


THE APOHA THEORY OF DIGNĀGA

Shoryu Katsura

In the Fifth Chapter of the P(ramāṇa)S(amuccaya) Dignāga presents the theory of *anyāpoha* (exclusion of others) which may be regarded as his most original contribution to Indian logic¹. Dignāga declares in the introductory verse (K. 1) that verbal cognition (*śabda*) is nothing but inference (*anumāna*) because both of them function on the principle of *anyāpoha*. He refutes four possible candidates for the meaning of a word (*śabdārtha*), viz. (i) an individual (*bheda*), (ii) a universal (*jati*), (iii) a relation (*sambandha*) between them and (iv) a thing possessing a universal (*jatimat / tadvat*), and concludes that the meaning of a word is *anyāpoha* (KK. 2-11). Here he inserts two summarizing verses (KK. 12 & 13)². He then deals with the relation of co-reference (*samānadhikaraṇya*) and that of qualifier-qualificand (*viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāva*) with regard to compound expressions such as 'nilotpala' (a blue lotus) (KK. 14-25ab). Next he gives a detailed account of the *apoha* theory, with special emphasis on the scope of 'exclusion' (KK. 25cd-38). He also criticizes the Sāṃkhya position (KK. 39-45) and discusses the meaning of a sentence (*vākyārtha*) (KK. 46-49). In the final verse (K. 50) he takes up a few additional topics and concludes that the other so-called *pramāṇas*, i. e., *upamāna* and so on, should be regarded as inference.

The aim of this paper is to present the essence of Dignāga's theory of *anyāpoha* discussed in PS, V, KK. 25cd-38. Dignāga's discussion centers upon the question of what is excluded by a word, that is, what is meant by the word *anya* of *anyāpoha*. In this connection, he seems to be presupposing the following Vaiśeṣika-like hierarchy of words or universals³.

Before discussing what is excluded, Dignāga explains three cases where there is no exclusion. (i) Two synonyms (*paryayaśabda*), say 'vrkṣa' and 'taru' (both meaning 'tree'), do not exclude each other's meaning, for they by definition have the same meaning⁴. (ii) The word 'vrkṣa' does not exclude the meaning of the universal word (*samānyaśabda / jatiśabda*)⁵, 'pārthiva' (made of the earth ele-



ment), to which it belongs, for the two words are not incompatible (*avirodhin*) with each other. The word 'vrkṣa' rather encompasses and engenders definite understanding (*niścaya*) of the meanings of 'pārthiva,' 'dravya' (substance), 'sat' (existent), etc.; if something is called 'tree,' it must be made of the earth element a substance, existent, and so on. Generally speaking,

A UNIVERSAL WORD OF LOWER ORDER DOES NOT EXCLUDE BUT ENCOMPASSES THE MEANINGS OF UNIVERSAL WORDS OF HIGHER ORDER WITH WHICH THE FORMER HAS AN INVARIABLE RELATION (*avyabhicarin*)⁶.....Rule I⁷.

(iii) The word 'sat' neither excludes nor encompasses the meanings of 'dravya,' 'pārthiva,' 'vrkṣa,' etc., for it awakens expectation (*ākāṅkṣa*) of determining which particular (*bheda*) it actually refers to—whether something called 'existent' is, for instance, a substance or a quality (*guṇa*) or an action (*karman*)—or it raises doubt (*sandeha*) as to which particular it refers to. Generally speaking,

A UNIVERSAL WORD OF HIGHER ORDER NEITHER EXCLUDES NOR ENCOMPASSES THE MEANINGS OF UNIVERSAL WORDS OF LOWER ORDERRule II⁸.

Now let us see how Dignāga explains what is excluded by a word. It is to be noted that Dignāga recognizes two types of *apoha*, viz. direct and indirect *apoha*. (i) The word 'vrkṣa' directly excludes the meanings of the word 'ghaṭa' (a pot), etc., which share the same universal of 'being made of the earth

element' (*parthivatva*) with '*vrkṣa*,' for '*vrkṣa*' is not compatible (*virōdhi*) with them in respect of that common universal—once something made of the earth element is called 'tree', it cannot be a pot, etc. Generally speaking,

TWO UNIVERSAL WORDS OF THE SAME ORDER EXCLUDE EACH OTHER'S MEANING.....Rule III⁹).

(ii) The word '*vrkṣa*' indirectly excludes the meaning of the word '*āpya*' (made of the water element), for '*vrkṣa*' encompasses the meaning of '*parthiva*' (Rule I) which in turn excludes the meaning of '*āpya*' (Rule III). Generally speaking,

A UNIVERSAL WORD OF LOWER ORDER EXCLUDES WHATEVER IS DIRECTLY EXCLUDED BY UNIVERSAL WORDS OF HIGHER ORDER WITH WHICH THE FORMER HAS AN INVARIABLE RELATIONRule IV¹⁰. In order to exhaust all the possible relationships between two universal words, Dignāga mentions a third case: (iii) the word '*parthiva*' disregards the meaning of the word '*rāpa*' (color), for '*parthiva*' indirectly excludes the meaning of '*guṇa*' (Rule IV) which in turn neither excludes nor encompasses the meaning of '*rāpa*' (Rule II). Generally speaking,

A UNIVERSAL WORD OF LOWER ORDER DISREGARDS THAT WHICH BELONGS TO WHATEVER IS DIRECTLY EXCLUDED BY UNIVERSAL WORDS OF HIGHER ORDER WITH WHICH THE FORMER HAS AN INVARIABLE RELATION.....Rule V¹¹).

In brief, a given word excludes the meanings of words which share the same universal with it and it indirectly excludes whatever is directly excluded by words of higher order, thus engendering definite understanding of their meanings, and it awakens expectation or raises doubt about the meanings of words of lower order. In the remaining space, I would like to mention a few interesting points found in this section of PS, V, and not explicitly discussed in previous studies of Dignāga's theory of *anyāpoha*,

(i) The expression '*sāmānādhikarāṇya*' has two distinct meanings, viz. the relation of referring to the same thing and the relation of having the same locus¹²). Although Dignāga normally employs the expression in the first meaning, he does recognize the second meaning in PS, V, K. 30.

(ii) G. Cardona has shown that the Indian grammarians determine the constant co-occurrence of a word—he calls it a linguistic item—and a meaning by *anvaya* and *vyatireka*¹³). He quotes Kaiyaṭa's formulation: '[*Anvaya*:] the understanding of a meaning when there is an item; [*vyatireka*:] the non-understanding of a meaning when an item is absent'. (pp. 337-8) A similar account of *anvaya* and *vyatireka* is given by Dignāga in PS, V, K. 34 and Vṛtti. Dignāga considers that *anvaya* and *vyatireka* are the two means of a word to express its meaning, and he defines them respectively as 'employment in similar cases' (*tulye vṛttiḥ*) and 'non-employment in dissimilar cases' (*atulye vṛttiḥ*)¹⁴). In other words, *anvaya* is the employment of a word when a meaning is intended, and *vyatireka* is the non-employment of a word when a meaning is not intended. The difference between Dignāga's formulation and the grammarians' is due to the fact that the former is made from the point of view of the speaker, while the latter is made from that of the listener.

(iii) A universal, say *rāpatva* (coloriness), is generally believed to be a ground for applying (*pravṛttinimitta*) a word, say '*rāpa*', to those which are supposed to possess that universal, e. g. blue, yellow, etc. Dignāga rejects this view and concludes that we employ a certain word for a certain group of objects only because we follow the linguistic convention generally accepted by ordinary people¹⁵).

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NOTES

- 1) The following previous contributions to the study of Dignāga's theory of *anyāpoha* have been consulted: E. Frauwallner, "Dignāga, sein Werk und seine Entwicklung," *WZKSO* III (1959), pp. 100-105; M. Hattori, "A Study of the Chapter on *Apoha* of the *Mīmāṃsāślokavarttika* (I & II)" (in Japanese), *Memoirs of the Faculty of Letters, Kyoto University*, Nos. 14 & 15 (1973-75); Do., "The Sautrāntika Background of the *Apoha* Theory," *Buddhist Thought and Asian Civilization*, California (1977); Do., "The *Apoha* Theory and the Sautrāntika Doctrine" (in Japanese), *Tri-piṭaka* 140 (1977); Muni Jambuvijaya, *Dvadaśāraṇa Nayacakram*, pt II, Bhavnagar (1976)pp. 607-8, 629-33, 638-40, 650-1, 728-9 contain the Sanskrit fragments and reconstructions of PS, Chap. V.
- 2) Frauwallner in the above-mentioned article has pointed out that the two verses correspond to PS, II, KK. 13 & 17 = *Nyāyamukha*, KK. 17 & 18.
- 3) The table has been reconstructed from the information given in PS, V, K. 25

- cd, Vṛtti & Ṭikā, K. 28, Vṛtti & Ṭikā, and K. 35, Vṛtti & Ṭikā. It should not be regarded as complete, but as subject to more specifications.
- 4) PS, V, K. 25cd and Vṛtti.
- 5) Although Dignāga mentions the name 'particular word' (*bhedasabda*), I do not use it because the difference between a universal word and a particular word is only relative.....the word '*dravya*' is a particular word with regard to '*sat*' but it is a universal word with regard to '*parthiva*'.
- 6) In this connection x has an invariable relation with y, if x is absent whenever y is absent.
- 7) PS, V, K. 25cd and Vṛtti, and KK. 27 & 35.
- 8) Ibid., K. 25cd and Vṛtti, and KK. 26 & 35.
- 9) Ibid., K. 28ab and Vṛtti.
- 10) Ibid., K. 28cd and Vṛtti.
- 11) Ibid., K. 28cd and Vṛtti.
- 12) G. Cardona, "Pāṇini's *Kāraṇas*," *J. of Ind. Philos.*, Vol. III (1974), pp. 289-291.
- 13) "*Anvaya* and *Vyatireka* in Indian Grammar," *The Adyar Library Bulletin*, Vol. 31-32 (1967-68).
- 14) Cf. PS, II, K. 5cd: *anumeye 'tha tattulye sadbhavo nāstītāsati!!*
- 15) PS, V, KK. 37-38ab and Vṛtti.

—NEW PUBLICATION—

A THOUSAND TEACHINGS
The *Upadeśasāhasrī* of Śaṅkara

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On the Tathāgata-Garbha-Dharma-Paryāya

Gishin Tokiwa

I. In the *Mahāparinirvāṇa mahāyāna sūtra* (PNS) a monk gives an exposition of the *Tathāgatagarbha sūtra* as follows:

"In all sentient beings the Awakened nature (*sañ-rgyas-kyi-khams*: buddha-dhātuḥ, herein referring to tathāgatagarbha) exists accomplished (*tsaṅ*: paripūrṇaḥ) in each of them (*sva-sva-kāye*). Except for beings of worldly desire (*icchantikāḥ*), sentient beings will be awakened to this after breaking forms of their disastrous contamination (*kleśa-āḥārāḥ*)." (Peking ed. Tibetan version Vol. 31, No. 788, 99a; Derge ed. Tib. v. Vol. 54, No. 120, 96b)

The monk's answers to a king's (and/ or a minister's) questions reveal the monk's fear of transgressing human conditions (*uttara-manuṣya-dharma-pralāpaḥ*) should he state that the Awakened nature certainly (*avaśyam*) exists in himself.

In one of his answers he says:

"Who knows whether I 'll become Awakened or not? But the Awakened nature does exist [in me]."

Then the questioner encourages him thus:

"So long as you are not an icchantika, please consider yourself on the way to Awakening."

The monk tries to overcome his fear of transgression by striving to attain Awakening through practices of *dāna*, *śīla*, *jñāna*, and other dharmas. (cf. P 99b; D 97a)

After giving examples of such negative attitudes toward tathāgatagarbha, the World-Honored One in the PNS expresses his approach to tathāgatagarbha:

"For eight million kalpas I abstained from taking hold of unworthy things, was content and gave up means of subsistence; and then I practiced on tathāgatagarbha, attained the right Awakening, and acquired the Awakened World-Honored one's great compassion to teach [people] one hundred thousand dharma-collections." (ibid.)

This seems to show the point that tathāgatagarbha, which might be an as-