstra* views (Derge 9a5-9b1/63b1-64a5/227b3-229a5)

2.2 The Naiyāyika views (Derge 9b1-3/64a5-66a3/229a5-236b6)

2.3 The Vaiśeṣika views (Derge 9b3-4/66a3-7/236b6-237b3)

³ This portion of PSV has been thoroughly studied by Hidenori Kitagawa in KITAGAWA 1965. He edited two versions of Tibetan translations of PS and PSV and translated them into Japanese with detailed annotations. Muni Jambūvijaya restored the Sanskrit of the beginning portions of PS and PSV chapter 4 in JAMBŪVIJAYA 1966. He translated into Sanskrit the relevant portions of PST in its footnotes. He did the same for the Vaiśeṣika section of this chapter in JAMBŪVIJAYA 1961. Most recently, Wasō Harada translated the beginning portions of PS and PSV chapter 4 (vv.1-5) in HARADA 1999, note 13. I would like to acknowledge my indebtedness to those previous studies. I briefly discussed Dignāga's treatment of *dr̥ṣṭānta* in KATSURA 1984. I would also like to thank Prof. E. Steinkellner and his staff at the Austrian Academy of Science for their great help in recovering the fragments of PS and PSV chapter 4.

(2) Next we recall that we previously experienced elsewhere the presence of the inferential mark in what is similar to the object to be inferred (*tattulya*, e.g., a kitchen) and its absence in the absence of the property to be inferred (*asat*, e.g., a lake); this is the confirmation of the second and the third characteristics, viz., *anvaya* (a positive concomitance) and *vyatireka* (a negative concomitance).

(3) Then we can have an ascertainment (*niścaya*) that the property to be inferred exists in the object to be inferred, as, e.g., that there must be, even though it is imperceptible, a fire at the top of the mountain.⁴

In short, an inferential mark possessing the three characteristics (*pakṣadharmatva*, *anvaya* and *vyatireka*) can produce the ascertainment of a certain state of affairs regarding an object to be inferred.⁵

Dignāga then states PS 4.6 as follows:

[In 'inference for others' (*parārthānumāna*, 'proof' in short), on the other hand,] with a desire to produce for others the same ascertainment (*niścaya*) as we ourselves have obtained, we refer to (1) [a reason's (*hetu*)] being a property of the topic (*pakṣa*) of a proposition (*pakṣadharmatva*), (2) [its inseparable] relation (*sambandha*) [with that which is to be proved] and (3) the [proposition] to be proved (*sādhya*). Other items should be excluded [from the members of a proof].⁶

⁴ PSV^K 150b5-7: *rjes su dpag pa la yañ tshul 'di yin par mthoñ ste | gal te rtags 'di rjes su dpag par bya ba la ñes par bzuñ na | gzan du de dan rigs mthun pa la yod pa ñid dan | med pa la med pa ñid dran par byed pa de'i phyir 'di'i ñes pa bskyed par yin no* // Cf. PSV^V 61b5, KITAGAWA 1965: 521; PST D223a6: *rjes su dpag pa la yañ zes rañ gi don rjes su dpag pa la'o* //; NMu § 5.5, KATSURA 1981.

⁵ Cf. PS 2.1ab: *anumānam dvidhā svārtham trirūpāl liṅgato 'rthadr̥k |*

⁶ *svaniścayavad anyeṣāṃ niścayotpādanecchayā | pakṣadharmatvasambandhasādhhyokter anyavarjanam* // = NMu v. 13: 如自決定已 恠他決
→

Thus the purpose of a logical proof (*parārthānumāna*) is to produce in the opponent the same kind of ascertainment that is obtained by the proponent through an inference (*svārthānumāna*). This indicates a close parallelism between an inference and a proof.

Commenting upon the above verse, Dignāga clarifies the roles of the three members (*avayava*) of his logical proof, viz., ‘proposition/thesis’ (*pakṣa*), ‘reason’ (*hetu*) and ‘example’ (*dṛṣṭānta*) in the following manner:

- (1) The statement of a proposition (*pakṣa-vacana*) is made in order to indicate the state of affairs to be inferred (*anumeya*).
- (2) The statement of a reason (*hetu-vacana*) is made in order to indicate that the reason is a property of the topic under discussion (*pakṣadharmatva*).
- (3) The statement of an example (*dṛṣṭānta-vacana*) is made in order to indicate that the reason is inseparably related (*avinābhāva*) to the property to be inferred (*anumeya*).

Then he excludes ‘desire to know’ (*jijñāsā*), ‘application’ (*upanaya*), ‘conclusion’ (*nigamana*) and others from the members of a proof and concludes that there are no members of a proof other than the above three.⁷

定生 說宗法相應 所立餘遠離. Quoted in PVA 487,31; *pādas* cd in VNT 64,22 and NV 130,5.

Cf. also *Hetubindu* of Dharmakīrti, ed. by STEINKELLNER (Wien: 1967) 6,17-18: *svaniścayavad anyeṣām api niścayotpādanāya ca sādhanam ucyate* |; *Prasannapadā* of Candrakīrti, ed. by L. de La Vallée Poussin (St. Petersburg: 1903-13) 19,1-2: *yo hi yam arthaṃ pratijānīte, tena svaniścayavad anyeṣāṃ niścayotpādanecchayā yayopapattyāsāv artho 'dhigataḥ saivopapattiḥ parasmāy upadeṣṭavyā* |; *Nyāyavatāra* of Siddhasena Divākara (ed. by S.R. Banerjee, Calcutta 1981) v. 10: *svaniścayavad anyeṣāṃ niścayotpādanam buddhaiḥ | parārtham mānam ākhyātaṃ vākyaṃ tadupacārataḥ* ||.

⁷ PSV^K 150b8-151a2: *gañ gi phyir phyogs kyi chos ñid bstan pa'i don du gtan tshigs brjod pa dañ | yañ de'i rjes su dpag par bya ba dañ med na* →

The statement of a proposition is actually the re-statement of the ascertainment obtained by one who has inferred for himself, while the statement of a reason corresponds to the ascertainment of the first characteristic (i.e., *pakṣadharmatva*) of a valid mark in an inferential process. Then the statement of an example, which expresses an inseparable relation (*sambandha/avinābhāva*), must correspond to the recollection of *anvaya* and *vyatireka*. This is the case because, as I have determined elsewhere, *anvaya* and *vyatireka* with *eva*-restriction represent such an inseparable relation between a logical mark and the property to be inferred, in short, the pervasion (*vyāpti*) of the former by the latter.⁸ Thus it is clear that there exists an apparent parallelism between an inference and a proof.

According to Dignāga the role of the statement of an example (*dr̥ṣṭānta-vacanā*) in a proof is to present the 'inseparable' (*avinābhāva*) relation (*sambandha*) between a reason (*hetu*, i.e., a proving property, *sādhana-dharma*) and a property to be proved (*sādhya-dharma*), namely, the relation in which the former does not exist (*a-bhāva*) without (*vinā*) the latter, for example, smoke does not exist without a fire. The same kind of relation holds between a valid logical mark (*liṅga*) and the marked (*liṅgin*, i.e., that which is to be inferred) in the case of an inference.⁹ It is further called 'restriction' (*niyama*), 'pervasion' (*vyāpti*), 'concomitance' (*anubandha*), etc. It is to be noted that such a relation ascertains the

mi 'byuñ ba'i don du *dpe brjod pa* dañ / rjes su dpag par bya ba yin pa'i don du *phyogs brjod pa* ste rjes su dpag pa'i yan lag gzan yod pa ma yin no || de'i phyir gzan dag ni śes pa la sogs pa rnams dañ ñe bar sbyor ba dañ mjug bsdu ba dag 'dir spañs pa yin no ||. Cf. PSV^V 61b7-62a1, KITAGAWA 1965: 521-522; NMu § 5.5, KATSURA 1981.

⁸ See KATSURA 2000.

⁹ See PS 2.21: *liṅge liṅgī bhavaty eva liṅginy evetarat punaḥ / niyamasya viparyāse 'sambandho liṅgaliṅginoh* ||. Quoted in Arcāṭa's *Hetu-binduṭīkā* (ed. by Sanghavi, Baroda 1949) 18,18-19.

second and the third characteristics (*anvaya* and *vyatireka*) of a valid reason (*hetu*) or an inferential mark (*liṅga*).

2. With the theory of the ‘inseparable relation’ or ‘pervasion’ as the foundation of his system of logic, Dignāga is greatly concerned with the problem of how to formulate each member of a proof, especially, that of the example (*dr̥ṣṭānta*). In PS 4.1 he states:

It has been said that a valid reason (*hetu*) possesses the three characteristics (*trirūpa*). According to convention (*rūḍhi*), however, it (i.e., the reason) is established as a property of the topic of a proposition (*pakṣadharmā*) only. The remaining two characteristics [of a valid reason] are [to be] presented by an example [statement] (*dr̥ṣṭānta*).¹⁰

Here Dignāga seems to be criticizing some certain unsatisfactory formulations of a proof given by other Indian logicians of his time. In this connection, I assume that he is presupposing, as for example, the following formulation:

[proposition]	<i>anityaḥ śabdah</i>
[reason]	<i>kṛtakatvāt</i>
[example]	<i>kṛtako ghaṭo 'nityo dr̥ṣṭaḥ</i>
[application]	<i>tathā ca kṛtakaḥ śabdah</i>
[conclusion]	<i>tasmāt kṛtakatvād anityaḥ śabdah</i>

[Proof 1]

According to Dignāga, the first characteristic of a valid reason, i.e., *pakṣadharmitva*, is implicitly stated in the statement of the reason of the above Proof 1 because the word *śabdasya* is implicitly understood; the statement in its expanded form is *śabdasya kṛtakatvāt*. The second and the third characteristics (*anvaya* and *vyati-*

¹⁰ *trirūpo hetur ity uktam pakṣadharme tu samsthitah / rūḍhe rūpadvayanī śeṣam dr̥ṣṭāntena pradarśyate //*. Quoted in VNT 88,26-27 with a variant reading.

reka), however, are not mentioned at all in the proof and must in a valid proof be formulated in the statement of an example. Thus it is clear that in a proof of Dignāga's, **the statement of a reason expresses the first characteristic (*pakṣadharmatva*) and the statement of an example expresses the second and the third characteristics (*anvaya* and *vyatireka*)**.

Furthermore, Dignāga states in PS 4.2:

An example is that [object] in which a reason (*hetu*) is shown to be followed by a property to be proved (*sādhya*) or to be absent in the absence of a property to be proved; it is of two kinds: 'similar' (*sādharmya*) and another (i.e., 'dissimilar' *vaidharmya*).¹¹

In this connection it is to be noted that Dignāga uses the word *dr̥ṣṭānta* in two distinct meanings, viz., an object (*artha*) as an example for a proof in PS 4.2 and a statement (*vacana*) that presents an example together with a general law (i.e., an inseparable relation or pervasion between a reason and a property to be proved) in PS 4.1. This is clear from his own comment that *yatra* in PS 4.2c refers to an object to be referred to (*abhidheya*).¹² Jinendrabuddhi justifies Dignāga's usage by way of stating that there is a 'superimposition of identity' (*abhedopacāra*) between the expression (*abhidhāna*) and the expressed (*abhidheya*). Thus the designation *dr̥ṣṭānta*, which refers to an example object (*artha*, i.e., *abhidheya*), is meta-

¹¹ *sādhyaenānugamo hetoḥ sādhyābhāve ca nāstītā | khyāpyate yatra dr̥ṣṭāntaḥ sa sādharmanyetarō dvidhā* // Cf. NMu v. 11 說因宗所隨 宗無因不有 此二名譬喻 餘皆此相似. Quoted in *Daśavaikālikasūtrahāri-bhadrīvr̥tti* 34B mentioned in JAMBŪVIJAYA 1966 Appendix: 133; cf. NMu v. 4 = PS 3.15 mentioned in footnote 23.

¹² PSV^K 148a7: *gaṇ la ṣes brjod par bya ba la thams cad la 'gro ba ni rjes su 'gro ba'o* // PSV^V D60a4: *rjes su 'gro ba thams cad du 'gro'o* // *gaṇ ṣes pa ni brjod par bya'o* // ('sarvatra gamo 'nugamaḥ | yatreti abhidheye /)

phorically applied to the statement of an example (*vacana*, i.e., *abhidhāna*).¹³

The *Nyāyasūtra* (henceforth NSū), on the other hand, distinguishes an example (*drṣṭānta*) from exemplification (*udāharaṇa*), i.e., the third member (*avayava*) of the five-membered proof.¹⁴ It may be a weak point in Dignāga's system of logic that he uses one and the same technical term in more than one meaning. For example, he applies *pakṣa* to both the content of a proposition to be proved and

¹³ PST D213a2-4: *de'i phyir de'i don du dpe brjod par bya ba'o zes pa dañ | dpe yis rab tu gsal bar byed || ces kyañ ño || rjod par byed pa dañ brjod par bya ba dag tha mi dad par ñe bar btags pa la 'di skad ces brjod do || gzan du na gañ la zes pa brjod par bya ba la zes pa'i tshig las don kho na dpe ñid de | don gyis gsal bar byed pa yañ ma yin no zes pas 'di mi rigs par 'gyur ro || de'i phyir tha mi dad pa ñe bar btags pa las dpe rjod par byed pa'i ñaṅ tshul can gyi tshig ni 'dir dpe'i sgras brjod do ||* (atas tadarthaṃ drṣṭānta ucyatām iti drṣṭāntena prakāśyata iti ca | **abhidhānābhidheya** **or abhedopacārād evam uktam** | anyathā yatirety abhidheya iti vacanād arthasyaiva drṣṭāntatā | na cārthena prakāśyata ity ayuktam etat syāt | tasmād **abhedopacārād drṣṭāntābhidhāyivacanam atra drṣṭāntaśabadenoktam** |)

PST D213b1-2: *gañ la zes pa brjod par bya ba la zes pa 'dis don dpe ñid gsuñs so || tshig ni de'i rjod par byed pa ñid kyi phyir ñe bar btags pa'i dpe'o || 'di yañ | dpe yis rab tu bstan par bya || zes pa 'dis sñar ñid rig par byas zin to ||* (yatirety abhidheya ity anenārthasya drṣṭāntatām āha | vacanaṃ tu tādabhidhāyivād upacāreṇa drṣṭāntaḥ | etac ca drṣṭāntena pradarśyata ity anena prāg eva veditam |)

¹⁴ See NSū 1.1.25: *laukikaparīkṣakāṇāṃ yasminn arthe buddhisāmyaṃ sa drṣṭāntaḥ ||*, and NSū 1.1.36: *sādhyaśādharmyāt taddharmabhāvi drṣṭānta udāharaṇam ||*. Uddyotakara certainly notices this distinction. See NV ad NSū 1.1.36: *nanu ca karaṇakāraparigrahāt vacanam udāharaṇam, drṣṭāntaś cārthaḥ; na cānayoḥ sāmānādhikaraṇyaṃ yujyate, na hi viśāṇādimaḍ ity abhidhānaṃ gavā sāmānādhikaraṇaṃ bhavati | naiṣa doṣaḥ, vacana viśeṣaṇatvena drṣṭāntasyopādānāt, na svatantra drṣṭānta udāharaṇam |*

the statement of such a proposition in a proof formulation; the latter (i.e., the first member of a proof) is called *pratijñā* in NSū.

It is to be noted in passing that Dignāga clearly states that the main purpose of an example statement is to indicate an external object (*bāhyārtha*) as an example.¹⁵ This seems to suggest that as long as he is discussing logic and epistemology, he is assuming external reality. Furthermore, it was most likely Dignāga who classified examples into two types and named them accordingly, i.e., 'a similar example' (*sādharmya-dr̥ṣṭānta*) and 'a dissimilar example' (*vaidharmya-dr̥ṣṭānta*). His convention was generally followed by Indian logicians after him.

2.1. Now let us see how Dignāga formulates his example statement. He assumes the following formulation as a valid proof:

[proposition] *anityaḥ śabdaḥ*

[reason] *prayatnānantarīyakatvāt*

[similar ex.] *yat prayatnānantarīyakam tad anityam dr̥ṣṭam,
yathā ghaṭaḥ*

[dissimilar ex.] (*yan*) *nityam (tad) aprayatnānantarīyakam dr̥ṣṭam,
yathākāśam*

[Proof 2]¹⁶

¹⁵ PSV^K 148b6: *phyi rol gyi don la bstan pa ni dpe la gtso bo yin no* ('*bāhyārtha-pradarśanam hi nidarśye pradhānam*).

¹⁶ PSV^K 148a7-8: *re zig chos mthun pas ni sgra mi rtag ste rtsol ba las byuñ ba'i phyir ro || gañ rtsol ba las byuñ ba de ni mi rtag par mthoñ ste dper na bum pa bzin zes bya ba dañ | chos mi mthun pas rtag pa ni rtsol ba las byuñ ba ma yin par mthoñ ste nam mkha' bzin zes bya ba lta bu'o ||* ('*sādharmyena tāvad anityaḥ śabdaḥ prayatnāntarīyakatvāt | yad dhi prayatnāntarīyakam tad anityam dr̥ṣṭam yathā ghaṭa iti | vaidharmyena nityam aprayatnāntarīyakam dr̥ṣṭam yathākāśam iti*).

When we compare the two Proofs quoted above, it is clear that in addition to the absence of the statements of application and conclusion in Proof 2 the difference lies in the statement of the example (*dr̥ṣṭānta*). Proof 1 simply refers to an object, i.e., a pot, which is both 'produced' (*kṛtaka*) and 'non-eternal', in other words, possesses both the proving property (*sāadhanadharmā/hetu*) and the property to be proved (*sādhyadharmā*). As Dignāga criticizes, it does not mention any relation (*sambandha*) between the two properties. Proof 2, on the other hand, mentions such a relation, namely, "Whatever is produced by human effort is non-eternal" (or whatever is P is Q) in a similar example and "Whatever is eternal (i.e., not non-eternal) is not produced by human effort" (or whatever is not Q is not P) in a dissimilar example. It is to be noted that these two statements are logically equivalent because they are in contraposition. In any case Dignāga's example statement, whether similar or dissimilar, expresses the pervasion (*vyāpti*) of a proving property by a property to be proven.¹⁷

¹⁷ Pakṣilasvāmin/Vātsyāyana, who must have been active before Dignāga, gives two parallel proofs which he seems to regard as independent, though both prove the same proposition by the same reason. Dignāga appears to have incorporated the two proofs into one by adopting both similar and dissimilar examples into one proof. *Nyāyabhāṣya* ad NSū 1.1.39:

[proposition]	<i>anityaḥ śabdaḥ</i>
[reason]	<i>utpattidharmakatvāt</i>
[exemplification]	<i>utpattidharmakam sthālyādi dravyam nityam dr̥ṣṭam</i>
[application]	<i>na ca tathānutpattidharmakaḥ śabdaḥ, kiṃ tarhi utpattidharmakaḥ</i>
[conclusion]	<i>tasmād utpattidharmakatvād anityaḥ śabdaḥ</i>
	[Proof a]
[proposition]	<i>anityaḥ śabdaḥ</i>

We should not ignore the fact that the word *dr̥ṣṭa* (observed) qualifies those apparently universal relations mentioned in the example statements of Proof 2, so that their meaning amounts to: It is observed that whatever is P is Q, or it is observed that whatever is not Q is not P. This suggests that Dignāga's statement of pervasion does not necessarily imply a universal law but rather assumes a general law derived from our observations or experiences; in other words, it is a kind of hypothetical proposition derived by induction.¹⁸ In order to justify such an inductive process Dignāga needed to present both positive and negative examples in one set of a proof. Thus, I think that Dignāga's presentation of example statements clearly indicate the inductive nature of his logic.

2.2. Now let us go back to PS 4.2: "An example is that [object] in which the reason (*hetu*) is shown to be followed by the property to be proved (*sādhya*) or to be absent in the absence of the property to be proved." This contains Dignāga's suggestion of how to formulate similar and dissimilar examples. Namely, a similar example should be formulated by the reason being followed by the property to be proved (*hetoḥ sādhyena anugamaḥ*), and a dissimilar example by the reason's absence in the absence of the property to be proved (*sādhyābhāve hetos nāstitā*). Their formulations may be called *an-*

[reason]	<i>utpattidharmakatvāt</i>
[exemplification]	<i>anutpattidharmakam ātmādi dravyam anityam</i>
[application]	<i>tathā cotpattidharmakaḥ śabdaḥ</i>
[conclusion]	<i>tasmād utpattidharmakatvād anityaḥ śabdaḥ</i>

[Proof b]

¹⁸ I would like to suggest an etymology of the word *dr̥ṣṭānta*, which is 'the end' or the culminating point (*anta*) of 'observation' (*dr̥ṣṭa*). It fits well with the inductive nature of Indian logic.

vaya (continued presence) and *vyatireka* (continued absence) respectively, for they can be put into the following formulae:

When the reason (P) is present, the property to be proved (Q) is present.

When the property to be proved (Q) is absent, the reason (P) is absent.

Since P is a reason and Q is a property to be proved by that reason, one can rephrase and symbolize the above formulae in the following manner:

If x is P, then x is Q. $Px \supset Qx$

If x is not Q, then x is not P. $\neg Qx \supset \neg Px$

Let us compare the above formulae with *anvaya* and *vyatireka* in the *trairūpya* formulae. PS 2.5cd reads: “[A valid inferential mark’s (*liṅga*) presence in what is similar to the [object to be inferred] and its absence in the absence [of the property to be inferred]” ([*liṅgasya*] *tattulye sadbhāvo nāstitāsatī*).¹⁹ If we assume that ‘what is similar to the object to be inferred (*anumeya*)’ and ‘the absence of the property to be inferred’ in PS 2.5cd respectively correspond to the traditional concepts of a set of similar examples (*sapakṣa*) and a set of dissimilar ones (*asapakṣa/vipakṣa*), they can be reformulated in the following manner:

When the property to be proved (Q) is present, the inferential mark (P) is present.

When the property to be proved (Q) is not present, the inferential mark (P) is not present.

(N.B.: an inferential mark is equivalent to the reason in a proof.)

When we compare them with the formulae of the two examples mentioned above, the difference lies in the *anvaya* formula,

¹⁹ For a detailed discussion of the *trairūpya* formulae according to Dignāga, see KATSURA 2000.

namely, the order of P and Q are reversed. As a matter of fact, the *anvaya* and *vyatireka* of *trairūpya*, rather than those of the examples, represent the more orthodox formulation of the 'Indian Principle of Inductive Reasoning' (named by George Cardona): $X \rightarrow Y$ and $\neg X \rightarrow \neg Y$.

anvaya and *vyatireka* of the *trairūpya* formulae show how a valid inferential mark is distributed in our Induction Domain (*à la* Richard Hayes) consisting of a set of similar examples and a set of dissimilar examples. If P is found in the domain of Q and not in the domain of $\neg Q$, we can assume a certain relation between P and Q. For example, P (e.g., smoke) is a result of Q (e.g., a fire). In the case of *trairūpya*, P is discovered to be the valid logical mark (*liṅga*) of the property to be proved, Q. In this connection, following Vasubandhū's lead, Dignāga considered that the valid mark/reason (P) is inseparably related (*nāntariyaka/avinābhāvin*) to the property to be proved (Q). In other words, in order to be a valid mark/reason, the domain of P should be restricted to and included in the domain of Q. He named such a relation 'pervasion' (*vyāpti*) of P by Q and successfully formulated it by introducing the restrictive particle *eva* into the formulae of *anvaya* and *vyatireka* in the following manner:

Only (*eva*) when the property to be proved (Q) is present, is the inferential mark (P) present.

When the property to be proved (Q) is not present, the inferential mark (P) is never (*naiva*) present.

It is to be noted that the above formulae present not a logical but rather an ontological relation between two items P and Q, though we can easily derive from such a relation the kind of general law that whatever is P is Q. The purpose of Dignāga's example statements is precisely to formulate such a general law; the order of P and Q is reversed there in order to present it in a logically proper way. In order to avoid confusion, the *anvaya* and *vyatireka* expressed in the two examples are called by later authors *anvaya-*

vyāpti (a positive pervasion) and *vyatireka-vyāpti* (a negative pervasion) respectively.

It is to be noted in passing that Dignāga does not give any argument for justifying the introduction of the *eva* restriction; in other words, he never tried to justify the very foundation of his theory of *vyāpti*. Considering Dignāga's allusion to *anvaya* and *vyatireka* in PSV chapter 5, I am inclined to think that he proposed *vyāpti* or a general law solely on the basis of the fact that no counter-example is observed (*adarśanamātreṇa*) in the domain of dissimilar examples.²⁰ It suggests the hypothetical nature of the deductive part of Dignāga's logic.

2.3. Let us see again how Dignāga actually formulates the logical relation or *vyāpti* in the example statements of Proof 2.

[similar ex.] *yat prayatnānantariyakam tad anityam dṛṣṭam,
yathā ghaṭaḥ*

[dissimilar ex.] *yan nityam tad aprayatnānantariyakam dṛṣṭam,
yathākāśam*

It is clear that he uses the relative pronouns *yad* and *tad* in order to express a kind of universal relation: Whatever is P is Q, or whatever is not Q is not P. He also indicates that the same relation can be expressed by inserting the restrictive particle *eva* in the appropriate place.²¹ For example,

[similar ex.] *anityam eva prayatnānantariyakam, yathā ghaṭo
vidyuc ca*

[dissimilar ex.] *aprayatnānantariyakam eva nityam, yathākāśam*

²⁰ See my article, "Dignāga and Dharmakīrti on *adarśanamātra* and *anupalabdhi*," *Asiatische Studien/Études Asiatiques* 46/1 (1992) 222-231.

²¹ See PSV^K 148b8-149a3, which is to be discussed later.

In this context the restrictive particle *eva* behaves almost like a 'universal quantifier'. Generally speaking, Dignāga admits the following two ways of expressing the logical relation or *vyāpti*:

(1) *yad P tad Q / & yad -Q tad -P /*

(2) *Q eva P / & -P eva -Q /*

Dignāga is very much concerned with the problem of how to formulate a logical proof in the proper way. We can now present his formulation in a formal manner. 'a' stands for the topic of a proposition (*pakṣa*) or the object of inference (*anumeya*); P stands for the proving property (*sādhana-dharma*), a reason (*hetu*), or an inferential mark (*liṅga*); Q stands for the property to be proved (*sādhya-dharma*); 's' stands for the similar example (*sādharmya-dr̥ṣṭānta*) or the member of a set of similar examples (*sapakṣa*); and 'v' stands for the dissimilar example (*vaidharmya-dr̥ṣṭānta*) or the member of a set of dissimilar examples (*vipakṣa*). It is to be noted that in Dignāga's system of logic 'a', being the topic under examination, is not a part of our Induction Domain which consists of *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa*. Furthermore, the underlying structure of an Indian proof statement is: "The property-possessor (*dharmin*) 'a' possesses the property (*dharma*) P"; the notion of 'possession' is expressed by the genitive or the locative case-ending or by the suffixes of possession, i.e., *-mat* and *-vat*, or even by the convention of elision of those suffixes (*matup-lopa*).

[proposition] a possesses Q.

[reason] Because a possesses P.

[similar ex.] It is observed that whatever possesses P possesses Q as, e.g., s.

[dissimilar ex.] It is observed that whatever does not possess Q does not possess P as, e.g., v.

We can translate the above formulae into the following standard symbolism, but it is impossible to convey the sense of 'it is observed that ...' without introducing some device of Modal Logic:

[proposition] Qa

[reason] Pa

[similar ex.] $(x)(Px \supset Qx) \ \& \ (Ex)((Px \ \& \ Qx) \ \& \ (x \neq a))$

[dissimilar ex.] $(x)(-Qx \supset -Px) \ \& \ (Ex)((-Px \ \& \ -Qx) \ \& \ (x \neq a))$

Based on his conviction that a valid proof should be formulated in the way discussed above, Dignāga criticizes what he regards as the wrong formulations of proof given by rival schools. For example, he picks up the following anonymous proof.²²

[proposition] *nityaḥ śabdaḥ* (Sound is eternal.)

[reason] *sarvasya anityatvāt* (Because everything is non-eternal.)

[Proof 3]

On first sight, the proposition and the reason of Proof 3 appear to be incompatible with each other (*viruddha*). However, if one takes into account that the topic of a proposition is not included in our Induction Domain in traditional Indian logic, Proof 3 makes sense when its reason is interpreted in the sense that everything except for sound (i.e., the topic of the proposition) is non-eternal. In this connection, Dignāga points out that the reason of Proof 3 does not really express the reason but actually expresses the dissimilar example. Then he proposes the following formulation:

[proposition] *nityaḥ śabdaḥ* (Sound is eternal.)

[reason] *(śabdasya) asarvatvāt* (Because sound is not everything.)

[dissimilar ex.] *sarvam anityam, yathā ghataḥ* (Everything is non-eternal as, e.g., a pot.)

[Proof 4]

²² NMu § 1.4, KATSURA 1977 and PS 3.6: *hetupratijñāvyāghāte prati-jñādoṣa ity asat / sa hi dṛṣṭānta evokto vaidharmyenāsusikṣitaiḥ* // Quoted in PVA 563,29.

Having criticized the above reason from various points of view, Dignāga proposes to re-formulate the dissimilar example by following the basic structure discussed above, namely, the absence of the property to be proved (i.e., *nityatva*) should be followed by the absence of the reason (*asarvatva*). Thus, we obtain the following formulation:

[proposition] *nityaḥ śabdaḥ* (Sound is eternal.)

[reason] (*śabdasya*) *asarvatvāt* (Because sound is not everything.)

[dissimilar ex.] *yad anityam tat sarvam, yathā ghataḥ* (Whatever is not eternal is everything as, e.g., a pot.)

[Proof 5]

Further, Dignāga criticizes the formulation of the following proof:²³

[proposition] *anityaḥ śabdaḥ*

[reason] *kṛtakasya anityatvāt, nityasya akṛtakatvāc ca*

[Proof 6]

According to Dignāga, this apparently correct proof should be re-formulated, for the two reasons mentioned in Proof 6 actually represent the similar and dissimilar examples. Thus we obtain the following formulation:

[proposition] *anityaḥ śabdaḥ*

[reason] *kṛtakatvāt*

[similar ex.] *yat kṛtakam tad anityam, yathā ghataḥ*

[dissimilar ex.] *yan nityam tad akṛtakam, yathākāśam*

[Proof 7]

²³ NMu § 2.8, KATSURA 1978. NMu v. 4: 説因宗所隨 宗無因不有 依第五顯喻 由合故知因 = PS 3.15: *hetoḥ sādhyānvayo yatrābhāve 'bhāvaś ca kathyate / pañcamyā tatra dr̥ṣṭānto hetus tūpanayān mataḥ* ||. (Quoted in PVA 647,15; cf. VNT 82,25-26)

Unlike Dignāga's theory of pervasion (*vyāpti*), which was on the whole accepted by the post-Dignāga Indian logicians whether they were Buddhist or not, Dignāga's rigid formulation of a logical proof does not seem to have gained much popularity. Most non-Buddhist logicians continued to adhere to the traditional five-membered proof formulation, while Dharmakīrti, as is well known, adopted a new proof formulation which consisted of the statements of the pervasion (*vyāpti*) and the reason's being a property of the topic of the proposition (*pakṣadharmatā*); just this formulation was adopted by the post-Dharmakīrti Buddhist logicians. Here is a sample of Dharmakīrti's formulation.

[*vyāpti*] *yat sat kṛtakam vā, tat sarvam anityam, yathā ghaṭādih*
 [*pakṣadharmatā*] *san kṛtako vā śabdaḥ*²⁴

[Proof 8]

3. In PS 4.3 and its Vṛtti Dignāga attempts to characterize the two examples by similarity (*sādharmya*) and dissimilarity (*vaidharmya*) or by implicative negation (*paryudāsa*) and simple negation (*prasaṅgya-pratiśedha*).

In [the presence of] the proving property (*sādhana*, i.e., the reason) the property to be proved (*sādhya*) should be presented affirmatively and [the reason should be shown to be] absent when the property to be proved is absent. Such being the case, the implicative negation (*paryudāsa*) [of the similar example] and the simple negation (*niśedha*) [of the dissimilar example] are of different characteristics.²⁵

²⁴ Cf. *Vādanyāya* of Dharmakīrti, ed. by M.T. Much, Vienna, 1991: 1.

²⁵ PS^K 4.3: *bsgrub bya bsgrub las sgrub pa yis || bstan bya bsgrub bya med la med || de lta yin na ma yin par || dgag pa msthan ñid mi mthun no ||* ('*vidhinā sādhanā sādhyam khyāpyam sādhye 'sati tv asat | evaṃ sati paryudāso niśedhaś ca vilakṣaṇau ||*). Cf. PSV^K 148a8-b3; PSV^V D60a6-7; KITAGAWA 1965: 513-4.

The first half of the verse repeats the same formulation of the two examples, i.e., *anvaya* and *vyatireka*, as presented in PS 4.2. When Dignāga refers to the two kinds of negation in the second half, he must have in mind the two kinds of examples in Proof 2 (given above) and the negative phrases, such as *a-nityam* in the similar example and *na anityam*, which is actually expressed as *nityam*, in consideration of the double negation, in the dissimilar example. According to Dignāga, the negative particle *a-* of *a-nityam* (non-eternal) in the similar example should be interpreted as an implicative negation (*paryudāsa*), so that the negation of eternal things (*nitya*) implies/affirms the existence of non-eternal (*anitya*) things. The negative particle *na* of *na anityam* (not non-eternal, i.e., eternal) in the dissimilar example, on the other hand, should be interpreted as a simple negation (*prasajyapraṭiṣedha*), so that the negation of non-eternal things does not imply/affirm the existence of eternal things, such as ether (*ākāśa*).

Thus Dignāga concludes that the dissimilar example of Proof 2 is meaningful even for those who do not acknowledge the existence of eternal things, such as the Sautrāntikas.²⁶ This implies that for Dignāga the dissimilar example does not necessarily need an objective support in reality, provided that there is an objective support for the similar example.

3.1. A question arises: Why are the two examples formulated in the way explained in PS 4.2 and 3? In other words, if a similar example is formulated by "The reason is followed by the property to

²⁶ PSV^K 148b2-3: *de lta na śna ma la ni ma yin pa yin la phyi ma la ni med par dgag pa yin no źes smras pa yin no || de ltar na rtag pa khas ma blaṅs kyaṅ chos mi mthun pa'i dpe grub pa yin no ||* ('*evaṃ ca pūrvatra paryudāsaḥ uttaratra tu prasajyapraṭiṣedha ity uktah | evaṃ ca nityān-abhyupagamasyāpi vaidharmyadr̥ṣṭāntaḥ siddhaḥ*). Cf. PSV^V D60a6-7, KITAGAWA 1965: 513-514.

be proved (*hetoh sādhyenānugamaḥ*)” or “ $Px \supset Qx$ ”, why is the dissimilar example formulated by “In the absence of the property to be proved the reason is absent (*sādhyābhāve hetor nāstitā*)” or “ $\neg Qx \supset \neg Px$ ”, not by “In the absence of the reason, the property to be proved is absent (*hetvabhāve sādhyasya nāstitā*)” or “ $\neg Px \supset \neg Qx$ ”? It is apparent that the law of contraposition was not known to the opponents, and it was perhaps Dignāga who for the first time among Indian logicians came to realize that such a law should be applied to the formulations of similar and dissimilar examples; unfortunately, however, he does not give either the name or definition of the law.

In any case, Dignāga answers to the above question: Only in that way, not in the reversed way (*na viparyayāt*), can we show that a reason under consideration possesses the second and the third characteristics of a valid reason, namely, “the reason’s presence in a set of similar instances only (*hetoh sapakṣa eva sattvam*)” and “its definite absence in the absence of the property to be proved (*sādhyābhāve cāsattvam eva*)”.²⁷ Here again we see the definitive role played by the restrictive particle *eva* in equating the *trairūpya* formula with the formulation of the two examples.

An objection arises: In that case an actual object like a pot cannot be regarded as a part of an example formulation because with ref-

²⁷ PSV^K 148b3-4: *gal te gcig la ni gtan tshigs bsgrub bya'i rjes su 'gro bar bśad la / gñis pa la ni bsgrub bya med na gtan tshigs med pa yin gyi gtan tshigs med na bsgrub bya med pa ma yin no zes bya ba la rgyu ci zig yod ce na / de lta na gtan tshigs mthun pa'i phyogs ñid la yod pa dan / bsgrub bya med pa la med pa ñid bstan par nus pa yin gyi bzlog pas ni ma yin no ||* (**kim punaḥ kāraṇam ekaṭra sādhyānugamo hetoh ukto dvitiye tu sādhyābhāve hetor nāstitā, na hetvabhāve sādhyasya nāstiteti / evaṃ hi hetoh sapakṣa eva sattvaṃ sādhyābhāve cāsattvam eva śakyam darśayitum na viparyayāt* /). The latter half is quoted in VNT 8,23-24. Cf. PSV^V D60a7-b1; KITAGAWA 1965: 514.

erence to an actual object we see that a reason is followed by a property to be proved and *vice versa*.

Dignāga rejects the objection: Just as in the statement of a reason a particular property, such as 'being a product', is not intended, similarly in the statement of an example a particular object, such as a pot, is not meant to be followed by a property to be proved, such as 'non-eternity'; thus, the objection is irrelevant. He further states that the main purpose in referring to a particular object like a pot is to indicate some positive support in external reality.²⁸

3.2. In PS 4.4 Dignāga points out what kind of undesirable consequences result if, as suggested by the above question, both similar and dissimilar examples are formulated in the same manner, namely, " $Px \supset Qx$ " and " $\neg Px \supset \neg Qx$ " or " $Qx \supset Px$ " and " $\neg Qx \supset \neg Px$ ".

In this connection, if [both similar and dissimilar examples are formulated] in the same way of concomitance, even if unmentioned [as a property to be proved], 'eternity' (*nityatā*) would be proved (*kṛta*) by means of the property of 'not being a product' (*akṛta-katva*), and the property of 'being a result' (*kāryatā*, i.e., a product) by means of the property of 'cessation' (*nāśitva*, i.e., non-eternity);

²⁸ PSV^K 148b4-6: 'on te de ltar na bum pa dper mi bya ste / de la ni ci ltar gtan tshigs bsgrub bya'i rjes su 'gro ba de bzin du / bsgrub bya yañ gtan tshigs kyi rjes su 'gro ba yin no ze na / ma yin te byas pa'i khyad par gtan tshigs su brjod par 'dod pa ma yin pa bzin du bum pa la bsgrub bya rjes su 'gro ba brjod pa ma yin pa'i phyir ro // phyi rol gyi don la bstan pa ni dpe la gtso bo yin no // ('evam tarhi ghaṭo 'nudāharaṇam / tatra hi yathā hetoḥ sādhyānugamas tathā sādhyasyāpi hetvanugama iti cet / na, kṛtakatvaviśeṣo 'vivakṣitahetur iva ghaṭe sādhyānugamasyāvivakṣitatvāt / bāhyārthapradarśanam hi nidarśye pradhānam /). Cf. PSV^V D60b1-3; KITAGAWA 1965: 514-515.

and [that which does] not pervade [the domain of the property to be proved] would not be accepted [as a valid reason].²⁹

He presupposes the following proof formulae which correspond to Hetucakra No. 2:

[proposition] *anityaḥ śabdaḥ*

[reason] *kṛtakatvāt*

[similar ex.] *yat kṛtakam tad anityam, yathā ghaṭaḥ*

[dissimilar ex.] *yan nityam tad akṛtakam, yathākāśam*

[Proof 8]

Dignāga points out that if the dissimilar example of Proof 8 were formulated in the reverse way as *yad akṛtatakam tan nityam*, then instead of ‘non-eternity’ (*anityatā*) ‘eternity’ would be proved by the property of ‘not being a product’, which is absurd. If, on the other hand, the similar example were formulated in the reverse way as *yad anityam tat kṛtakam*, then instead of ‘non-eternity’ the property of ‘being a product’ would be proved by ‘non-eternity’, which is absurd.³⁰

²⁹ *nityatākṛtakatvena, nāsitvād vātra kāryatā / syād anukṛtā kṛtāvyāpiny anīṣṭam ca samānvaye* // Quoted in VNT 8,24-26 with variant readings. Cf. NMu v.12: 應以非作證其常 或以無常成所作 若爾應成非所說 不遍非樂等合離.

³⁰ PSV^K 148b7-8: *gal te chos mthun pa'i dbaṅ gis gaṅ ma byas pa de rtag go ṣes brjod na / ma byas pa'i phyir dam ma bcas pa ṇid kyi rtag pa bsgrub par 'gyur ro // ci ste chos mi mthun pa'i dbaṅ gis gaṅ <mi> rtag pa de ni bya ba'o ṣes de ltar yaṅ brjod na / mi rtag pa'i phyir byas pa bsgrub par 'gyur ro // ('yadī sādharṃyavaśena yad akṛtakam tad anityam ity ucyate / akṛtakatvenāpratijñātam eva nityatvam sādhitam syāt / atha vaidharṃyavaśena yad anityam tat kṛtakam ity evam apy ucyate / anityatvena kṛtakatvam sādhitam syāt /)*. Cf. PSV^V D60b3-4; KITAGAWA 1965: 515.

Then he examines Hetucakra No. 8 whose 'reason' (*hetu*) does not pervade the whole domain of the property to be proved or the set of similar instances (*sapakṣa*), unlike in the above case. It runs as follows:

[proposition]	<i>anityaḥ śabdaḥ</i>
[reason]	<i>prayatnānantarīyakatvāt</i>
[similar ex.]	<i>yathā ghaṭo vidyuc ca</i>
[dissimilar ex.]	<i>yathākāśam</i>

[Proof 9]

Dignāga sees the problems that entail if two examples are not properly formulated. If a similar example is formulated as "Whatever is non-eternal is produced by human effort" (*anityaṃ prayatnānantarīyakam eva*) and a dissimilar example as "Whatever is not produced by human effort is eternal" (*aprayatnānantarīyakam nityam eva*), then one of the similar examples, i.e., lightning (*vidyut*), which is non-eternal but not produced by human effort, should be regarded as eternal, as well as being produced by human effort, which is absurd. In order to avoid such an absurd consequence, Dignāga suggests the following formulation:³¹

³¹ PSV^K 148b8-149a3: *ma khyab pa' la yañ rtsol ba las byuñ ba ñid kyi gtan tshigs la ñes pa 'di yod de | glog la sogs pa rnams rtag pa ñid dan | rtsol ba las byuñ ba ñid kyi ñes pa yod do || rtsol ba las byuñ ba ma yin pa ni rtag pa ñid yin la mi rtag pa yañ rtsol ba las byuñ ba ñid yin no 'zes gal te de latr ñes par gzuñ na skyon 'dir 'gyur ba yin na | gañ gi tshe rtsol ba las byuñ ba ma yin pa ñid ni rtag ces ñes par gzuñ ba yin gyi | rtsol ba las byuñ ba 'o 'zes ma yin pa de'i tshe ñes pa med pa yin te | de ltar na rtag pa ni rtsol ba las byuñ ba la med par brjod pa yin no || de bzin du mi rtag pa ñid ni rtsol ba las byuñ ba las 'zes bya ba ('avyāpiny api prayatnānantarīyakatve hetāv asty ayam doṣaḥ | vidyudādīnām nityatvaṃ prayatnānantarīyakatvaṃ ca prasajyata iti doṣo 'sti | asty ayam doṣaḥ yady evam avadhāryeta aprayatnānantarīyakam nityam evety anityaṃ ca prayatnānantarīyakam eveti | yadā tv evam avadhāryate apra-*
→

[proposition] *anityaḥ śabdah*

[reason] *prayatnānantarīyakatvāt*

[similar ex.] *anityam eva prayatnānantarīyakam, yathā ghaṭo vidyuc ca*

[dissimilar ex.] *aprayatnānantarīyakam eva nityam, yathākāśam*

[Proof 10]

An objection may arise: If the domain of the reason should be restricted to the domain of the property to be proved as in Hetucakra No. 8 (= Proof 10), then the other type of reason (in Hetucakra No. 2 = Proof 8), whose domain is co-extensive with that of the property to be proved, would not be a valid reason because there is no restriction of the reason (*hetvavadhāraṇa*). Dignāga answers by saying that the restriction (*avadhāraṇa*) is made in accordance with the speaker's intention (*vaktrabhiprāyavaśāt*); in other words, the speaker chooses which property is to be restricted, so that it can become a reason. So in Hetucakra No. 2, not the property of being non-eternal (*anityatva*), but the property of being a product (*kṛtakatva*) is chosen to be restricted as the valid reason, even though their domains are theoretically co-extensive.³²

Another objection: Just as non-eternity is inferred from the absence of the property of being produced by human effort (i.e., the reason)

yatnāntarīyakam eva nityam na prayatnāntarīyakam iti tadā nāsti kaścid doṣaḥ / evaṃ nityatvasya prayatnāntarīyake 'bhāva ukto bhavati / tathānityam eva prayatnāntarīyakam iti /. Cf. PSV^V D60b3-5; KITAGAWA 1965: 515-516.

³² PSV^K 149a3-4: 'dir / gal te yañ gtan tshigs ñes par gzuñ ba'i phyir don gzan med par 'gyur ba de lta na brjod pa po'i bsaṃ pa'i dbaṅ gis ñes par bzuñ ba'i phyir </> rtsol ba las byuñ ba ñid la rtag pa ñid med par brjod do ze na / ('atra yady api hetvavadhāraṇāt hetvantarābhāvaḥ prāptaḥ / tathāpi vaktrabhiprāyavaśād avadhāraṇam tasmāt prayatnāntarīyakatvasyaiva nitye 'bhāva ucyate /). No corresponding PSV^V; cf. KITAGAWA 1965: 516.

in eternal things (i.e., a set of dissimilar instances), similarly the property of not being produced by human effort can be inferred from the absence of eternity in those which are produced by human effort, which is absurd because the unintended proposition would be proved as a result. Dignāga points out that in order to avoid such confusion we should formulate the dissimilar example in the form of absence of the reason only (*eva*) in the absence of the property to be proved (*hetor eva sādhyābhāve 'bhāvaḥ*).³³

4. Enough for the proper formulation of example statements. Now Dignāga discusses the important topic of whether we really need both similar and dissimilar examples in one proof.

A question arises: If the dissimilar example is formulated by means of the absolute absence of the reason in the absence of the property to be proved (*sādhyābhāve hetor abhāva eva*), then there is no error at all in the similar example, such as "Whatever is produced by human effort is non-eternal" (*anityam eva prayatnānantarīyakam*), which implies that there is no need to formulate a similar example, as long as a dissimilar example is properly formulated.

To this Dignāga answers: If so, the notorious erroneous reason called 'unique and inconclusive' (*asādhāraṇānaikāntika*) would

³³ PSV^K 149a4-6: *mi mthun pa bkod pa yin te | de lta na yin na ji ltar rtag pa la rtsol las byuñ ba med pa'i phyir mi rtag pa ñid rjes su dpog pa de bzin du rtsol ba las byuñ ba <la> rtag pa ñid med pa'i phyir rtsol ba las ma byuñ ba rjes su dpog pa'i phyir dam ma bca' ba bsgrub pa de ñid yin no || de'i phyir gtan tshigs kho na bsgrub bya med pa la med par bstan par bya'o ||* (*viśamopanyāsaḥ | tathā hi yathā nitye prayatnānantarīyakatvābhāvād anityatvānumānam evaṃ prayatnānantarīyake nityatvābhāvād aprayatnānantarīyakatvānumānam iti tad evāpratijñātārthasādhanaṃ | tasmād dhetor eva sādhyābhāve 'bhāva upadarśyaḥ*). No corresponding PSV^V; cf. KITAGAWA 1965: 516.

become a valid reason. For example, the following is an example of a proof based on the unique and inconclusive reason:

[proposition] *nityaḥ śabdaḥ* (Sound is eternal.)

[reason] *śrāvaṇatvāt* (Because it is audible.)

[Proof 11]

Since the reason ‘audibility’ is the unique property of sound, the topic of the proposition, it is regarded as ‘unique’ to sound, or as not being a property of either the eternal or non-eternal – with the exception of sound – things in the world. Therefore, it is traditionally considered to be an inconclusive reason. Although it does not possess the second characteristic of a valid reason (*anvaya*), it certainly possesses the third characteristic (*vyatireka*), for it is true that whatever is not eternal is not audible, and there are many instances of things that are neither eternal nor audible, such as a pot. In fact we can formulate a dissimilar example for Proof 11, namely, “Whatever is not eternal is not audible, as, e.g., a pot” (*yad anityam tad aśrāvaṇam, yathā ghaṭaḥ*), though we cannot formulate a similar example, namely, “Whatever is audible is eternal” (*yac chrāvaṇam tan nityam*), that is applied with an actual example. Now if, as the opponent argues, there is no need for a similar example as long as a dissimilar example is properly formulated, then we have a problem; for the unique and inconclusive reason, such as ‘audibility’, should be a valid reason, which is absurd.³⁴ In other

³⁴ PSV^K 149a6-7: ‘on te ‘dir bsgrub bya med na med pa ñid ñe bar bstan na / mi rtag pa ñid ni rtsol ba las byuñ ba’o źes bya ba ‘di la ñes pa ci źig yod ce na / dper na rtag pa ñid ni mñan par bya ba yin te / mi rtag pa la med pa’i phyir thun moñ ma yin pa yañ rtag pa ñid la gtan tshigs su ‘gyur ro || (*atheha sādhyābhāve ‘bhāva evopadarśitaḥ | anityam eva prayatnānatariyakam iti atra hi na kaścid doṣa iti cet | yathā nityam eva śrāvaṇam, vinaśvare ‘bhāvād asādhāraṇam api nityatve hetuḥ syāt /). No corresponding PSV^V; cf. KITAGAWA 1965: 516-517.

words, in order to avoid such an undesirable consequence, we should be able to formulate both similar and dissimilar examples.

The opponent counters: Usually we can deduce a similar example from a dissimilar example by means of 'implication' (*arthāpatti*); for example, from "Whatever is not non-eternal is not produced by human effort" we obtain: "Whatever is produced by human effort is non-eternal." However, this is not the case with a unique and inconclusive reason, for from "Whatever is not eternal is not audible" we cannot obtain "Whatever is audible is eternal" because there is nothing in the world that is both audible and non-eternal except for sound; in other words there is no external support.

Dignāga answers: We also admit that by means of implication (*arthāpatti*) we obtain both examples; or either one of the two examples can indicate both by means of implication.³⁵ Dignāga still holds his position that the two examples are necessary, though they are not necessarily explicitly stated; either one of them can imply the other, or both.

³⁵ PSV^K 149a7-b1: *gal te ñes pa 'di med de dper na mi rtag pa ñid ni rtsol ba las byuñ ba'o zes bya ba 'dir śugs kyis bsgrub bya <mi> rtag pa la sgrub pa rñed pa ñid yin pa de ltar rtag pa ñid ni mñan par bya'o zes rtag pa la mñan par bya ba ñid bstan par ni nus pa ma yin no ze na | gal te śugs kyis gñi ga rñed pa yin na de kho bo cag mñon par 'dod pa ñid yin te śugs kyis sam gañ yañ ruñ bas gñi ga rab tu bstan pa'i phyir ro ||* ('*naiṣa doṣaḥ | yathānityam eva prayatnānantarīyakam ity atra arthāpat-tyā sādhye 'nitye sādhanam labdham bhavati, evam nityam eva śrāvaṇam iti nitye śrāvaṇatvaṃ darśayitum na śakyata iti cet | yadi tarhy arthāpat-tyobhayaṃ labdham tad asmābhir anujñātam eva, arthāpattyā vā anyatareṇobhayapradarśanāt ||*). The last phrase corresponds to NMu (KATSURA 1981: 72) 或由義准一能顯二, which is quoted in *Pramāṇa-vārttika-Svavṛtti* (ed. by RANIERO GNOLI, Roma 1960): 18,17. No corresponding PSV^V; cf. KITAGAWA 1965: 517.

So far Dignāga has insisted on the necessity of a similar example in addition to a dissimilar example; now he argues for the necessity of a dissimilar example. An opponent points out: if ‘pervasion’ (*vyāpti*) is expressed in the form of the reason’s being followed by the property to be proved (*hetoḥ sādhyānugamaḥ*), then it is not necessary to state its absence in the absence of the property to be proved (*sādhyābhāve nāstitā*); hence there is no necessity to formulate a dissimilar example. Note that Dignāga uses the word ‘pervasion’ for the first time in a technical sense in this particular portion of PSV.³⁶

The opponent further remarks that it may be meaningful to formulate a dissimilar example, provided that the mere existence of the reason in a set of similar instances (*sapakṣe hetoḥ sadbhāvamātram*) is intended by Dignāga in the formulation of a similar example; in that case, however, it is meaningless to refer to an external object as an actual example; consequently, ‘pervasion’ should be expressed in a similar example.³⁷

³⁶ PSV^K 149b1-2: *gal te gtan tshigs bsgrub bya'i rjes su 'gro ba khyab pa rab tu bstan par bya ba yin na | de ni mi rtag pa las gzan la med pa'i phyir bsgrub bya med na med do zes brjod par mi bya ba dan | ('yadi tu hetoḥ sādhyānugama vyāptiḥ darsitāḥ, tasyānityād anyatrābhāvāt, sādhyābhāve ca nāstiteti na vaktavyam |)*. Cf. PSV^V D60b5-6: KITAGAWA 1965: 517.

³⁷ PSV^K 149b2-4: *ci ste yod pa tsam yin na rtsol ba las byun ba ñid kyan med na bum pa'i <mi> rtag pa ñid kyan med pa'i phyir phyi rol gyi don la bltos pa 'di ni dpe yin no || zes brjod par mi bya'o zes bya ba'i ñes pa 'di ni yod do (že na)^a | khyab pa ñid kyi gtañ tshigs ni bsgrub bya'i rjes su 'gro bar brjod par bya ste | ('atha sadbhāvamātram, prayatnānantarī-yakatvenāpi ghaṭe 'nityatvasyāpy avinābhāvitvāt, bāhyārthāpekṣam idaṃ nidarśanam iti na vaktavyam ity asty eṣa doṣa iti | vyāptir eva hetoḥ sādhyānugamena vaktavyā |)*.

^a Following PST *že na* should be deleted. Cf. PSV^V D60b6; KITAGAWA 1965: 517.

In this connection, Dignāga seems to accept the opponent's criticism. Namely, he admits that when a pervasion is explicitly expressed in a similar example, the reason's absence in the absence of the property to be proved is shown by implication (*arthāpattyā*), which makes it unnecessary to formulate a dissimilar example. However, he also maintains that when two examples are to be formulated, a similar example shows the reason's mere presence in a set of similar instances, while a dissimilar example shows a pervasion (*vyāpti*) in the form of the reason's absence in the absence of the property to be proved.³⁸ Dignāga seems to be conceding that it is not absolutely necessary to formulate both examples as long as the pervasion is expressed in one of the two examples.

An objection arises: If it is enough for a similar example to state the reason's mere presence in a set of similar instances, then there is no need to define it in terms of the reason's being followed by the property to be proved (*sādhyenānugamo hetoḥ*) as in PS 4.2a. It is to be noted that *anugama* is equivalent to *vyāpti* in this context. To this Dignāga replies: The purpose of formulating a similar example in that way is to reject the reversed formulation, namely, the property to be proved being followed by the reason (*sādhyasya hetunānugamaḥ*).³⁹

³⁸ PSV^K 149b4-5: *gnas skabs 'di la śugs űid kyis bsgrub bya med pa la gtan tshigs med par bstan pa'i phyir chos mi mthun pa'i dpe sbyar bar mi bya'o || gañ gi tshe dpe gñi ga sbyar bar bya ba de'i tshe mthun pa'i phyogs la yod pa tsam bstan par bya ba yin la | khyab pa ni bsgrub bya med na med pa ston pas yin no ||* (*asyāṃ cāvasthāyām arthāpattyā sādhyābhāve hetor abhāvaḥ pradārśita iti vaidharmyadr̥ṣṭānto na prayoktavyaḥ | yadā tu dr̥ṣṭāntadvayaṃ prayoktavyaṃ tadā sapakṣe sanmātram pradārśyam, vyāpteḥ sādhyābhāve 'bhāvena pradārśitatvāt*). Cf. PSV^V D60b6-61a1; KITAGAWA 1965: 517-518.

³⁹ PSV^K 149b5-6: *'on te de ltar na gtan tshigs bsgrub bya'i rjes su 'gro ba ni chos mthun pas rab tu stan to źes bya ba 'di brjod par bya ba ma*
→

In order to justify the rejection of the reversed formulation, Dignāga presents a rather complicated argument. First he refers back to PS 3.22 where he defined the valid reason (*hetu*).

Of the [nine reasons mentioned in PS 3.21]⁴⁰ the valid reason is that which is either present [wholly] or in two ways [i.e., present and absent] in the similar instances (*sajātīya*) and which is absent in the absence of the [similar instances]; the reversed is the ‘incompatible’ (*viruddha*) [reason] and the rest comprise the ‘indeterminate’ (*aniścita*) [reason].⁴¹

As is well known, of the nine types of reasons in his Hetucakra, Dignāga accepts only two as valid, namely, No. 2 ‘the property of being produced’ (*kṛtakatva*) and No. 8 ‘the property of being produced by human effort’ (*yatnaja*). The difference between the two valid reasons lies in the fact that the former pervades the whole domain of similar instances (*sapakṣa*), while the latter is present only in part of it. He then points out that in order to include the latter under the valid reason, the second characteristic of a valid reason should be restricted in the following manner: “It is present only in the similar instances” (*sajātīya eva san*). He also notes that the two example statements present the second and the third characteristics of a valid reason (*anvaya* and *vyatireka*), while the reason

yin no ze na / 'di yañ bsgrub bya gtan tshigs kyi rjes su 'gro ba bkag pa'i don du 'gyur ro // ('na tarhi vaktavyam idaṃ hetoḥ sādhyānugamaḥ sādharmaṇa pradarśita iti / etat punaḥ sādhyasya hetunānugamapratiṣedhārthaṃ syāt /). Cf. PSV^V D61a1; KITAGAWA 1965: 518.

⁴⁰ *prameyakṛtakānityakṛtaśrāvaṇayatnajāḥ / anityayatnajāsparsā nityatvādiṣu te nava // (= NMu v. 6: 所量作無常 作性聞勇發 無常勇無觸 依常性等九). Quoted in NVTṬ 247,8-9.*

⁴¹ *tatra yaḥ san sajātīye dvedhā(/dvidhā) cāsaṃs tadatyaye / sa hetur vi-parīto 'smād viruddho 'nyas tv aniścitaḥ // (= NMu v. 7: 於同有及二 在異無是因 翻此名相違 所餘皆不定). Quoted in NVTṬ 247,1-2.*

statement presents the first characteristic, i.e., the reason's being a property of the topic of a proposition (*pakṣadharmatva*).⁴²

Now by rejecting the reversed formulation of a similar example, Dignāga seems to think that a reason is properly restricted to the domain of a property to be proved and, consequently, that the second characteristic of a valid reason is shown by a similar example. Therefore, it is meaningful to formulate a similar example. The above remark has been made in order to include Hetucakra No. 8 as a valid reason, for the reversed formulation of a similar example is possible at least theoretically in the case of Hetucakra No. 2.

Now an objection may arise. If a reason is present only in the similar instances (*sajātīya eva san*), one can naturally assume that it is absent in the dissimilar instances (*vijātīye 'sattvam*); hence, there is no need to mention 'absent in the absence of the [similar instances]' (*asams tadatyaye*) in PS 3.22b. Dignāga argues that such a formulation has the purpose of restricting in such a way that a valid reason is absent only in the absence (*atyaya*) of the similar instances but not in dissimilar (*vijātīya*) items in general. Similarly in the dissimilar example, a valid reason is absent only in the absence of a property to be proved but not in different (*anya*) or dissimilar items.⁴³ Therefore, it is meaningful to formulate the dissimi-

⁴² PSV^K 149b6-8: 'on te bkag pa ni don med pa yin te </ ma yin te /> mthun pa'i phyogs la yañ rnam pa gñis źes brjod pa'i phyir ro || phyogs kyi chos ni gtan tshigs kyis brjod pa'i phyir 'dir ni gtan tshigs lhag ma bstan par bya ba yin te | de la gdon mi za bar rigs mthun pa kho na la yod źes ńes par gzuñ bar bya'o (źe na) | ('atha nārthas tatpratiśedhe, na, san dvidhā ceti vacanāt | hetuśeśaś cātra pradarśitavyaḥ pakṣadharmatvasya hetunaivoktatvāt | tatrāvaśyaṃ sajātīya eva sann ity avadhāryam eva). Cf. PSV^V D61a1-2; KITAGAWA 1965: 518.

⁴³ PSV^K 149b8-150a2: de ltar na rigs mthun pa ńid la yod ces bya bas bsgrub bya'i rjes su 'gro ba kho na gtan tshigs so źes ńes par bzuñ ba na | rigs mi mthun pa la yod pa dgag pa thob pas ńes pa'i don du 'gyur
→

lar example, even when it can be assumed from the similar example.

The same line of arguments can be found in PSV ad PS 2.5cd when Dignāga presents the theory of *trairūpya*, where he justifies the formulation of the third characteristic of a proper reason apart from that of the second characteristic.⁴⁴ In this context, he gives other instances of the same type of arguments from PSV chapters 3 and 4.⁴⁵ Having made a few more remarks,⁴⁶ Dignāga gives his final answer with respect to why it is necessary to formulate both similar and dissimilar examples.

te | ji ltar de dan bral ba la med pa ni de dan bral ba ñid la med pa yin gyi rigs mi mthun pa la ma yin la | bdag med pa la sogs pa la ma yin pa de bzin du 'dir yan bsgrub bya med pa kho na la med pa yin gyi | gzan pa la ma yin rigs mthun pa la yan ma yin no || ('tarhi sajātiya eva sann iti sādhyenānugama eva hetor iti avadhāraṇe vijātiye sattvapraṭiṣedhaprāp-tir iti niyamārthaḥ syād yathā tadatyaya evāsan na vijātiye 'nātmādau tatthehāpi sādhyābhāva evābhāvo nānyatra nāpi vijātiye). Cf. PSV^V D61a3-5; KITAGAWA 1965: 518-519.

⁴⁴ See KATSURA 2000.

⁴⁵ PSV^K 150a3-4: *rigs mi mthun pa'i bsgrub bya la rjes su 'gro ba yod na | 'gal ba la 'am mi 'gal ba la yod pas don du ma sgrub par byed pa'i gtan tshigs 'gal ba'i gtan tshigs ñid du bzad pa yin no || gañ yan chos mthun pa tsam gyis brjod pa la ma ñes par thal bar 'gyur ro zes 'chad par 'gyur ba de la lus can ma yin pa ñid ni rtag pa med pa la yan yod pa'i phyir zes bstan par bya ba yin gyi | gzan pa dan 'gal ba ñid med <la yod> pa'i phyir zes ni ma yin no || ('vijātiye tu sādhyānugame sati viruddhe 'viruddhe vā sattvād anekārthasādhanaśya hetutā viruddhahe-tutā vyākhyātā | yadāpi sādharmaṃyāmātroktāṃ anaikāntikaḥ syād iti vakṣyati tatra amūrtatvasya nityābhāve 'pi sadbhāvād iti pradarśyate, na tv anyatra viruddhe vā sadbhāvād iti). Cf. PSV^V D61a4-5; KITAGAWA 1965: 519.*

⁴⁶ PSV^K 150a4-8; PSV^V D61a5-7; KITAGAWA 1965: 519-520.

Here a question arises: Are the two forms of the examples together regarded as a proving statement (*sādhana*vacana), or either one of them as in the case of the statement of the reason? – isn't there only one reason in one proof? Dignāga replies: Both forms together are regarded as a proving statement. Otherwise,⁴⁷

If [it were allowed that] either one or both [of the examples] were not mentioned [in a proof], even 'common' (*sādhāraṇa*), 'specific' (*viśiṣṭa* = *asādhāraṇa*), or 'incompatible' (*viruddha*) [reasons] would be regarded as a valid reason (*sādhana*) [, which is absurd]. Therefore, the examples [in a proof] should be two.⁴⁸ (PS 4.5)

(1) If a similar [example] only were stated, then [a reason might be] present even in the absence of a property to be proven (i.e., in the dissimilar instances); consequently, a common [and uncertain (*sādhāraṇānaikāntika*) reason] would be suspected of being a valid reason. Or (2) if a dissimilar [example only] were stated, then [a reason might be] absent even in the domain similar to what is to be proved (i.e., in the similar instances); consequently, an uncommon [and inconclusive (*asādhāraṇānaikāntika*) reason] would be [regarded as a valid reason]. (3) If neither of the two [examples] were stated, then [a reason might be] absent in the similar instances and present in [its] absence [i.e., in the dissimilar instances]; consequently, an incompatible (*viruddha*) [reason] would be [regarded as a valid reason]. Therefore, both [examples] should be stated as

⁴⁷ PSV^K 150a8-b1: 'on te ci dpe rnam pa gñis kyis tshig sgrub byed yin ni / ci ste gtan tshigs bžin du gañ yañ ruñ ba ñid yin že na / rnam pa gñi ga yin no žes brjod de / gžan du na ... Cf. PSV^V D61b1-2; KITAGAWA 1965: 520.

⁴⁸ PS^K 4.5: re re 'am gñi ga ma brjod pa'i || thun moñ ba dan khyad par can || 'gal ba ñid kyañ sgrub byed 'gyur || de phyir dpe ni gñis yin no || Cf. PS^V thun moñ dan ni khyad par ñid || 'gal ba'an sgrub byed ñid du 'gyur || re rer gñis ka ma brjod na || des na dper brjod gñis su bya ||. KITAGAWA 1965: 520.

the countermeasures (*pratipakṣa*) to such [pseudo-reasons] as ‘incompatible’ and ‘inconclusive’.⁴⁹

To some [opponent], if one [of the two examples] is known, then even one [example which is unknown to him], being stated, is regarded as a member of proof (*sādhana*).

Or, just as in the case of verbal cognition (*śābda*), if both [*anvaya* and *vyatireka*]⁵⁰ are known [to both parties], either one of the two [examples] will indicate both by implication (*arthāpattyā*); consequently, there is no need to state both.⁵¹

Dignāga justifies his position by saying that unless two examples are formulated, pseudo-reasons such as ‘incompatible’ and ‘inconclusive’ (both common and unique) could be regarded as valid reasons. As a matter of fact, in *Hetucakra* he mentions both kinds of examples for each of the nine reasons. However, Dignāga admits a couple of exceptional cases. Namely, when one of the examples is well known to the opponent, it is enough to state the other; and

⁴⁹ PSV^K150b2-4: *gal te chos mthun pa kho nas brjod na de'i phyir bsgrub bya med pa la yañ 'gyur bas thun moñ ba ñid gtan tshigs su dog pa yin no || ci ste chos mi mthun pa ñid kyi brjod na de'i phyir bsgrub bya'i rigs la yañ med pa'i phyir thun moñ ma yin pa ñid 'gyur ro || gal te gñi ga ma brjod na de'i phyir rigs mthun pa la med par 'gyur la med pa la yod par 'gyur ba'i phyir 'gal ba ñid du 'gyur ro || de'i phyir gdon mi za bar 'gal ba dañ / ma ñes pa'i gñen por gñi ga yañ brjod par bya'o ||*. KITAGAWA 1965: 520-521; cf. PSV^V D61b2-4; cf. PVS^V 11,7-8: *eṣa tāvan nyāyo yad ubhayaṃ vaktavyaṃ viruddhānaikāntikapratipakṣeṇa* / = NMu § 5.4, KATSURA 1981.

⁵⁰ Cf. PSV. ad PS 2.4; KITAGAWA 1965: 87-88 and PST D89b2.

⁵¹ PSV^K 150b4-5: *gañ zig la cuñ zad rab tu grub pa yin pa'i phyir gañ yañ ruñ ba brjod pa yañ sgrub byed yin no || sgra kho na la* (read *sgra bzin du* = PSV^V) *don gñis rtogs pa'i phyir ram / gañ yañ ruñ bas śugs kyis gñi ga bstan pa'i phyir gñi ga brjod par mi bya'o ||* Cf. PSV^V D61b4-5; KITAGAWA 1965: 521; cf. PVS^V 18,17: *arthāpattyā vānyatare-ñobhayapradarśanāt* = NMu § 5.4, KATSURA 1981.

when both examples are well known, it is enough to state either one of them. Of course, this is a practical decision, and theoretically speaking, Dignāga insists on the necessity of the two examples. It may be interesting to note in passing that such a practical solution is already mentioned in NMu.

As I have discussed elsewhere, Dignāga was aware of the logical equivalence of *anvaya* and *vyatireka* with *eva*-restriction; consequently, he could have said that one example, being properly formulated, could indicate both by implication (*arthāpattyā*). Nonetheless, he held to the necessity of the formulation of two examples in one proof. I take it that this attitude of Dignāga's reflects the inductive nature of his system of logic. He wanted to have both similar and dissimilar examples in our world of experience (or the induction domain) in order to induce the general proposition of pervasion (*vyāpti*).

5. In PSV chapter 4, verse 6, which I discussed at the beginning of this paper, comes next. In the rest of *svamata* section Dignāga deals with the following topics:

- (i) It is necessary to formulate the 'example' separately from the 'reason' but the formulations of the two should not be unrelated.⁵²
- (ii) Dignāga criticizes the ill-formed proof formulae commonly used by his contemporaries who adopt the Nyāya definition of the reason (NSū 1.1.34 & 35: *udāharaṇasādharmyāt sādhyasādhanam hetuḥ, tathā vaidharmyāt*).⁵³

⁵² PS & PSV 4.7-8 (K151a2-7; V62a2-5); KITAGAWA 1965: 522-523.

⁵³ PS & PSV 4.9-10 (K151a7-b4; V62a5-b3); KITAGAWA 1965: 523-525.

(iii) Further, he points out that the mere statement of an actual example without reference to a general law of pervasion will require further examples *ad infinitum*.⁵⁴

(iv) Dignāga recognizes ten types of pseudo-examples, which become the standard classification among later Buddhist logicians. With reference to a similar example, (1) one which lacks a reason (*sādhanavikala*), (2) one which lacks a property to be proved (*sādhyavikala*), (3) one which lacks both (*ubhayavikala*), (4) one in which the positive concomitance is stated in a reverse way (*viparī-tānvaya*), and (5) one in which it is not stated at all (*anavaya*).

Similarly with reference to a dissimilar example, (1) one which lacks a reason, (2) one which lacks a property to be proved, (3) one which lacks both, (4) one in which the negative concomitance is stated in a reverse way (*viparītavyatireka*), and (5) one in which it is not stated at all (*avyatireka*).⁵⁵

6. In conclusion I would like to point out the following:

(1) Dignāga recognizes two senses of the term *dr̥ṣṭānta*, namely, an example object (*artha*) and an example statement (*vacana*).

(2) He recognizes two kinds of examples: 'similar' (*sādharmya-dr̥ṣṭānta*) and 'dissimilar' (*vaidharmya-dr̥ṣṭānta*). The former as an object exhibits the presence of both the property to be proved (*sādhyadharma*) and the proving property (*sādhanadharma* or *hetu*), while the latter exhibits the absence of both properties. The former as a statement is formulated in the form of the positive concomitance (*anvaya*), i.e., the presence of the proving property is

⁵⁴ PS & PSV 4. 11-12 (K151b4-152a5; V62b3-63a3); KITAGAWA 1965: 525-527; cf. NMu v. 14: 若因唯所立 或差別相類 譬喻應無窮及遮遣異品.

⁵⁵ PS & PSV 4.13-14 (K152a5-b5; V63a3-b1); KITAGAWA 1965: 527-529.

followed by the presence of the property to be proved, and the latter in the form of the negative concomitance (*vyatireka*), i.e., the absence of the property to be proved is followed by the absence of the proving property.

(3) The two statements of examples are logically equivalent like the second and the third characteristics (*anvaya-vyatireka*) of a valid inferential mark (*liṅga*) with *eva*-restriction. Consequently, theoretically speaking, there is no need to formulate the two examples in one proof as other Indian logicians do. However, Dignāga insists on the necessity of presenting the two examples in one proof, which seems to indicate the inductive nature of his system of logic.

(4) Dignāga is greatly concerned with the proper formulation of a proof, especially that of the example and criticizes the proof formulae of other contemporary logicians.

(5) Finally the role of the two examples in Dignāga's logic is to present respectively the positive and the negative concomitances (*anvaya-vyatireka*) of a valid inferential mark and, hence, to reveal the relation (*sambandha*), which is called *avinābhāva* or *vyāpti*, between a proving property and a property to be proved. It is Dignāga who for the first time in the history of Indian logic succeeded in formally defining this relation by employing the restrictive power of the particle *eva*, which he inherited from Indian Grammarians.

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