

# DIGNĀGA AND DHARMAKĪRTI ON *APOHA*

by

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Two recent contributions to the study of Dignāga's *apoha* doctrine by Radhika Herzberger (1986) and Richard Hayes (1988) argue strongly that we should not consider that Dignāga and Dharmakīrti shared the same basic philosophical position, although they traditionally have been regarded as belonging to the same Buddhist school of epistemology and logic. I basically agree with them and in this paper I would like to comment on Dr. Herzberger's interpretation of the *apoha* doctrines of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti and to present what I can summarize at the moment as the main doctrinal differences between the two Buddhist logicians.

In Chapter 3 of her book, Herzberger attempts a new interpretation of Dignāga's *apoha* doctrine, completely different from what she terms 'the dominant view of Dignāga's theories of language' presented by Masaaki Hattori. She quotes the following passage from Hattori's monumental work on Dignāga:

"... a word indicates an object merely through the exclusion of other objects (*anyāpoha*, -*vyāvṛtti*). For example, the word 'cow' simply means that the object is not a non-cow. As such, a word cannot denote anything real, whether it be an individual (*vyakti*), a universal (*jāti*), or any other thing." [Hattori 1968: 12; Herzberger 1986: 109]

Although Herzberger does not directly reject Hattori's presentation of Dignāga's theories, she seems to regard it as inconsistent with some of Dignāga's crucial arguments found in chapter 5 of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*. Apparently she considers that Hattori and others have been misled by Dharmakīrti in interpreting Dignāga's *apoha* doctrine. In contrast with the above received view, Herzberger presents the gist of her own interpretation as follows:

"My conclusion . . . will be that Dignāga's *apoha* doctrine was meant to ensure that names apply directly to their perceptual objects (*sākṣādvṛtti*), and are not in excess of their perceptual objects." [Herzberger 1986: 109; my emphasis]

She bases her argument on two verses of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* chapter 5, namely,

*na pramāṇāntaram śābdam anumānāt tathā hi tat (or sah) /*  
*kṛtakatvādivat svārtham anyāpohena bhāṣate //*<sup>1</sup> (1)  
*vyāpter anyanīśedhasya tadbhedārthair abhinnaṭā /*  
*[sākṣādvṛtter abhedāc ca] jātidharmavyavasthiṇḥ //*<sup>2</sup> (36)

She translates them as follows:

"Knowledge derived from words is not a separate means to truth from inference; for the name signifies its own object (*svārtha*) by excluding what is other in the same way as (the reason) 'being an artifact' [establishes what is to be proved]." [Herzberger 1986: 145; my emphasis]

"Where the concomitance excludes others, there is non-separation [of the word for the universal] from the meaning of its individuals [i.e. with its sub-classes]. Because [the name] directly applies

<sup>1</sup> Sanskrit fragment recovered by Hattori 1982: 107 fn. 1.

<sup>2</sup> Sanskrit fragment of v. 36ab is found in the *Nyāyāgamānusāriṇī* (cf. DANC II) p. 730, and that of v. 36d recovered by Hattori 1982: 137 fn. 33. Sanskrit reconstruction of v. 36c was done by Jambuvijaya, DANC II 728 fn. 9.

[to its bearer] and is not distinct [from it], the characteristic of universals are properly established." [Herzberger 1986: 163; my emphasis]

Regarding Herzberger's translation of verse 1, I have no serious objection except for her peculiar interpretation of the word 'svārtha', which I shall discuss later. Her translation of the verse 36, however, is simply a mistranslation. It seems to have resulted from her failure to consult Jinendrabuddhi's subcommentary.<sup>3</sup> It is true that Jinendrabuddhi is often heavily influenced by Dharmakīrti, so that we should be very careful in adopting his interpretation of Dignāga. In the present case, however, I do not see any reason to suspect that this is the case. Let me quote Jinendrabuddhi's comments on the verse 36ab together with Jambūvijaya's Sanskrit reconstruction.

g'zan bkag pa ni khyab pa'i phyir 'jes pa / khyab pa ni ran gi khyad par mi spon ba'o // g'zan bkag pa ni ji skad b'sad pa'i spyi'o // de khyab pa'i phyir te / ran gi khyad par mams la khyab par byed pa nīd kyi phyir 'jes pa'i don to // g'zan bkag pa'i 'jes pa kṛti sbyor ba'i mtshan nīd can gyi byed pa po la drug pa 'di'o // de khyad don dan tha dad med ces pa / g'zan sel ba'i khyad par brjod pa mams dan ste / rdzas la sogs pa'i sgra mams dan yod pa la sogs pa'i sgra g'zi mthun pa'o 'jes pa'i don to // (PST V 201,36-202,2)

vyāpter anyanīśedhasyeti vyāptiḥ svabhedāpratikṣepaḥ, anyanīśedho yathoktaṃ sāmānyam, tasya vyāpteḥ svabhedeṣu vyāpakatvād ity arthaḥ. anyanīśedhasyeti kṛdyogalakṣaṇeyam kartari śaṣṭhi. tadbhedārthair abhinnaṭeti anyāpohabhedārthavācakaiḥ dravyādiśabdaiḥ sadādiśabdasya sāmānādhikaranyam ity arthaḥ. (DANC II 729)

My translation:

"In the phrase 'vyāpter anyanīśedhasya' (= v. 36a), 'vyāpti' (pervasion) means non-rejection of its own particulars (*bheda*) and 'anyanīśedha' (negation of others) refers to a universal (*sāmānya*) discussed above. 'Since it pervades' (*vyāpteḥ*) means 'since [negation of others] pervades its own particulars'. Of 'anyanīśedhasya' the genitive case ending (*śaṣṭhi*) characterized by its connection with the Kṛt suffix is applied in the sense of an agent (*kartṛ*). 'tadbhedārthair abhinnaṭeti' means that a [universal] term, such as 'being' (*sat*), and [particular] terms, such as 'substance' (*dravya*), which express particular objects belonging to that [universal, i.e.] negation of others, can refer to the same object."

Jinendrabuddhi clearly identifies *anyanīśedha* (i.e., *anyāpoha*) as the subject (*kartṛ*) – not as the object (*karman*) as Herzberger understands it – of the action of pervasion. Furthermore, he explains that what is meant by the expression 'anyanīśedha' is a universal, such as being-ness (*sattā*), which does not reject but pervades its own particulars, such as substance. The expression 'tadbhedārthair' is a Bahuvrīhi compound – not a Tatpuruṣa as Herzberger understands it – meaning '[the words] whose objects are the particulars of that [universal]'. And 'abhinnaṭeti' simply means the fact that the two words, viz. the word for a universal and that for its particular, say e.g. 'sat' and 'dravyam', can refer to the same object (*sāmānādhikaranyā*); in other words, they can be put in apposition like 'sad dravyam'. Following Jinendrabuddhi, I translate verse 36ab as follows:

"Since negation of others (i.e. a universal) pervades [its particulars], [the word for the universal] is not different [in terms of the case-ending] from [the words] whose objects are particulars of that [universal]."<sup>4</sup>

A linguistic phenomenon called 'co-reference' (*sāmānādhikaranyā*) is possible between two terms


<sup>3</sup> Herzberger [1986: 163] translates Jambūvijaya's Sanskrit reconstruction of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* viṭī ad PS V 36. Her translation is not always accurate. For a better translation of the same passage from the original Tibetan texts, see Hayes 1988: 299f.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Hayes 1988: 299: "Since a term's denial of other terms pervades narrower terms, the wider term is not different from terms narrower than itself." Note that Hayes translates *sāmānyāśabda* by 'wider term' and *bhedaśabda* by 'narrower term'.

'A' and 'B', if A is the universal of particular Bs and consequently A pervades the domain of B. What Dignāga wants to stress in this half verse is that co-reference is explainable only when universals and particulars are understood in terms of *anyāpoha*. A similar view is more fully expressed by Dignāga in PS V 27.<sup>5</sup>

Commenting upon PS V 25c-38, I have once argued<sup>6</sup> that Dignāga was well aware of the fact that in his *apoha* doctrine the 'exclusion' (*apoha*) operation is not universally applicable but quite limited in its scope; namely, two synonyms (e.g. *ṛkṣa* and *taru*, both meaning a tree) do not exclude each other's object, a term for a particular (*bhedaśabda*, say *ṛkṣa*) does not exclude the object of a term for its universal (*sāmānyasabda*, say *pārthiva* 'made of the earth element'), nor vice versa.<sup>7</sup> As a matter of fact, the *apoha* operation is possible only in the following two cases; namely, a term for a particular A (say *ṛkṣa*) directly excludes the object of a term for a particular B (say *ghaṭa*) when A and B share the same universal (*pārthivatva*), and a term for a particular A (say *śiṃśapā*) indirectly excludes the object of a term for a particular B (say *ghaṭa*) when B shares the same universal (*pārthivatva*) with another particular C (*ṛkṣa*), to whose class the particular A belongs, and B is directly excluded by the word for C.<sup>8</sup>

As I demonstrated then, it is clear that Dignāga's *apoha* doctrine presupposes a genus-species type of hierarchy of terms for universals and particulars. With the help of Jinendrabuddhi, we can reconstruct a part of his presupposed hierarchy in the following manner:<sup>9</sup>



<sup>5</sup> *tanmātrākāṅkṣaṇād bhedaḥ svasāmānyena nojjīhataḥ / nopāntaḥ saṃśayotpateḥ sāmye caikāntatā tayoh* // Hattori 1982: 129 fn. 24. Cf. Hayes 1988: 290: "A wider term does not exclude its narrower terms, because it creates anticipation for them alone. Neither does it entail them, because uncertainty arises concerning which of its narrower terms is applicable. In either case the two terms can apply to the same set of object."

<sup>6</sup> "The Apoha Theory of Dignāga", *Indogaku Bukkyōgaku Kenkyū* 28/1, 1979, (16)-(20).

<sup>7</sup> See PS V 25cd: *anyatve 'pi na sāmānyabhedaparyāyavacyanu* // Hattori 1982: 129 fn. 22. Cf. Hayes 1988: 287: "A term does not exclude terms of wider extension, terms of narrower extension or co-extensive terms, even though they differ from it."

<sup>8</sup> See PS V 28: *bhedo bhedāntarārthaḥ tu virodhivād apohate / sāmānyāntarabhedārthāḥ svasāmānyavirodhinaḥ* // Hattori 1982: 129 fn. 24 and 131 fn. 25. Cf. Hayes 1988: 291: "A narrower term precludes the objects denoted by other narrower terms because of hostility. (Because) particulars of another wider term are contradicted by the word (*śiṃśapā*)'s own wider term." (parentheses mine)

<sup>9</sup> I then thought that Dignāga borrowed a hierarchical structure of universals from the Vaiśeṣika school; however, thanks to Herzberger's studies of Bhartṛhari, it seems more likely that Dignāga owes the idea to Bhartṛhari. Cf. Herzberger 1986: 35ff.

My criticism of Herzberger's translation so far does not perhaps pose a serious threat to her interpretation of Dignāga's *apoha* doctrine. However, her misunderstanding of verse 36c presents a fundamental problem for her theory of direct application. Let us first look at Jinendrabuddhi's comments.

dños su 'jug phyr źes pa . . . / 'dir ni yod pa ñid la sogs pa'i yon tan gźan la ma ltos par yod pa ma yin pa bsal ba'i dños po la sgra 'jug go // . . . / don gźan sel ba tsam ni tha mi dad pa'i phyr źes pa ste / 'dis ni tha dad med phyr źes pa 'di bkral ba'o // (PST V 202,31-203,10)  
 sāksādvṛtteḥ iti . . . atra sattādiguñāntarānapekṣayā asadapohavastuni śabdah pravartate. . .  
 arthāntarāpohamātrasyābhinnatvād ity abhedāt ity etad anena vyākhyāyate. (DANC II 729)

My translation:

"Concerning the phrase 'sāksādvṛtteḥ', . . . Here [it is meant that] without depending upon external qualities, such as 'being-ness' (*sattā*), the term ['sat' (being)] applies to the thing which is the exclusion of 'non-being' (*asad*). . . . The phrase 'abhinnatvā' is explained by [the Teacher Dignāga as] 'since the mere exclusion (*apoha*) of other objects has no subdivisions'."

If we follow Jinendrabuddhi, the phrase 'sāksādvṛtteḥ' (literally: because of the direct application) in verse 36c in no case supports Herzberger's new interpretation of the *apoha* doctrine that names directly apply to their perceptual objects. Rather, it means that names directly apply to their proper objects, *anyāpoha* (i.e. *anyanīṣedha* in v. 36a). For instance, the term 'sat' directly applies to the exclusion of non-being (*asadapoha*) without depending on the universal *sattā*. As a matter of fact, as the conclusion in v. 36d clearly indicates and as Hattori and Hayes have demonstrated,<sup>10</sup> *anyāpoha* is a substitute for a universal (*sāmānya* or *jāti*) of other schools of Indian realism. Thus, 'sāksādvṛtti' in v. 36c must mean that a term applies directly to a universal, which is nothing but *anyāpoha*, without the intervention of another universal.

Furthermore, the word 'abheda' in verse 36c does not mean that a name is not distinct from its bearer, as Herzberger understands it. But it means that *anyāpoha* (i.e. *anyanīṣedha* in v. 36a) has no internal subdivision; consequently, it fulfills one of the conditions of a universal, unity (*ekatva*). Now I translate verse 36cd as follows:

"Because [a word] directly applies to [the negation of others] and there is no subdivision [in the negation of others], the properties of a universal (viz. *ekatva*, *nityatva* and *pratyekaparīsamāpti*) are established."<sup>11</sup>

Let us now return to verse 1. Commenting upon the term 'svārtha' (own object), Herzberger says: ". . . the own object of a name is the object in space/time directly designated by a demonstrative. . . . it is exempt from the *apoha* operation because it does not designate its object on the basis of a universal but directly. The *apoha*-operation is restricted to that part of the name-giving sentence which designates its object indirectly through universals. This is because demonstratives are never in excess (*ati-vṛt*) of their bearers." [Herzberger 1986: 124f.; my emphasis]

Now the expression 'name-giving sentence' in her comment may need some explanation. According to her, Dignāga's *apoha* doctrine consists of a pair of basic sentences: a singular affirmative sentence, "this has H" (where H is a name) and a singular negative sentence "this has nonnonH" (Herzberger

<sup>10</sup> Masaaki Hattori, "The Sautrāntika Background of the Apoha Theory", in *Buddhist Thought and Asian Civilization: essays in honor of Herbert V. Guenther on his sixtieth birthday*, ed. L. S. Kawamura and K. Scott, Emeryville, California 1977: 48, and Hayes 1988: 185.

<sup>11</sup> Cf. Hayes 1988: 299: "Because denial of others applies directly, and because it has no internal divisions, the properties of a universal are established." He wrongly takes '*anyāpoha*' as the subject rather than the object of the verb 'applies'.

1986: 107). From this she develops a complex procedure of the *apoha* operation, the full discussion of which is beyond the scope of this paper. Anyhow, if I am not mistaken, Herzberger seems to understand that every name (say e.g. *vrkṣa*) possesses a kind of deep structure consisting of a demonstrative and a name (e.g. '*ayaṁ vrkṣaḥ*'). The demonstrative directly designates an individual or what she calls a spatio-temporal object, while the name designates a class of such spatio-temporal objects indirectly through a universal or a shared feature (*sāmānyalakṣaṇa*). She does not seem to regard that spatio-temporal object either as an intrinsic feature (*svalakṣaṇa*) or as a shared feature (Herzberger 1986: 144, 168). It should be noted in passing that Herzberger (1986: 126) considers the demonstrative to be omitted/dropped by an operation similar to *matuplopa*.

The fact that Dignāga himself never discusses the role of a demonstrative in the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* chapter 5 makes it rather difficult for Herzberger to work on the hypothesis that his *apoha* doctrine tacitly presupposes what she calls a pair of basic sentences. It seems to me a rather futile undertaking to reconstruct such an elaborate theory of *apoha* which was never even mentioned by Dignāga. Her only textual support for the idea of the basic affirmative sentence comes from the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* chapter 1 where Dignāga criticizes the Vaiśeṣika theory of perception. The passage she quotes<sup>12</sup> simply indicates that Dignāga admits a phase immediately after perception, which involves both a demonstrative and a generic name. It is of course concerned with a psychological process from perception to judgement rather than a process of name-giving.

I will refrain from commenting further upon her detailed interpretation of Dignāga's *apoha* doctrine and I will concentrate upon what she calls a spatio-temporal object. Herzberger says:

"Dignāga proposed granting spatio-temporal continuants such as human bodies a status in between the illusory and the unconstructed, a status he described as 'constructed in dependence on realities', i.e., 'in dependence on' the purely empirical." [Herzberger 1986: 114]

As I mentioned above, she takes this spatio-temporal object to be directly designated by the demonstrative and to be neither *svalakṣaṇa* nor *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*. She understands that it possesses both *svalakṣaṇa* and *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* at the same time, which she believes conflicts with Hattori's whole framework of understanding Dignāga. In this connection she quotes Hattori:

"The former is real, while the latter lacks reality. As each is incompatible with the other, there cannot be anything which possesses both *svalakṣaṇa* and *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* at the same time." [Hattori 1968: 80; Herzberger 1986: 115]

There are several questions to be raised in this context. What is the ontological status of Herzberger's spatio-temporal object? What are the *svalakṣaṇa* and *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* in Dignāga's system? And what is it that bears both *svalakṣaṇa* and *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*? Is there any unsurmountable gap between the perceptual and the conceptual realm?

First, what is it that Herzberger calls a spatio-temporal object? Relying on Hidenori Kitagawa's English summary of Dignāga's *\*Upādāyaprajñaptiprakaraṇa*, she believes that Dignāga's concept of *upādāyaprajñapti*, which she understands as an entity "constructed in dependence on realities", permits her to propose just such a spatio-temporal object which bridges the gap between the perceptual and the conceptual.<sup>13</sup>

It should be pointed out at the outset that the term *upādāyaprajñapti* cannot mean any entity, but literally means a 'concept based on' realities. Therefore, it cannot be something distinct from both

<sup>12</sup> Herzberger 1986: 119; cf. Hattori 1968: 43f.; for Sanskrit reconstruction, see Jambūvijaya 1961: 170 (Appendix 7).

<sup>13</sup> Herzberger 1986: 113f. Cf. H. Kitagawa, "A Study of a Short Philosophical Treatise ascribed to Dignāga", *Sino-Indian Studies*, 5/3-4, 1957 = reprinted in Kitagawa 1965, 430-439.

*śvalakṣaṇa* and *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*; it belongs to the conceptual realm and it must be identified as *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* in Dignāga's system. As a matter of fact, the idea of *upādāyaprajñapti* goes back much earlier than Dignāga. For example, Nāgārjuna mentions it in his celebrated *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* 24.18:

*yah pratītyasamutpādaḥ śūnyatām tām pracakṣmahe /  
sā prajñaptir upādāya pratīpat saiva madhyamā //*<sup>14</sup>

"It is conditioned origination which we call 'emptiness'. It is a 'concept based on' (*upādāya prajñapti*, 'concept attached to') something (else, i.e. not in itself some entity, something 'existing'), and precisely it is the 'intermediate way' (avoiding the extremes of 'it is' and 'it is not')."<sup>15</sup>

Candrakīrti explains *upādāyaprajñapti* by the example of a chariot. He says that a concept of a chariot is formed, based upon its components, such as wheels.<sup>16</sup> The idea of *upādāyaprajñapti* is neither unique to Nāgārjuna nor to Dignāga. It is rooted in the common Buddhist belief that an apparently singular object should be analyzed into its real components. For example, such common ideas as 'I', 'Self' and 'Person' can be and should be analyzed into the five Groups (*skandha*). This is the basic principle behind the *dharma* theory of Abhidharma schools, as well.

Hattori, too, was well aware of the fact that Dignāga utilized the term *upādāyaprajñapti* (Hattori [cited in note 10] 1977: 54-56). Actually Dignāga mentions three types of *upādāyaprajñapti*, viz. whole (*samūha*) like a body, continuant (*santāna*) like a person, and particular states or aspects (*avasthāviśeṣa*) such as non-eternity (*anityatā*). Hattori takes them to be understood by Dignāga as 'nominal existence' and finds them discussed in Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttikasavavṛtti*.<sup>17</sup> Thus, the theory of *upādāyaprajñapti* cannot be a dividing point between Dignāga and Dharmakīrti as Herzberger supposes.

Dignāga works out his epistemological and logical investigation through two key words, viz. *dharma* and *dharmin*. I would like to understand the significance of *upādāyaprajñapti* in terms of *dharma* and *dharmin*. Let me quote three half verses from the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*.

*dharmino 'nekarūpasya nendriyāt sarvathā gatih* | (PS I 5ab)<sup>18</sup>

"A thing possessing many properties cannot be cognized in all its aspects by the sense."<sup>19</sup>

<sup>14</sup> Edited by L. de la Vallée Poussin together with *Prasannapadā* of Candrakīrti, St. Petersburg 1903-1913 [Reprint: Osnabrück 1970: 503].

<sup>15</sup> Translation by A. K. Warder, *Indian Buddhism*, Delhi 1970: 383. Warder has written an interesting article on *prajñapti*, using Pali sources: "The Concept of a Concept", *JIPh* 1, 1971, 181-196. For a detailed discussion of the *Kārikā* of Nāgārjuna, see J. May, "On Mādhyamika Philosophy", *JIPh* 6, 1978, 233-241.

<sup>16</sup> *Prasannapadā* (cited in note 14) p. 504.

<sup>17</sup> PVSV 68f.: *evamjātyāś ca sarve samūhasantānāvasthāviśeṣaśabdā* . . . For a German translation of this portion, see Tilmann Vetter, *Erkenntnisprobleme bei Dharmakīrti*, Wien 1964: 110-112.

It may be noted in passing that although Hattori attributes the idea of *upādāyaprajñapti* to the Sautrāntika school, it was shared by most of the Abhidharma schools including the Pudgalavādins who actually insist that *pudgala* is an *upādāyaprajñapti*. Cf. the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* of Vasubandhu, chapter 9, (the recent translation by James Duerlinger, *JIPh* 17, 1989, 129-187) as well as the *Āśrayaprajñaptiśāstra* of the Saṃmatīya school (Tasiho 1649, tr. by K. Venkataramanan in *Visvabhāṣa Annals* 5, 1953). Hattori seems to have been influenced by Frauwallner who identified the *Abhidharmakośa* VI 4 (ed. together with Yaśomitra's *Sphuṭārthā* by Dīvarikāśa Śāstri, Varanasi 1972: 889: *yatra bhinne na tadbuddhīr anyāpohe dhiyā ca tat / ghaṭmubuvat saṃvṛtisat paramārthasat anyathā //*) as a typical Sautrāntika view (*Die Philosophie des Buddhismus*, Berlin 1958: 119-122). However, I once demonstrated that the theory of two existences, nominal and ultimate (*saṃvṛtisat* and *paramārthasat*), expressed in this verse was not unique to the Sautrāntika but shared by the orthodox Vaibhāṣika school too, by referring to a parallel verse in the *Samyuktābhidharmasāra*, Taishō 1552, by Dharmatrāta who preceded Vasubandhu (*Indological Review* 2, 1976: 28).

<sup>18</sup> Sanskrit fragment recovered by Jambūvijaya, DANC I 104 (Appendix); Hattori 1968: 91.

<sup>19</sup> Translation by Hattori 1968: 27. Hayes [1988: 138] gives a different translation: "No knowledge at all of a possessor

[*anekadharmino 'rthasya na līṅgāt sarvathā gatiḥ*] | (PS II 13ab)<sup>20</sup>

"An object has many properties. But we do not become aware of them all through the inferential sign."<sup>21</sup>

*bahudhāpy abhidheyasya na śabdāt sarvathā gatiḥ* | (PS V 12ab)<sup>22</sup>

"Although that which is expressed by a word has many properties, it is not cognized in its entirety through a word."<sup>23</sup>

These parallel lines clearly indicate that Dignāga does not admit the complete understanding (*sarvathā gati*) of a single object (*dharmin* / *abhidheya*) with many properties (*dharma*) either by a sense organ (*indriya*), or an inferential mark (*līṅga*) or a linguistic item (*śabda*). According to him the *dharma-dharmin* distinction exists only in our conceptual realm, not in the external world.<sup>24</sup> I understand that both *dharmin* and its *dharma*s are identified as such separately and negatively (i.e. through *anyāpoha*), but never in totality (*na sarvathā*), by the conceptual cognition (*vikalpa*), while the actual object is perceived as it really is in its totality and positively.<sup>25</sup> Concerning the three types of *upādāyaprajñapti* I would like to propose that the first two, viz. 'whole' and 'continuant', correspond to the concept of *dharmin* and the last one, particular aspects, represents that of *dharma*s. They are nothing but *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* in Dignāga's system. Thus I cannot support Herzberger's identification of *upādāyaprajñapti* as a single spatio-temporal entity which is distinct from both *svalakṣaṇa* and *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* and which is the bearer of both features. Her remarks on *upādāyaprajñapti*, however, are not always consistent because she also mentions that shared features (i.e. *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*) are constructed 'in dependence on' what is given in the perceptual world (Herzberger 1986: 159).

Now what are the *svalakṣaṇa* and *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* in Dignāga's system? The two terms certainly go back to the Abhidharma literature. For example, Vasubandhu, commenting upon the *Abhidharma-kośa* VI 14cd, says:

*kāyaṃ svasāmānyalakṣaṇābhyāṃ parīkṣate, vedanāṃ cittāṃ dharmāṃś ca svabhāva evaiśārṇ svalakṣaṇam. sāmānyalakṣaṇaṃ tu anityatā saṃskṛtānām, duḥkhatā sāsravānām śūnyatānātmate sarvadharmāṇām.*<sup>26</sup>

"One examines the body by its *sva*- and *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*, as well as sensation, mind and *dharma*s. Their *svalakṣaṇa* is precisely [their] own nature (*svabhāva*), while *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* is

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of properties that has many characteristics is derived from a sense faculty." For his comments on Hattori's translation, see *ibid* 170 n. 20.

<sup>20</sup> *don gyi chos rnam du ma ni // thams cad rtags las rtags ma yin* // Kitagawa 1965: 462. Sanskrit reconstruction given by Jambūvijaya, DANC II 724 fn. 6. For another Sanskrit reconstruction, see Frauwallner 1959: 102: *bahurve 'py artha-dharmānāṃ na līṅgāt sarvathā gatiḥ* |

<sup>21</sup> Translation by Hayes 1988: 244.

<sup>22</sup> Sanskrit fragment recovered by Hattori 1982: 115 fn. 18.

<sup>23</sup> Translation by Hayes 1988: 277.

<sup>24</sup> Cf. a possible fragment of the *Hetumukha*: *sarva evāyam anumānānumeya-yavāhara buddhyārtūḍhenaiva dharmadharmī-bhedena na bahiḥ sadasaivam apekṣate* (Frauwallner 1959: 164). Cf. PVSV 2-3. Dharmakīrti is also very keen to establish the *dharma-dharmin* distinction conceptually by the *apoha* doctrine. See PV I 61-62 and *Svaṃvṛtā*, PV II 90-102, and PV IV 181-188. Cf. Ernst Steinkellner, "Wirklichkeit und Begriff bei Dharmakīrti", *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens* 15, 1971 [179-211]: 199f.

<sup>25</sup> Cf. PS II 15: *dṛṣṭavad vidhīrūpeṇa yadi līṅgaṃ prakāśayet / sarvathāpratipattiḥ syāt sarvathā vā gatir bhavet* // Sanskrit reconstruction given by Jambūvijaya, DANC II 720.

<sup>26</sup> *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* (cited in note 17): 902. Cf. Yaśomitra on this passage: *kaḥ svabhāvaḥ. kāyaṃ bhūtabhāutika-ṇam, vedanāyā anubhavanam, cittasyopalabdhirnam.*

the non-eternity of the conditioned [*dharmas*], the unhappiness of the defiled [*dharmas*], and the emptiness and non-substantiality of all *dharmas*.<sup>27</sup>

Thus, for the Abhidharmikas *svalakṣaṇa* is *svabhāva* of a *dharma*, such as hardness of the earth-element (*pṛthivīdhātu*), and *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* is the common feature of *dharmas*, such as non-eternity, and every *dharma* is supposed to possess both *svalakṣaṇa* and *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*.<sup>28</sup> Since *svalakṣaṇa* of a *dharma* is nothing but that *dharma* itself, we must understand the Abhidharma framework, just as we have seen with reference to Dignāga, in terms of a *dharmin* (i.e. *svalakṣaṇa* or a particular *dharma* itself) and *dharmas* (i.e. *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*, such as non-eternity) which are possessed by that *dharmin* and shared by other *dharmins*. It is unnecessary to say that, being legitimate *dharmas*, both *svalakṣaṇa* and *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* are real according to the Abhidharmika ontology.

I am sure that Dignāga inherited the two terms, *svalakṣaṇa* and *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*, from the Abhidharmikas. As is well known, Dignāga admits only two means of cognition (*pramāṇa*), viz. perception (*pratyakṣa*) and inference (*anumāna*), because he accepts only two types of the object of cognition (*prameya*), viz. *svalakṣaṇa* and *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*, which are to be cognized respectively by the two means of cognition.<sup>29</sup> Unfortunately, he gave no formal definition of those two key-terms, which may suggest that Dignāga accepted the Abhidharmika's concepts of them at least in general. Nonetheless, he appears to have attached to them new significances.

When Dignāga discusses the sense cognition, one of the four subdivisions of perception acknowledged by him, he refers to its object, which is no other than *svalakṣaṇa*, in the following manner:

*svasaṃvedyam anirdeśyam rūpam indriyagocarah |* (PS I 5cd)<sup>30</sup>

"The object of the sense is the form which is to be cognized [simply] as it is and which is inexpressible."<sup>31</sup>

As to *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*, he says:

*l rañ gi mtshan ñid bstan bya min || yul tha dad phyir gzan du yin |*

<sup>27</sup> Cf. Vittorio A. van Bijlert, *Epistemology and Spiritual Authority*, Wien 1989: 56.

<sup>28</sup> Cf. Yaśomitra on *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* [Varanasi 1970] 12 (ad *Abhidharmakośa* 1 2ab): *svasāmānyalakṣaṇam ... khakkhatalakṣaṇaḥ pṛthivīdhātuh, anityaṃ duḥkham ity evamādi*. Ibid 16: *svasāmānyalakṣaṇadhāraṇād dharmāḥ*.

<sup>29</sup> The idea first appeared in the *Nyāyamukha* (Taisho 1628, 3b), then in PS(V) I 2: *tara pratyakṣam anumānam ca pramāṇe dve eva, yasmād lakṣaṇadvayaṃ prameyaṃ. na hi svasāmānyalakṣaṇābhyām anyat prameyam asti. svalakṣaṇaviśayaṃ hi pratyakṣam, sāmānyalakṣaṇaviśayaṃ anumānam iti pratipadayiṣyāmaḥ*. Sanskrit reconstruction is given by Jambūvijaya, DANC I 100 (Appendix). Hattori (1968: 24) translates: "Now, the means of cognition are [immediate and mediate, namely,] perception (*pratyakṣa*) and inference (*anumāna*). They are only two, because the object to be cognized has [only] two aspects. Apart from the particular (*sva-lakṣaṇa*) and the universal (*sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*) there is no other object to be cognized, and we shall prove that perception has only the particular for its object and inference only the universal." For Herzberger's disagreement with Hattori's translation and interpretation of this passage, see Herzberger 1986: 115f.

I have some reservations with regard to Hattori's translation of '*lakṣaṇadvayaṃ prameyaṃ*' as 'the object to be cognized has [only] two aspects' (my emphasis), which may suggest that the object to be cognized is a possessor of the two *lakṣaṇas* and something different from them. This might have resulted in Herzberger's peculiar interpretation of '*svārtha*' as a spatio-temporal entity which possesses *svalakṣaṇa* and *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*. Van Bijlert (cited in note 27, p. 56) states: 'they are two aspects of one and the same object, the real visible aspect which is revealed by perception and the conceptualized aspect of the thing, which is the field of inference.' He, too, seems to be presupposing the existence of the object apart from *svalakṣaṇa* and *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*. He characterizes *svalakṣaṇa* of Dignāga by momentariness (1988: 57), which is the doctrine of Dharmakīrti and which has no textual basis in Dignāga.

I do not think that Dignāga admitted any bearer of the two *lakṣaṇas*. I would prefer the simple translation of '*lakṣaṇadvayaṃ prameyaṃ*' given by Hayes (1988: 133): 'two attributes are knowable'. Tibetan translation (Hattori 1968: 177: *mtshan ñid gñis gyal bya*) does not support the sense of possession in that sentence.

<sup>30</sup> Sanskrit fragment recovered by Jambūvijaya, DANC I 104 and by Hattori 1968: 91.

<sup>31</sup> Translation by Hattori 1968: 27.



*l mthoñ ba la sogz ñid kyis bñtan // rañ gi ño bos brjod pa min /* (PS II 2)<sup>32</sup>

"Because the particular is inexpressible. [Inference], since the object grasped by it differs, is otherwise. It is described through the fact of its being seen, but it is not named through its essential property."<sup>33</sup>

This is virtually all Dignāga says about the two *lakṣaṇas*. Now the main distinction between *sva-lakṣaṇa* and *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*, according to Dignāga, lies in the fact that the former is inexpressible, while the latter can be expressed through its general feature. Thus it is clear that *sva-lakṣaṇas* of Abhidharma, viz. *dharma*s which are actually named as *rūpa*, *vedanā*, etc., should be regarded by Dignāga not as *sva-lakṣaṇas* but as *sāmānyalakṣaṇas*. Consequently, Dignāga's *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* corresponds to both *sva-* and *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* of the Abhidharma, which cannot be regarded as real in Dignāga's system. To him *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* is after all *anyāpoha*.<sup>34</sup> It is an equivalent of *sāmānyajāti* (universal) of other schools,<sup>35</sup> whose reality he rejects.<sup>36</sup>

Dignāga's concept of *sva-lakṣaṇa* is hard to clarify because his only positive phrase about it is 'the object of the sense' (*indriyagocara*). What is the object of the sense? He says that it is 'inexpressible'! Therefore, we must wait for Dharmakīrti who gives the more detailed analysis of *sva-lakṣaṇa* at the beginning of the *Pramāṇavārttika* Chapter 3.<sup>37</sup> I suspect that Dignāga's *sva-lakṣaṇa* may carry the sense of *svabhāva* of its Abhidharma equivalent and that it perhaps means the object i t s e l f, whatever we may call and describe it. It is to be noted in passing that to Dharmakīrti *sva-lakṣaṇa* is the only real object of both perception and inference. According to him, perception grasps *sva-lakṣaṇa* directly and inference takes it indirectly through *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*.<sup>38</sup>

Now let us consider what it is that bears *sva-lakṣaṇa* and *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* in Dignāga's system. I have already proved that Herzberger's spatio-temporal entity or *upādāyaprajñapti* cannot be the bearer of the two *lakṣaṇas* because it itself is a mere concept. Actually I do not think Dignāga would admit any real bearer of the two *lakṣaṇas*. Consequently, I do not accept Herzberger's framework for understanding Dignāga.<sup>39</sup> As a matter of fact, I would like to propose an even more radical version of the framework than Hattori's. Namely,

<sup>32</sup> Kitagawa 1965: 448f.

<sup>33</sup> Translation by Hayes 1988: 232.

<sup>34</sup> See e.g. Hattori 1982: 135: *ci ltar don la don gñan gsal* (sic) *ba spyi yin pa de bñin du / sgra gñan mnam par gcod pa ni // sgra la spyir ni brjod pa yin* (PS V 33ab). Hayes (1988: 296) translates: "What a universal is at the level of objects is an object's exclusion of contrary objects. Similarly, at the level of verbal symbols, expression of a universal is the term's preclusion of contrary terms."

<sup>35</sup> Cf. PS V 36d discussed above, which declares that *anyāpoha* possesses the three properties of *jāti*.

<sup>36</sup> See PS II 16 (Kitagawa 1965: 464): *spyi ni yod pa ma yin na'añ // ñen ni mthoñ ba med pa'i phyir // de las gñan te mthoñ mi 'gyur // gcig la mthoñ phyir tha dad pa'am //* For Sanskrit reconstruction see DANC II 725. Hayes (1988: 246) translates: "But there really is no universal. Because we do not observe it throughout its substratum, nor do we see it outside its substratum. But if it is observed in each of its substrata, it is divided."

<sup>37</sup> For my own discussion of Dharmakīrti's distinction between the two *lakṣaṇas*, see Shoryu Katsura, "Dharmakīrti's Theory of Truth", *JIPh* 12/3, 1984 [215-235]: 217, where I characterized them by 'moment' and 'continuum'.

<sup>38</sup> See PV III 53-54.

<sup>39</sup> In order to support her opposition to Hattori's framework, Herzberger (1986: 159) quotes the following remark of Jinendrabuddhi's from Hayes' article: "In the process of learning an object's name by having the object pointed out while its name is being uttered, we simultaneously grasp its particular aspect and its general aspect. When that name is used later, only the general aspects are communicated." (Richard P. Hayes, "Dignāga's views on reasoning (*svārthanumāna*)", *JIPh* 8/3, 1980, 219-277: 69 fn. 57; cf. Hayes 1988: 238.) She should be reminded that the above quotation is not a literal translation of Jinendrabuddhi's and that it is meant to be a summary, the original source of which, however, I could not trace in Jinendrabuddhi's commentary on *Pramāṇasamuccaya*.

There cannot be anything (in the external reality) which possesses either *svalakṣaṇa* or *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* at any time.

I would like to assume that in Dignāga's system *svalakṣaṇa* is the object itself which is to be grasped directly by perception, which is neither expressible nor identifiable at that moment, but which is later identified by our conceptual thinking (*kalpanā*) and given a certain name, while *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* is the general feature common to individual objects which is to be grasped by our conceptual thinking, e.g. inference and verbal communication, and which is a concept or a name itself.

Now, if there is no bearer of the two *lakṣaṇas*, is there any unsurmountable gap between the perceptual and the conceptual realm in Dignāga's system as Herzberger thought? I do not think that there are enough textual sources to solve this question. Dignāga does not seem to be much interested in the question of how to relate the perceptual realm with the conceptual one. We must again wait for Dharmakīrti who attempted to bridge the gap between the two realms by introducing a new category of cognition called 'perceptual judgement', which arises immediately after the perception, which identifies the perceived object, and which is the driving force behind both inferential and verbal cognition.<sup>40</sup>

Then what is actually meant by the word 'svārtha' in the verse 1? The relevant portion of v. 1 may be re-written as follows:

*śabdaṃ svārtham anyāpohena bhāṣate /*

And it should be compared with the following concluding remark on v. 36 given by Dignāga:

*śabdo 'rthāntaranivṛtīviśiṣṭān eva bhāvān āha /'*<sup>41</sup>

"A name really designates objects qualified by the exclusion of others." [Herzberger 1986: 163] In spite of the importance attached to the second statement by the post Dignāga Buddhist logicians, such as Dharmakīrti and Jñānaśrīmitra, Dignāga himself never elaborated on this part of the *apoha* doctrine. Unfortunately, Jinendrabuddhi provides no comment on this passage. Therefore, we are forced to conjecture.

Following Herzberger, if we take 'svārtha' to mean what she calls a spatio-temporal entity, i.e. *upādāyaprajñapti*, then the above first statement of Dignāga must mean that a name designates its own object, i.e. *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*, by excluding others, which cannot be what she wants to present. Taking into consideration the second statement and accepting a part of her suggestion, I would like to take 'svārtha' as referring to the perceptual object itself which is something real in our external world.<sup>42</sup>

<sup>40</sup> I dealt with this topic at the First Dharmakīrti Conference in Kyōto 1982 and the revised version of my paper "On Perceptual Judgement" will appear in *A.K. Warder Festschrift*. H. Yaita recently published a new critical edition of the *Tarkarahasya* (*Journal of Naritasa Institute for Buddhist Studies* 12, 1988), which includes the following two important Sanskrit fragments of PSV: *cakṣuḥsparśanābhyāṃ bhinnāṃ viśayam upalabhyānyad eva tatsahacarasamudāyaviśayaṃ smṛtam abhedajñānam utpadyate; tathā viśeṣyān svair indriyair bhinnān upalabhyārthāntaravyavacchedaviśayam abhedena sarvatra mānasam jñānam utpadyate. na bhāvaguṇavayoḥ pratyakṣam, tasyānupalakṣaṇāt pratyakṣābhīmāna eṣa kutārkikāṇām* (my emphasis). Cf. Hattori 1968: 48 and 204f.; Jambūvijaya 1961: 172. This material clearly indicates that Dignāga, besides his concept of *samvṛtisajjñāna* (cognition of conventional existence), had already developed the notion of *smṛta* (recognition) as a kind of perceptual judgement. I regret that I cannot utilize this new information in the present paper.

<sup>41</sup> Hattori 1982: 139 fn. 36. I would like to thank Mr. Wasō Harada of Kōyasan University who first suggested to me the parallelism between the two passages. Dharmakīrti quotes the second sentence together with a possible fragment of the *Hetumukha*, a lost work of Dignāga: *ayam arthāntaravyāvṛtyā tasya vastunaḥ kaścid bhāgo gamyate* (PVSV 62,26). He does so in order to support his view that a linguistic item expresses a positive conceptual image of a universal (e.g. a cow in general) and at the same time indicates the negation of others (e.g. the negation of non-cows). It is well known that this simultaneous understanding of both positive and negative aspects of an object is later strongly advocated by Jñānaśrīmitra. See my paper "Jñānaśrīmitra on *apoha*", in *Buddhist Logic and Epistemology*, ed. Matilal & Evans, Dordrecht etc. 1986.

<sup>42</sup> It is quite certain that Dignāga admitted the external reality, for he mentioned it at least twice in PSV (ad PS IV 4) in connection with the 'example'. Kitagawa 1965: 515: *phyi rol gyi don la bstan pa ni dpe la gso bo yin no*; 517: *phyi rol gyi don la blos pa 'di ni dpe yin no*.

Even in that case, however, the first statement can only mean that a name designates its own object, i.e. *svalakṣaṇa*, by excluding others (viz. indirectly through *anyāpoha*). Thus in any case, we cannot read the theory of direct application into the first verse as Herzberger wishes to do.

In this connection, it should be noted that the above interpretation of '*svārtha*' should not conflict with our common understanding of *svalakṣaṇa* being 'inexpressible'. Of course, a name or our verbal cognition does not grasp the perceptual object directly, nor does it designate the same object of the complex features totally and positively. A name refers to the object only indirectly, partially and negatively through *anyāpoha*.<sup>43</sup> It is in this sense, perhaps that *svalakṣaṇa* is called 'inexpressible'. I must admit that my conjecture as to Dignāga's position may have been much influenced by Dharmakīrti's interpretations.

Now what is the main difference between Dignāga and Dharmakīrti with reference to the *apoha* doctrine? As the late Professor Frauwallner (1959: 98ff.) so elegantly demonstrated, Dignāga's *apoha* doctrine was first suggested in the *Nyāyamukha* in connection with the function of a logical mark (*liṅga*) and it was later incorporated into chapter 2 of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, where the *apoha* theory of inference was fully expounded; then it was applied to the verbal cognition in chapter 5 of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* in order to establish the *apoha* theory of semantics.<sup>44</sup> Thus, the *apoha* doctrine became a sort of the general theory of the conceptual knowledge (*vikalpa*) which includes both inference and verbal cognition in the case of Dignāga. In other words, what Dignāga tried to advocate is that there is no essential difference between the inferential and verbal cognition because both a logical mark (*liṅga*) and a linguistic item (*śabda*) function in the exactly same way, i.e. *anyāpoha*.

As I have assumed elsewhere,<sup>45</sup> Dignāga was much concerned with the problem of the inevitable relation (*avinābhāva*) between *liṅga* and *liṅgin* or between *hetu* and *sādhya*. He insists that a logical mark can successfully indicate its object (*liṅgin*) not when there is a casual relation such as 'causality' etc. proposed by the Vaiśeṣika (and the Sāṃkhya), but only when there is the inevitable relation between *liṅga* and *liṅgin*.<sup>46</sup>

Dignāga established the theory of pervasion (*vyāpti*) in order to justify the inevitable relation. Namely, an item *x* has the inevitable relation to another item *y* only when the domain of *x* is pervaded by the domain of *y*. The introduction of the restrictive particle *eva* into the *trairūpya* formulae of a legitimate *liṅga* or *hetu* seems to have played a decisive role in giving formal and precise expression to the pervasion. When the domain of *x* is pervaded by the domain of *y*, the situation can be expressed by '*x y eva*', if we follow Vyāḍi's metarule: *yata evakāras tato 'nyatrāvadhāraṇam* (Restriction should be made to the item other than that which is accompanied by the particle *eva*.)

How to establish the pervasion is one of the questions which Dignāga never satisfactorily answered. Of course, he was fond of utilizing the *anvaya-vyatireka* (inductive) method<sup>47</sup> to determine the relation between *liṅga* and *liṅgin* or between *śabda* and *artha* (its object). However, as the following

<sup>43</sup> See PS V 12ab quoted above.

<sup>44</sup> Cf. *Nyāyamukha* vv. 17 and 18; PS II 13 and 17, PS V 12 and 13.

<sup>45</sup> See e.g. "Dignāga on trairūpya", *Indogaku Bukkyōgaku Kenkyū* 32/1, 1983, and "On the origin and development of the concept of *vyāpti* in Indian logic", *Teisugaku* 38, 1986.

<sup>46</sup> See e.g. Dignāga's criticism of the Vaiśeṣika theory of inference in chapter 2 of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*; Jambūvijaya 1961: 184ff.

<sup>47</sup> Cf. G. Cardona, "On Reasoning from Anvaya and Vyatireka in Early Advaita," in *Studies in Indian Philosophy*, Ahmedabad 1981, 79-104.

well-known passage of chapter 5 of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* indicates, he was aware of the shortcomings of such a method:

*katham punaḥ śabdasyārthāntarāpohena svārthābhīdhāne pūrvadoṣāprasaṅgaḥ. yasmād*

*adṛṣṭer anyasābdārthe svārthasyāṁśe. 'pi darśanāt /*

*śruteḥ sambandhasaukaryam na cāsti vyabhicārita // (PS V.34)*

*śabdasyānvayavyatirekāv arthābhīdhāne dvāram, tau ca tulyātulyayor vṛtyavṛtī, tatra tulye nāvaśyam sarvatra vṛtīr ākhyeyā, kvacit ānantye 'rthasyākhyānāsambhavāt: atulye tu saty apy ānantye śakyam adarśanamātreṇāvṛtīr ākhyānam. ata eva svasambandhibhyo 'nyatrādarśanāt tad-vyavacchedānumānam svārthābhīdhānam ity ucyate.<sup>48</sup>*

"If a term expresses its own meaning by precluding other meanings, why do the faults mentioned above not arise?

Because a term is not observed to apply to objects in the extension of a contrary term, and because it is observed to apply to members of its own extension, it is easy to connect [the term to its meaning], and the term is not errant in its meaning.

Association and dissociation are the two ways that a verbal symbol expresses its object. They consist respectively in applying to what is similar and in not applying to what is dissimilar. It is not necessary to say that a verbal symbol applies to every instance of what is similar, because in some cases it is not possible to express an extension that is unlimited. But it is possible to say that it does not occur in the dissimilar – although it too is unlimited – simply on the basis of its not being observed to apply to any dissimilar instance. For this reason, because a term is not observed to apply to anything other than that to which it is related, its expression of its own object is said to be a negative inference.<sup>49</sup> (my emphasis)

Here Dignāga is clearly aware of the fact that it is impossible to establish the *anvaya* relation (association, agreement in presence) between a particular linguistic item (or a verbal symbol) and all of its objects, which reflects the core of the difficulty faced by any inductive method. As to the *vyatireka* relation (dissociation, agreement in absence), he seems to believe that it can be established on the basis of mere non-observation (or non-perception, *adarśanamātra*) of a counterexample. In view of Dignāga's general principle of the essential identity between the verbal communication and the inferential process, the above interpretation should not be restricted to the former; the same must apply to the latter. Thus it is clear that Dignāga's theory of pervasion has no strong claim for universality and that it is of a purely hypothetical nature:

It is possible that the domain of x is pervaded by the domain of y (what is similar to x, *tulya* = *sapakṣa*) as long as x is not observed in the domain of non-y (what is dissimilar to x, *atulya* = *vipakṣa*).

Consequently, for Dignāga all the verbal as well as the inferential knowledge essentially amount to the negative inference of a hypothetical nature. In this sense he cannot and does not have to establish a universal relation between a linguistic item or a logical mark and their respective objects.

As Richard Hayes suggests, Dignāga's system of epistemology and logic does not seem to be bound by any doctrinal prejudice.<sup>50</sup> I believe that this is due to the fact that he does not commit himself to any specific kind of ontology or metaphysics at least when he is dealing with the epistemological and logical subjects in the *Nyāyamukha*, the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, etc., which may be inferred from the

<sup>48</sup> Sanskrit reconstruction made by Frauwallner, 1959: 100f.; cf. DANC II 650. For Tibetan version and Sanskrit fragments, see Hattori 1982: 134f.

<sup>49</sup> Translation by Hayes 1988: 297f. Cf. Herzberger 1986: 161.

<sup>50</sup> Cf. Hayes 1988: 166-168.

lack of his own clear definition of *svalakṣaṇa* as I argued above. I have suggested that Dignāga's *apoha* doctrine presupposes a certain hierarchical tree of universals and particulars. Yet we should not superimpose any metaphysical doctrine, even a Buddhist one, upon such a hierarchy. Dignāga's final recourse in determining the domain of application of a certain linguistic item is people's common sense (*lokavyavahāra* or *lokaprasiddhi*).<sup>51</sup> Thus Dignāga's hierarchy of universals and particulars must reflect common sense, and the pervasion between two items, either linguistic or logical, in his logic should be determined by the observation of how people use their own language. Naturally people can argue and debate each other on the common ground. One cannot convince another solely by basing one's argument upon his own system of logic and metaphysical doctrines. In this sense, it may be possible to argue that Dignāga tried to build a new system of logic which is free from any tradition (*āgama*) and which is acceptable to any one who is interested in a serious investigation based on our common experience and knowledge.

Let us now examine Dharmakīrti's fundamental difference from Dignāga. I agree with Herzberger (1986: 212) when she says "Dharmakīrti sought stronger conditions for the truth of universal sentences". She is also quite right in pointing out that "Dharmakīrti argued that non-observation by itself is altogether a very weak form of proof" on the basis of the *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti*.<sup>52</sup> Although Dharmakīrti does not mention the above-quoted passage of Dignāga when he denies *adarśanamātra* theory there and in chapter 2 of the *Pramāṇaviniścaya*,<sup>53</sup> I believe that he is tacitly criticizing the whole inductive framework of Dignāga's logic. See e.g. PV I 13:

*na cādarśanamātreṇa vipakṣe 'vyabhicāritā /*  
*sambhāvyavyabhicāratvāt sthālitāṇḍulapākavat //*

"By mere non-observation in the opposite one cannot be sure of the necessary concomitance of the probans, because there is the possibility of the concomitance proving to be contingent, as it is found to be the case with the grains in a cooking vessel."<sup>54</sup>

As a matter of fact, Dharmakīrti in this context quotes a passage from chapter 2 of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, where Dignāga mentions the expression '*adarśanamātra*' in order to refute the Vaiśeṣika proof of the existence of the invisible 'wind',<sup>55</sup> together with a few passages from the *Nyāyamukha*. The sheer silence in face of *Pramāṇasamuccaya* V 34 seems to indicate his dissatisfaction with Dignāga's whole approach towards the problem of how to determine the pervasion and the logical connection.

As is well known, Dharmakīrti introduced the theory of *svabhāvapratibandha* (essential connection) in order to assure the universality of his theory of the logical connection, as a result of which he could reject the inductive nature of Indian logic represented by Dignāga. It is most likely that Dharmakīrti was the first to establish the deductive method of logic in India. Furthermore, he introduced the new

<sup>51</sup> Cf. PSV ad PS V 38b, Hattori 1982: 138 (Vasudhararakṣita): *gdon mi za bar mig gi gzun bya ñid med par / ñion po dañ ser po la sogs pa'i tha dad pa la yañ gzuṅs kyī sgra 'jig rten la grags pa khas blañ bar bya ba'i ro la sogs pa la ni ma yin no //* 140 (Kanakavarman): *mig gi s gzuñ bar bya ba ñid spañs nas / ñion po dañ ser po la sogs pa tha dad pa mams la yañ / 'jig rten la bñian pa'i gzuṅs kyī sgra khas blañ bar bya'i ro la sogs pa mams la ni ma yin no //* (my emphasis).

<sup>52</sup> Herzberger 1986: 215f.; PVSV 14.

<sup>53</sup> PVSV 10ff. and PVin II 39ff. (= Ernst Steinkellner, *Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇaviniścayaḥ, zweites Kapitel: Svārthānumānam. Teil I, Tibetischer Text und Sanskrittexte*, Wien 1973).

<sup>54</sup> Translation by Mookerjee and Nagasaki, *The Pramāṇavārttikam of Dharmakīrti. An English Translation of the First Chapter with the Autocommentary and with Elaborate Comments*, Patna 1964: 43.

<sup>55</sup> PVSV 14: *yady adarśanamātreṇa dṛṣṭebhyaḥ pratiśedhaḥ kriyate, na ca so 'pi yuktaḥ*. Cf. PSV ed. Kitagawa 1965: 461.

categories of *hetu*, viz. *kārya* (result), *svabhāva* (essence), and *anupalabdhi* (non-perception). The first two correspond to the two types of *svabhāvapratibandha* recognized by him, viz. *tadutpatti* (causality) and *tādātmya* (identity), while the last one must have been introduced by him in order to replace the preceding incorrect notions about the proof of non-existence (or negative inference) including Dignāga's concept of *adarśanamātra*. I propose to discuss Dharmakīrti's criticism of Dignāga's theory of *adarśanamātra* in a future paper.

Thus the first and foremost important difference between Dignāga and Dharmakīrti on the *apoha* doctrine is closely related to the fundamental difference of their systems of logic; namely, Dignāga's logic carries with itself the inductive approach of traditional Indian logic, while Dharmakīrti's system has a strong tendency towards deductive logic with his new theory of *svabhāvapratibandha*. Dignāga's theory of pervasion reveals a hypothetical nature, which is strongly criticized by Dharmakīrti.

Now Herzberger (1986: 212) says "[Dharmakīrti] found these [stronger] conditions [for the truth of universal sentences] in an *a priori* sphere". She maintains that Dharmakīrti established the inevitable logical relation not in the actual world of reality but in the conceptual realm of essential natures (*svabhāva*) which are *a priori* given by the beginningless *vāsanā* (impressions); thus, there is a great gulf between the perceptual and the conceptual realm in the framework of Dharmakīrti.

Regarding Dharmakīrti's concept of *vāsanā*, we are not in a position to say anything definitive, for the study of this very interesting topic has only just begun<sup>56</sup> and whether or not the distinction once made by Stcherbatsky between *anubhava*- and *anādi-vāsanā* is valid for Dharmakīrti<sup>57</sup> is still to be investigated. In any case, Dignāga also refers to *vāsanā* at least once in the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*.<sup>58</sup> Therefore, Herzberger should not take the theory of *vāsanā* to be an important dividing concept between Dignāga and Dharmakīrti.<sup>59</sup>

As to the concept of *svabhāva* in Dharmakīrti's works, however, we have a thorough study by Steinkellner (cited in note 24). Following his lead, I would like to take the term to mean not only the concept (*vikalpa*) but also the causal efficiency (*arthakriyāśakti*) of real existence. Thus, although *svabhāvapratibandha* holds primarily between two conceptual items, either linguistic or logical, it certainly reflects the state of affairs in reality which stimulates us to conceptually construct an essential relation of this kind. Namely, there is an essential connection between smoke and a fire in the conceptual realm (or the universe of discourse) because a fire can produce smoke in the actual world, and there is a similar connection between being a *śiṃśapā* and being a tree because a *śiṃśapā* can be called a tree. Thus, it is certain that to Dharmakīrti the conceptual realm of the universals are not necessarily given *a priori* by the beginningless *vāsanā* but firmly rooted in the actual world of causal efficiency.

An important characteristic of Dharmakīrti's epistemology, which is apparently missing in Dignāga, is the strong interest in explaining away the whole epistemological process which begins with an object in the external world, being followed by perception of the object, identification or judgement of it, verbal or inferential knowledge based on the judgement, a desire to act towards the perceived object, an action, etc., and ends with the actual fulfillment of the desire.<sup>60</sup> Thus he is not only interested

<sup>56</sup> See e.g. Eshō Mikogami, "Śubhagupta no *vāsanā*-iron hihan", *Bukkyōgaku Kenkyū* 38, 1982, and Yūshō Wakahara, "*vāsanā* to *pratyakṣa*", *Bukkyōgaku Kenkyū* 44, 1988.

<sup>57</sup> *Buddhist Logic*. Vol. 2. Dover 1962: 367f.

<sup>58</sup> PS V 47. Cf. M. Hattori, "*Apoha* and *Pratibhā*", in *Sanskrit and Indian Studies*, ed. Nagatomi et al., Dordrecht etc. 1980: 65.

<sup>59</sup> Cf. Herzberger 1986: 167.

<sup>60</sup> See Katsura (cited in note 37) 1984: 231.

in knowledge but also in a human activity stimulated by knowledge and aimed at a certain external object which is capable of fulfilling a human purpose. Therefore he is bound to deal with the problem of how to relate the perceptual realm with the conceptual one. As I mentioned before it is perceptual judgement which bridges the two realms in Dharmakīrti's system. In any case it is hard to imagine the gulf between the two realms there as Herzberger suggests.

Let us now consider how Dharmakīrti could claim the universal concomitance between two items without relying on the *a priori* sphere proposed by Herzberger. Here I would like to refer to Richard Hayes' interpretation of Dharmakīrti. As I mentioned before he takes Dignāga to hold 'the essentially open-minded and critical spirit' of classical Buddhism, but he regards Dharmakīrti as one who violates such a spirit by strongly defending Buddhist teachings.<sup>61</sup> As far as I can see Dharmakīrti could claim the stronger conditions for the logical relation than Dignāga because his 'universe of discourse' was neatly organized in accordance with the two principal relations of *tadutpatti* and *tādātmya* while Dignāga's was just a collection of common sense. The whole system of Dharmakīrti is based upon the Buddhist doctrine of causation and everything can be and should be explained away there by means of causal relation. In this connection it is unnecessary to mention that Dharmakīrti gave the clear definition of *svlakṣaṇa*, which constitutes the perceptual realm of the ultimate reality by introducing the concept of causal efficiency. For Dharmakīrti, to be is to be causally efficient. The notion of causal efficiency is not found in Dignāga.

Dharmakīrti's strong inclination towards the causal interpretation finds its way into his *apoha* doctrine. As I have shown before, Dignāga's *apoha* doctrine is based on his open-ended hierarchy of universals and particulars especially when it comes to determine what is *anya* (the contrary, which is to be excluded) in *anyāpoha*. It seems significant that Dharmakīrti never refers to such a hierarchy. He determines *anya* by causation. According to him two items are non-different when they share the same result (*ekakāryatā*) and they are different when they do not share the same result (*atatkāryatā*).<sup>62</sup> For example, a number of different items can be grouped together and identified as a pot when they can all contain water or other liquids; they are distinguished from the other kinds of vessels such as a dish because the latter cannot hold water. Thus it is clear that identity and difference in Dharmakīrti's system are determined by causal relation.

As I mentioned before, Dignāga would not accept causality as the basis of his inference, while Dharmakīrti strongly relies upon the theory of causation, which seems to make it possible for him to claim the universal connection between the two items. It might have been the case that Dharmakīrti substituted people's common sense, which is Dignāga's final recourse in his system of logic, by the traditional Buddhist doctrine of causation equipped with the new theory of causal efficiency. This may be counted as the other important difference on the *apoha* doctrine between the two logicians.

In conclusion I would like to state that Herzberger's new interpretation of Dignāga's *apoha* doctrine cannot be textually supported and that the orthodox view still holds good. I cannot accept her understanding of the whole framework of Dharmakīrti's system. Yet I appreciate her critical spirit and great efforts to investigate the three important figures of Indian philosophy. Certainly she stimulated me to re-consider the whole *apoha* doctrine of both Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. I am quite sure that Dharmakīrti and post-Dharmakīrti Buddhist logicians shared Herzberger's keen interest in the problem of how to relate the perceptual and the conceptual realm, which had not been fully

<sup>61</sup> Hayes 1988: 309-312.

<sup>62</sup> PVSV 57: *ekakāryatāiva bhāvanām abhedah*; PV I 76, 83.

discussed by Dignāga. Let me now give a tentative list of the main doctrinal differences between Dignāga and Dharmakīrti.

(1) Ontology: Dignāga gives no explicit definition of reality, which seems to indicate his non-commitment to any ontology and system of metaphysics. Dharmakīrti, on the other hand, presents the celebrated definition of reality by introducing the concept of *arthakriyāśakti*. Furthermore, his reality is characterized by momentariness, an idea which has no place in Dignāga.

(2) Epistemology: Again Dignāga gives no definition of *pramāṇa* in general. His main contribution in this field is the introduction of the theory of *svasaṃvedana* (self-cognition) and *apoha*. Dharmakīrti, however, gives the definition of *pramāṇa* being *avisamvādin* (non-contradictory) and *apūrvagocara* (fresh knowledge), which enables him to classify various kinds of cognitions systematically. He introduced a new category of cognition, 'perceptual judgement', by which he was able to bridge the gap between the perceptual and the conceptual realm and explain away the whole epistemological process leading to a practical activity.

(3) Logic: Dignāga's logic centers upon the theory of *trainīpya*. He first introduced the wheel of reasons (*hetucakra*) in order to map various possible relations between a logical reason and a property to be proved. He must be the first Indian logician to hit upon the concept of *vyāpti*. Dignāga's logic is essentially inductive in nature. Dharmakīrti seems to have tried to eliminate the weakness of Dignāga's inductive method. He introduces the concept of *svabhāvapratibandha*, consisting of *tadutpatti* and *tādātmya*, in order to ensure the universal nature of *vyāpti* or *avinābhāva*. Thus Dharmakīrti finds a small space for the *trainīpya* theory and develops a new set of three reasons, viz. *kārya*, *svabhāva*, and *anupalabdhi*. The whole framework of his logic is based on causation, while Dignāga rejects causation as the basis of inference.

Finally, there are a number of topics which are discussed for the first time by Dharmakīrti. For example, he tries to prove several Buddhist doctrines, viz. momentariness, existence of the other world (*paraloka*) and other continuants (*santānāntara*), etc. He also gives a detailed discussion on both Buddha and *āgama*.



## APPENDIX

*Pramāṇasamuccaya* V 13

*anekadharmā śabda 'pi yenārthaṃ nātivartate /*

*pratyāyati tenaiva na śabdaguṇatvādibhiḥ //*

(Sanskrit reconstruction by Frauwallner 1959: 102; Jambūvijaya, DANC II 630, reconstructs: . . . *na tu śabdaguṇādibhiḥ*)

Kanakavarman (Hattori 1982: 117) translates:

*/ du ma chos can sgra la yañ // gañ gis don ni mi spoñ ba /*

*/ de ñid kyis ni rtogs byed kyī // sgra dañ yon tan sogs kyis min /*

Vasudhararakṣita (Hattori 1982: 114-116) translates:

*/ sgras kyañ chos gañ du ma yi // don la 'jug pa ma yin gyi /*

*/ sbyar bya de ñid la de sgra'i // yon tan ñid sogs kyis ma yin /*

Herzberger translates: "Even though a word has multifarious properties, it causes the object to be conveyed by means of that [quality] alone which does not exceed over (*ati-vṛt*) the object; not by means of qualities etc. which belong to words. [Herzberger 1986: 155]

Hayes translates: "A word too has many properties. But it makes its object known through those properties by which it does not deviate from the object; it does not make its object known through the fact that significant sound is a quality and other such properties. [Hayes 1988: 277] (my emphasis)

It is amazing that all of the four translators misunderstood the last *pada* of this important verse.<sup>63</sup> The compound *śabdaguṇatvādi* should be understood as a *dvandva* compound, meaning 'being a word (*śabdatva*), being a quality (*guṇatva*), etc.' The purport of the verse is that a word (e.g. *vrkṣa*) possesses many properties, viz. being a quality, being a word, being a particular word '*vrkṣa*', etc.; of them only those properties, such as 'being a particular word '*vrkṣa*'', by which the word '*vrkṣa*' does not deviate from its object, can help that same word denote its object, but the rest of its properties, namely, 'being a word', 'being a quality', etc., can be of no help, for they, being higher universals, deviate from the object of the word '*vrkṣa*'.

Herzberger, who understands the compound as a *tatpuruṣa* meaning 'qualities of words', tries to read the influence of the Vyāḍi-Vajapyāyana debate as well as the negative allusion to Bhartṛhari into the above verse (Herzberger 1986: 110-112). This is simply impossible. As a matter of fact, Bhartṛhari holds a similar remark of the hierarchy of universals related to a word, which Herzberger herself quotes and translates:

*yathā hi ghaṭe dravyatvapṛthivītvaghaṭatvādīnām aviruddhaḥ samavāyas tathā vrkṣaśabde 'pi guṇatvaśabdatvapṛkṣaśabdatvādīnām ākṛtviśeṣānām aviruddhaḥ samavāyah. (Vākyapakīyavṛtti p. 53, Herzberger 1986: 61)*

"Just as there is in the pot a compatible inherence of [universals such as]: being a substance, being earthen, being a pot, so also there is in the word 'tree' a compatible co-inherence of particular universals, such as: being a quality, being a word, being the word 'tree'." [Herzberger 1986: 18, my emphasis]

<sup>63</sup> The *pada* quoted by Jinendrabuddhi is also not correctly translated. See Hattori 1982: 174: *sgra yi yon tan sogs kyis min*.

In this connection I would like to express my thanks again to Mr. Harada who first suggested the possible link between PS V 13 and *Vākyapadīyavṛtti* and who also supplied me with his excellent studies of Dignāga and Bhartṛhari from which I profited immensely.

### Abbreviations and Literature

DANC I, II	<i>Dvādaśāraṇa Nayacakṛaṇa of Ācārya Śrī Mallavādi Kṣamāśramaṇa. With the commentary Nyāyāgama-nūśāstrī of Śrī Siṃhasūri Gaṇi Vādi Kṣamāśramaṇa.</i> Ed. Muni Jambūvijayaḥ. Part 1. Bhavnagar 1966. Part 2. Bhavnagar 1976.
Frauwallner 1959	E. Frauwallner, "Dignāga, sein Werk und seine Entwicklung." <i>Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens</i> 3, 83-164.
Hattori 1968	Masaaki Hattori, <i>Dignāga, On Perception, being the Pratyakṣapariccheda of Dignāga's Pramāṇa-samuccaya; from the Sanskrit fragments and the Tibetan versions. Translated and annotated.</i> Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Hattori 1982	Masaaki Hattori, <i>The Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti of Dignāga with Jinendrabuddhi's Commentary, Chapter Five: Anyāpoha-Parīkṣā. Tibetan Text with Sanskrit Fragments.</i> Memoirs of The Faculty of Letters, Kyoto University, No. 21. Kyoto.
Hayes 1988	Richard p. Hayes, <i>Dignāga on the Interpretation of Signs.</i> Dordrecht etc.
Herzberger 1986	Radhika Herzberger, <i>Bhartṛhari and the Buddhists – An Essay in the Development of Fifth and Sixth Century Indian Thought –.</i> Dordrecht etc.
Jambūvijaya 1961	Muni Jambūvijayaḥ (ed.), <i>Vaiśeṣikasūtra of Kaṇāda with the Commentary of Candrānanda.</i> Baroda.
JIPh	<i>Journal of Indian Philosophy</i>
Kitagawa 1965	Hiidenori Kitagawa, <i>Indo koten ronrigaku no kenkyū,</i> Tōkyō.
PS	<i>Pramāṇasamuccaya</i> (Dignāga)
PST V	<i>Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā (Viśāḍāmalāvatī),</i> Chapter 5 (Jinendrabuddhi): v. Hattori 1982
PSV	<i>Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti</i> (Dignāga)
PV I	<i>Pramāṇavārttika,</i> Chapter I: v. PVSV
PV II,III,IV	<i>Pramāṇavārttika,</i> Chapters II, III, IV: <i>Pramāṇavārttika-Kārikā (Sanskrit and Tibetan).</i> Ed. Yūsho Miyasaka. <i>Acta Indologica</i> 2 (1971/72), 1-206. (PV II = <i>Pramāṇasiddhi</i> ; PV III = <i>Pratyakṣa</i> ; PV IV = <i>Parārthānumāna</i> ).
PVSV	<i>Pramāṇavārtikasavṛtti:</i> Raniero Gnoli, <i>The Pramāṇavārtikam of Dharmakīrti, the First Chapter with the Autocommentary. Text and Critical Notes.</i> Roma 1960.