

THE MEANS AND LIMITS OF KNOWLEDGE

(712) In this final chapter we propose to examine the means and limits of knowledge as recognized in the Pāli Canonical texts.

(713) In Chapter IV, we noticed that when the Buddha classified his predecessors and contemporaries in respect of the ways of knowledge emphasized by them as the Traditionalists, the Rationalists and the 'Experientialists' (*v. supra*, 250), he identified himself as a member of the last group (*v. supra*, 249). In his address to the Kālāmas and to Bhaddiya Licchavi, where he criticizes six ways of knowing based on authority (*v. supra*, 251) and four ways of knowing based on reason (*v. supra*, 314) on the ground that beliefs based on authority or reason may turn out to be true or false (*v. supra*, 283, 308, 436, 442), he ends on the note that one should accept a proposition as true only when one has 'personal knowledge' (attanā va jāneyyātha, A. II.191) of it, taking into account the views of the wise (*v. supra*, 662).

(714) This emphasis on personal and direct knowledge is found throughout the Nikāyas and in trying to determine the ways of knowing recognized in the Canon, it is necessary to see clearly what was meant by this kind of knowledge.

(715) The fact that the Buddha claimed to be 'one of those' (tesāham asmi, *v. supra*, 249) recluses and brahmans, who had a 'personal higher knowledge' (sāmāñ yeva . . . abhiññāya, *loc. cit.*) of a doctrine not found among 'doctrines traditionally handed down' (pubbe ananussaresu dhammesu, *loc. cit.*) is clear evidence that the Buddha did not claim or consider himself to have an unique way of knowing denied to others. It tanks him in his own estimate as a member of a class of recluses and brahmans, who claimed to have a personal and a 'higher knowledge' of doctrines not found in the various traditions. Who could these 'recluses and brahmans' be, in the light of our knowledge of the historical background? (*v. Chs. I, II, III*).

(716) We saw that the brahmin thinkers fell into three types on epistemological grounds—the Traditionalists of the Vedas and Brāhmaṇas, the Rationalists of the Early Upaniṣads and the 'Experientialists' of the Middle and Late Upaniṣads (*v. supra*, 76, 244). Since the Buddha dissociates himself from the first two classes (*v. supra*, 246) we may presume that he identifies himself among others with the brahmin thinkers of the Middle and Late Upaniṣads. From the time of the Early Upaniṣads, newly discovered doctrines not found in the traditional Vedic learning, were being taught. Śvetaketu had 'learned all the Vedas' (sarvān vedān adhītya . . . Ch. 6.1.2) but had to be instructed by Uddalaka with a doctrine 'whereby what he has not heard (presumably in the Vedic teaching) is heard' (yenaśrutam śrutan bhavati, Ch. 6.1.3). Such doctrines as well as the doctrines constituting the 'higher knowledge' (parā vidyā) of the Middle and Late Upaniṣads (*v. supra*, 75) have to be reckoned among 'the doctrines not traditionally handed down' (anānusutesu dhammeū) referred to in the Pāli passage. The brahmin Rationalists have to be excluded from the class of thinkers, with whom the Buddha identifies himself, also for the reason that they did not claim to have a 'higher knowledge' (abhiññā) based on any kind of contemplative or meditative experience (dhyāna = Pjhāna, *v. supra*, 31), unlike the Middle and Late Upaniṣadic thinkers.

(717) We have observed that these latter thinkers claimed a kind of knowledge, which was a matter of directly 'seeing' or intuiting ultimate reality (*v. supra*, 73) and which was usually described by the word *jñāna* (*v. supra*, 74). In a sense, the emphasis on *jñāna* or knowledge was common to all the Upaniṣadic thinkers, since knowledge came to be valued as the means of salvation at least from the time of the Aranyakas onwards (*v. supra*, 16). Thenceforth, there was a cleavage in the Vedic tradition between the *karmamārga* or 'the way of ritual' and the *jñāna-mārga* or 'the way of knowledge'. Early Buddhism is aware of this distinction, for the Suttaṇipāta mentions the *yāna-pathe* or 'the way of ritual' (*yāna-pathe appamattā*, Sn. 1045) as against the *jñāna-pathe* or 'the way of knowledge' (*jñāna-patthāya sikkhe*, Sn. 868). But it is also necessary to emphasize the distinction between the two ways of knowledge recognized within the Upaniṣads – the intellectual or rational knowledge of the Early Upaniṣads and the intuitive knowledge of the Middle and Late Upaniṣads. Of these two, it is the latter way of knowing that Buddhism values.

(718) There is more evidence that Buddhism recognizes the validity of the means of knowledge upheld by this latter class of thinkers, although its valuation of it and what was known by it was not the same. We noted that *jñāna* was upheld in the Middle and Late Upaniṣads, where knowledge was described as one of 'seeing' (*v. supra*, 73). In the Nikāyas it is said that the Buddha is a *jñāna-vādin* or a *jñānī*. He is described as one who 'knowing, knows and seeing, sees having become sight and knowledge' (*jñānam jñātī passati passati cakkhubhūto nānabūto*, M. I.111). 'The knowing and seeing One' (*jñātā passatā*, M. II.111) is a characteristic description of the Buddha and it is usually said of what he claims to know that he both 'knows and sees' (tam ahām *jñānī passāmī ti*, M. I.329). The central truths of Buddhism are 'seen'. One 'comprehends the Noble Truths and sees them' (*ariyā-saccaṁ avecca³ passati*,⁴ Sn. 229). Even Nirvāṇa is 'seen' (*nibbānaṁ passayyan ti*, M. I.511) in a sense analogous to the seeing of a man born blind after a physician has treated him (*lac. cit.*). The Buddha is one who 'has knowledge and insight into all things' (sabbesu dhammesu ca *jñāna-dassī*, Sn. 478) and 'the religious life is led under the Exalted One for the *knowledge, insight, attainment, realization and comprehension* of what is not *known, not seen*, not realized, not attained, and not comprehended'.⁵ It is said that the statement 'I know, I see' is descriptive of one who claims to be a *nānāparādīn* (*nānāvādaṇī* . . . *vādaṁāno* *jñānam*'imam dhamman⁶ *passāmī* dhamman⁷ t, A. V.42, 44) and *nānāvādaṇī* or the claim to such knowledge is closely associated with *bhāskarāṇī*-*vāda* or the claim to mental culture and development through meditation.⁶

(719) There is no doubt that 'knowledge and insight' (*nānādassana*) or 'knowing and seeing' (*jñātī passati*) in the above sense is mainly though not exclusively (*v. infra*, 721) a by-product of 'mental concentration' (*samādhī*) in *jñāna* or *yoga*. It is said that there is a causal relation between the attainment of mental concentration and the

⁵ Cp. *Saṃālo pi Gotamo nānā-vādo*, aham pi *rūpa-vādo*, *nānā-vādo* kha *pāṇi-nānā-vādena arahati uttarimānasachātānī iddhipāṭhātīrapi dassetum*, D. III.12. Note the connection between *nānāvāda*- and *uttarimānasachātānī*-(paranormal).

⁶ *Nānī ti . . . Tathāgatassa etapī adhivacanāṇī*, A. IV.340.

⁷ Cp. *Paranasaccaṇī sacchilāroṭī*, *paññāya ca ativijjha passati*, M. II.112, 173.

⁸ *Yam . . . amitāṭāṇī adiṭṭhaṇī appatāṇī asacchikātāṇī arabbhisameataṇī*, *tassa nānāvādaṇī dasarāṇī* *pattiṭā sacchikiriyāya abhisamayāya Bhagavati brahmacariyāṇī vissati* t, A. IV.384.

⁹ *Nānāvādaṇī ca . . . vādaṁāno bhāvanāvādaṇī ca jñātānīmāpī dhammaṇī* *passāmī* dhamman⁸ t, A. IV.42, 44.

emergence of this knowledge and insight (*v. infra*, 724). This shows that it is qualitatively similar to the Upaniṣadic 'knowing' and 'seeing' which was also a result of *dhyanā* (cp. *dhyāyamānaḥ*, *v. supra*, 73).

(720) This kind of direct intuitive knowledge was also claimed by some of the Ājīvikas (*v. supra*, 213) and at least the leader of the Jains who professed omniscience (*v. supra*, 311). The direct knowledge and vision of omniscience is in fact called *nāna-dassana* (M. I.482, 519). Pūrṇa Kassapa and Nigantha Nātaputta, who claimed omniscience, are called *Jñāna-vādīn* or those who professed to have this kind of direct intuitive knowledge (cp. *ubhinnāṇī nānā-vādaṇī* . . . , A. IV.429). This is confirmed from what we learn from the Jain scriptures, where knowledge is said to consist of *jñāna* and *darsana*. On this Tatia observes: 'The hoary antiquity of the Jain conception of *jñāna-vāraṇa* and *darsanā-vāraṇa*' points to the antiquity of the distinction between *jñāna-* and *darsana*'.¹ The Jain Agamas use the terms *jñāṇī* and *pēśāī* in order to express the two faculties of the soul.² These Ājīvikas and the Jain leader may therefore be reckoned among the Samāṇas with whom the Buddha identified himself (*v. supra*, 249, 715).

(721) Though we left out the Materialists for the obvious reason that they did not claim any higher knowledge (*v. supra*, 142) there is good reason to believe that when Buddhism used the expression 'knowing and seeing' (*jñānam passampi*), it meant by it the direct knowledge gained by sense-perception as well. We find that the expression, 'I know . . . I see' (*jñānī . . . passāmī*, *v. supra*, 90) was placed in the mouth of the Materialist who claimed to know only what could be directly perceived. We find this expression used in the Nikāyas to denote the direct knowledge derived from sense-perception. Thus in a context, where the conditions under which one's memory is said to become defective are stated (*v. infra*, 722), we find the following simile: ' . . . just as if a man possessed of sight were to observe the reflection of his face in a basin of water disturbed, shaken, tossed about by (gusts of) wind and full of ripples, but fail to know and see (his face) as it really is'³ (*yathābhūtaṇī na jñāneyya na pañceyya*).

¹ *Studies in Jaina Philosophy*, p. 71.

² Seyyathā pi . . . udapatto vāterito calito bhadto ūmijāto tathā cakkhumā puriso sakam mukhaminītaṇī paccevakkhaṇāmo yathābhūtaṇī na jñāneyya na passeyya, S. V.123.

(722) Now Keith seems to have noticed the essential affinity between the way of knowing of the Middle and Late Upaniṣads and that of Early Buddhism; he makes the following observation: 'The view of intuition as the source of true knowledge, and at the same time a decisive cause of emancipation from rebirth is characteristic of Buddhism as of the Upaniṣads, and explains why in neither do we find any serious contribution to epistemology. The Buddha, like the sage of the Upaniṣad, sees things as they truly are (*Yathābhūtām*) by a mystic potency, which is quite other than reasoning of the discursive type. The truth of his insight is assured by it alone, for it is obviously incapable of verification in any empirical manner.'¹ He qualifies this statement when he adds that 'the Canon does not treat intuition (*pañña*) as being wholly distinct from, and unconnected with discursive knowledge . . . it is allied to deliberate and searching mental appreciation (*yoniso manasi-kāro*)' (*op. cit.*, p. 90).

(723) While we agree with Keith's comparison between the way of knowledge accepted in Buddhism and the Upaniṣads, in the light of the evidence that we have shown above, we cannot subscribe to his other remarks. Despite the qualitative similarity between the means of knowledge in the Middle and Late Upaniṣads and Buddhism, it is necessary to note that the latter gives a different orientation to and evaluation of this means of knowledge. This tends to present this knowledge in a different light altogether and makes less obvious the gap between the empirical and the mystical.

(724) In the Upaniṣads one's knowledge and vision is not, in the final analysis, due to one's efforts but to the grace or intervention of Ātman or God (*v. supra*, 73). The emergence of this knowledge is conceived as something inexplicable and mysterious. This character warrants it being called a kind of mystical knowledge. But in the Buddhist account the mental concentration (samādhi) which is a product of training and effort, is a causal factor (*upanisa*) in the production of this knowledge: ' . . . in the absence of right mental concentration and in the case of one not endowed with right mental concentration, the cause is absent (for the production of) the knowledge and insight of things as they really are' (. . . *sammāśamādhiṁhi asati sammāśamādhivipamnaśa hatūpaniṣap hoti yathābhūtañāpadassanañ, A. III.200). It is a natural and not a supernatural occurrence: 'It is in the nature of things (dhammañāt) that a person in the state of (meditative) concentration knows and sees*

what really is. A person who knows and sees what really is, does not need to make an effort of will to feel disinterested and renounce. It is in the nature of things that a person who knows and sees as it really is, feels disinterested and renounces. One who has felt disinterested and has renounced does not need an effort of will to realize the knowledge and insight of emancipation (vimutti-ñānadassanañ). It is in the nature of things that one who has felt disinterested and renounced, realizes the knowledge and insight of emancipation'. (*Dhammañāt esa . . . yan cetanāya karapiyam nibbindāni virajjāni*' ti. *Dhammañāt esa . . . yan yathābhūtām jānatā passati. Yathābhūtām jānatā passato na samādito yathābhūtām jānai passati. Yathābhūtām jānato passato na cetanāya karapiyam nibbindāni virajjāni*' ti. *Dhammañāt esa . . . yan cetanāya karapiyam vimuttīñānadassanañ sacchikaromi*' *Dhammañāt esa . . . yan nibbinno viratto vimuttīñānadassanañ sacchikaroti, A. V.3, 313.) Here the 'knowledge and insight' (*ñāna-dassana*) which is a means to an end and is often called pañña (*v. infra*, 797) as well as the final 'knowledge and insight of emancipation' (*vimuttīñānadassana-*), which is the end itself, are considered to be natural causal occurrences.*

(725) This difference in valuation is clearly brought out when we compare the views of Pūraṇa Kassapa and the Buddha on the nature of knowledge. Both claim to belong to the same class of thinkers on epistemological grounds. Pūraṇa Kassapa is a ñāna-vādin (*v. supra*, 720) and so is the Buddha (*v. supra*, 718). But their theories with regard to the genesis of knowledge are utterly different. Pūraṇa holds that 'there is no cause or condition for the lack of knowledge and insight . . . or for the presence of knowledge and insight' (*nāthi hetu nāthi paccayo aññāñāya adassanāya . . . ñāñāya dassanāya, S. III.126*), while the Buddha holds that 'there was a cause and reason' (*atthi hetu atthi paccayo, loc. cit.*) for both. This is partly due to the fact that Pūraṇa was a niyati-vādin or a Strict Determinist (*v. supra*, 199), but even the Middle and Late Upaniṣadic thinkers in claiming that the arising of the final intuition of reality was due to the grace of Ātman or God (*v. supra*, 73) subscribe to a similar view.

(726) In outlining the causes and conditions for the emergence or non-emergence of this (kind of) knowledge it is said: 'When one dwells with one's mind obsessed with and given to passion and one does not truly know and see the elimination of the passion that has arisen, it is a cause of one's failure to know and see . . . (likewise) ill-will, sloth and torpor, excitement and perplexity, and doubt (are causes

¹ *Buddhist Philosophy*, p. 90.

of one's failure to know and see).¹ On the other hand, the cultivation of the seven factors of enlightenment (*satrabojaṅga*) is said to be a cause and condition for the arising of knowledge and insight.²

(727) The five factors outlined above as what causes the lack of knowledge and insight are in fact the same as what is commonly known in the Pāli Nikāyas as 'the five impediments' (*pāñcānivaraṇa*, D. I.73).

According to the Buddhist theory, the elimination of these five factors is said to clear the way for the development of the jhānas or the meditative states of the mind: 'When these five impediments are eliminated he looks within himself and gladness arises in him and with gladness, joy; with his mind overjoyed his mind becomes at ease and with his body at ease he experiences happiness; being happy his mind becomes concentrated.'³ Then follows a description of the first up to the fourth jhāna. It is at this stage, on the attainment of the fourth jhāna 'when the mind is concentrated, pure, cleansed, free from blemishes, purged of adventitious defilements, supple, pliant, steady and unperturbed' (*evam samāhīcittaparisuddhe pariyodāte anaragā vigaṭupakkilese mudubhūte kammāniye thite ānejjappatte*, D. I.76) that he is said to 'turn and direct his mind to knowing and seeing' (*ñāna-dassasāya cittāp abhinibharati abhininnāmeti, loc. cit.*). The mind in this state is said to observe introspectively but directly one's consciousness associated with the body.⁴ In this same state he turns and directs his mind to 'psycho-kinetic activity' (*iddhi-vidhāya*, D. I.77), to 'clair-audience' (*dibbāya sotadhātu*, D. I.79), to 'telepathic knowledge' (*cetopariyāñāṇye*, D. I.79), to the 'retrocognitive knowledge of past existences' (*pubbenivāśanussatīñāṇya*, D. I.81), to the 'knowledge of the decease and survival of beings' (*sattānāp*

¹ Yasminpi . . . samaye kāmarāgapaṇavayorūthitena cetasā vibhāti kāmarāgapareñena uppammasse ca kāmarāgassa mīssarātaप् yadabhibhūtaप् na jānāti na passati ayam pi . . . hetu ayam paccayo aśīñātya adassāntya . . . byājāda- . . . thīnamiddha- . . . udhaccaṅḍilakruce . . . vicikkicchā, S. V.127.

² Katamo pana bhante hetu, katamo paccayoñātāya dassāntya, krathāp sahetu sapaccayoñātāp dassāntap? Idha . . . satiṣambōjhaṅgaप् bhāvēdi . . . pe . . . spekkhāsamsambōjhaṅgaप्, S. V.127, 128.

³ 'Tass' imme pāñcānivaraṇe pahine attani samanupasseto pāmūlīap jāyati, pamuditassā pīti jāyati, pītmānassa kāyo passambhatti, passaddhaṅkāyo sukhamp vede, sukhuño cittāp samādhīyati, D. I.73.

⁴ These correspond to the 'bhūmis' or the levels of consciousness described in the Aksyupanisad, as studied by Przyłuski and Lamotte; 'Boudhisme et Upajād' in BEFEO, Vol. 32, pp. 160 ff.

⁵ Ayam me kāyo rūpi . . . idān ea pana me vīññātaप् ettha pāti pāti-Baddhan ti, D. I.76.

catūrapāñcāñāṇye, D. I.82), to the 'knowledge of the destruction of defiling impulses' (*āsavakkhayāñāṇya*, D. I.83). These six came to be known as the 'six (kinds of) higher knowledge' (chalañāṇā, v. *infra*, 752) in the Pāli Nikāyas but since the first is a case of 'knowing how' and not of 'knowing that' it came to be dissociated from the rest and these latter were known as the 'five (kinds of) higher knowledge' (pāñcābhiñā, v. *infra*, 752).

(728) We note here the operation of a causal process. The elimination of the impediments makes the mind concentrated in meditation and this in turn makes it possible for it to have knowledge and insight of things as they are (yathābhūtañādassanā). This is why it is often said that 'mental concentration is the cause of knowing and seeing things as they are' (yathābhūtañādassanā upanisā samādhī, S. II.30). One first 'obtains the attainment of virtue' (silasampadañā ārādhetai, M. I.200); this is followed by 'the attainment of concentration' (samādhisampadañā ārādhetai, M. I.201) and subsequently by 'the attainment of knowledge and insight' (ñāpadassanāpāñādārādhetai, M. I.202).

(729) Now the word *pāññā* (wisdom) is often used to denote this 'knowledge and insight' which results from concentration in so far as it pertains to salvation (v. *infra*, 797). It normally has a wider connotation and is used to denote 'intelligence comprising all the higher faculties of cognition'.² The five impediments (*pāñcānivaraṇa*) are often defined as 'defilements of the mind and factors which weaken wisdom' (ceraso upakkilese pāññāya dibbalikaraṇe, M. I.181, 270, 276, 521; II.28). The alleged observation on which this theory is based is that, as we saw above (v. *supra*, 727) 'when the mind is emancipated from these five defilements, it is supple, pliant, lustrous, firm and becomes rightly concentrated for the destruction of the defiling impulses' (yato ca . . . ditram imeti pāñcāhi upakkilesahi vimuttrāt hōti, tam hōti cittām mudu ca karmamānya ca pabbhāsarañ ca na ca pabbhāgu samārā.

ca . . . ditram imeti āsavāñātāpāññā ca pabbhāsarañ ca na ca pabbhāgu samārā. samādhīyati āsavāñātāpāññā, A. III.16, 17). In this state it is said that 'he directs his mind to those things which have to be realized by one's higher knowledge in order to realize them by one's higher knowledge' (cāññāñā-sacchikiriyassa dhammassa cittāp abhininnāmeti dāññāñā-sacchikiriyā, loc. cit.) and here we find enumerated the usual six kinds of higher knowledge he is capable of (sace ālārikkhati, loc. cit.) having (A. III. pp. 17–19).

¹ On this distinction, v. G. Ryle, *The Concept of Mind*, Ch. II, pp. 25–60.

² PTS. Dictionary s.v.; on this term see Mrs Rhys Davids, *Buddhism*, 1914, pp. 94, 130, 201; *Compendium of Philosophy*, pp. 49, 41, 102.

(730) We find here the simile of gold-ore, which is compared to the mind. Gold-ore is said to have the defilements (jātarūpassa upakkilesā, sīsari, sajjham, loc. cit.) but when it is purified, it shines with its natural lustre (cp. also S. V.92, 93). In a Brāhmaṇic context a simile of this sort, functioning as an analogical argument (*v. supra*, 14), would have constituted the proof of the statement that the mind shines forth with its natural lustre and acquires the faculties of extrasensory knowledge and vision, when purged of its defilements. But in the Pāli Nikāyas, unlike in the Jain literature (*v. supra*, 243) *upamā* or 'comparison' is not considered a separate means of knowledge but only as an aid to understanding. It is often said that 'a simile . . . is employed in order to make clear the sense' (upamā . . . katā athassa viññapanāya, M. I.155; III.275; It.114) or that 'some intelligent people understand the meaning of what is said by means of a simile' (upamāya idh'ekacce viññū purisā bhāsītassa athaŋ ajānanti, A. IV.163).

(731) Since sīla or 'virtue' is a prior requirement for the development of samādhi or 'concentration' (*v. supra*, 728), a causal relationship is established between sīla and pāñña (wisdom). This explains the saying that 'wisdom becomes brighter with conduct' (apadāne sobhī pāññā, A. I.102) and also the statement that 'wisdom is cleansed by virtue and virtue is cleansed by wisdom—where there is virtue there is wisdom and where there is wisdom there is virtue' (sīlaparidhōta pāññā pāññāparidhōtaŋ sīlaŋ yathā sīlaŋ tathā pāññā yathā pāññā tathā sīlaŋ. D. I.124).

(732) The five impediments (*v. supra*, 726) constituting the emotional factors as well as mental and physical lassitude (thīnamiddha) not only prevent the mind from being concentrated and thus affect the emergence of jhānic (extrasensory) perception but affect our cognitive faculties even in normal consciousness. A brahmin named Saṅgārava comes to the Buddha and asks the question: 'What is the cause and reason why at times even hymns which have been recited for a long period do not clearly appear (before one's memory) not to speak of hymns not so recited, while at other times even hymns not recited for a long time are easily remembered, leave alone hymns recited for a long time?'¹ It is replied that this happens when the mind is affected by one 'Ko nu kho . . . hetu ko pacayo, yen'ekāda dīgharattapī sajjāyakatā pi manā na ppatibhanti, pageva asajjhāyakatā? Ko pana . . . hetu ko pacayo, yen'ekāda dīgharattapī asajjhāyakatā pi manā patibhanti, pageva sajjāyakatā ti?' A. III.250.

or more of the five impediments which tend to cause forgetfulness (A. III.230-6).

(733) Not only was the origin of knowledge conceived differently (*v. supra*, 725) in Buddhism despite the qualitative likeness in the way of knowing between the Early Buddhist and the Upaniṣadic thinkers (*v. supra*, 719), but there was no agreement regarding the content of knowledge as well. The Upaniṣadic thinkers conceived of the Ātman or the ultimate reality as being seen or perceived (dṛṣṭam), heard or learnt (śrutam), mentally conceived (matam) or rationally understood (vijñātam) (*v. supra*, 70, 71), while in the Middle or Late Upaniṣads the Ātman or Brahman was 'attained' (prāptah, Kātha, 2, 3.18) by the yogic process. But all that is claimed to be known by these means, including the last, is rejected in Buddhism, e.g. yam p'idaŋ dīṭhāni sutam mutamp viññātam pattam . . . manasā: tam pi n'eaŋ mama, n'eso'ham astri, na m'eso atta ti (M. I.136). This is probably the reason why we find in the Buddhist texts an apparently ambivalent attitude towards rāna. On the one hand, it is valued as a means of knowledge necessary for salvation (see, however, *infra*, 798, 799), while on the other hand what is directly known by it is discarded as not being the knowledge of the ultimate reality. Thus while it is said that 'the one who is sceptical should train himself in the path of intuitive knowledge—the Recluse has proclaimed his doctrines after intuitively understanding them' (kathānkaṭī rānapathaya sikkhe, natvā pavutta Samanena dhammā, Sn. 868), we also find statements which criticize rāna—as inadequate for salvation, e.g.:

Passāni sudhānam paramāpi arogaŋ
dīṭhēna saṃpudḍhi naṭassa hoti
etābhijānam 'paraman' ti rānavā
suddhānupassi ti pacceti rānam.

Dīṭhēna ce sudhī narassa hoti
rānam vā so pajahāti dukkhāpi
aññena so sujhati sopadhiiko

Sn. 788, 789.

I.e. 'I see the pure and the transcendent, without defect—by seeing is man's salvation; knowing this, seeing the pure and apprehending it as the transcendent, he falls back on intuitive knowledge. If man's salvation is by 'seeing' and he abandons sorrow by intuitive knowledge, he is saved in a different way (from the true way), being still subject to limitations (also cp. Sn. 908, 909).'

(734) This is not a contradictory attitude. It only means that this kind of knowledge is necessary but not sufficient for salvation. This is made clear by the statement that 'the Exhalted One had declared that there is no salvation from belief, hearing (or learning) or intuitive knowledge . . . nor does he say that it is possible by the absence of belief, hearing (or learning) or intuitive knowledge' (na dīthiyā na sutiyā na fāññā . . . tū Bhagavā visuddhim (v. 1) āha, addīthiyā assutiyā fāññā . . . no pi tena, Sn. 839). What this means is that belief (=saddhā, sammādīthi- v. *supra*, 672), learning or hearing from a teacher (v. *supra*, 672) and the development of knowledge or the verification of what is accepted as a belief, are necessary but not sufficient conditions for salvation. Even 'the knowledge and insight of things as they are' (yathābhūtānādassana-, S. II.30; V.432; A. IV.330), which is had by means of fāññā- is only a means to an end and not the end itself, which is 'salvation' (cp. sammāfāññā sammāvimutti pahoti, M. III.76) or 'the knowledge and vision of salvation' (yimatrī- fāññādassana-, M. I.145; A. III.81; S. V.162).

(735) There is yet another difference, which is apparent in the Early Buddhist attitude towards the data of intuitive experience, which differentiates it from that of the Middle and Late Upanisadic thinkers. The Buddhist considered it possible to misinterpret this experience and draw erroneous inferences from it (v. *infra*, 790). We thus find that Buddhism does not make the claim of the mystic that this knowledge was derived from a supernatural source in an unaccountable manner but that it is a product of the natural development of the mind, and due to the operation of causal processes. It does not regard the content of this experience (like the mystic) as identical with ultimate reality. Buddhism also believes that erroneous inferences could be drawn from these experiences. At the same time it does not decry normal perception but like the Materialists draws many of its conclusions on the basis of it (v. *infra*, 784). It would be misleading to call this mystical or intuitive knowledge in the context of Buddhism in view of the utterly different attitude to and evaluation of it. We shall, therefore, refer to this kind of knowledge as 'extrasensory perception' in the Buddhist context.

(736) When it was said that this knowledge was to be had 'personally' or 'individually' (sāmāṇ) it is necessary to point out that what is meant is not that this knowledge was incommunicable or subjective. The primary reason for the frequent use of 'sāmāṇ' to qualify the verb from √dīś in these contexts, seems to be to emphasize the fact

that this knowledge is to be had by directly seeing 'oneself' and not indirectly by hearing it from some source (as in the Vedic tradition). Thus it is said that a 'monk does not hear that in such and such a village there was a beautiful girl or woman but has *himself* seen her' (Idha . . . bhikkhu na h'eva kho sunāti annukasmin nāma gāme . . . itthi vā kumāri vā abhirūpā . . . api ca kho sāmāṇ passati, A. II.90). The distinction is drawn as to whether 'one has seen it oneself or has heard it from a tradition' (sāmāṇ dittho vā hoti anussavasuto vā, M. I.465).

At a time when a statement would have appeared authoritative only if it was handed down by a long line of teachers (v. *supra*, 294), the Buddha emphasizes that 'he has seen it by himself . . . and that he is not saying so after having heard from another recluse or brahmin' (ditthā mayā . . . tam kho nāññāsa sāmāṇassa vā brāhmaṇassa sutvā vadāmi, It. 58). 'Would it be proper', he says, 'for him to say so . . . if he had not known, seen, experienced, realized and apprehended with his wisdom' (mayā c'etām . . . affātam abhavissa adītham aviditam asacchikatam aphassitam patinaya . . . vadeyram, api nu me etām . . .' patirūpam abhavissā ti, M. I.475). He preaches what he has himself verified to be true but he claims that he could instruct an honest and intelligent person to verify for himself what he had verified: 'Let an intelligent person come to me, sincere, honest and straightforward; I shall instruct him and teach the doctrine so that on my instructions he would conduct himself in such a way that before long he would himself know and himself see . . .' (etu viññā puriso asat̄o amāyāvi vijijātikor: aham anusāsāni, aham dhammāṇ desemī; yathānusīttham tathā patipajjānā na cirass'eva sāmāṇ neyya nāsati sāmāṇ dakkhitī, M. II.44). 'The dhamma' is described as 'bearing fruit in this life, before long, an invitation to "come and see", leading to the goal and verifiable by the wise' (. . . dhammo sandīthiko akāliko ehipassiko opanayiko pacattān veditarbo viññūhi, M. I.37). This shows that this knowledge was not claimed to be a private experience, which could not be communicated.

(737) We saw that while the Vedic brahmans upheld bearing (the scriptures) or testimony as the supreme source of knowledge the main school of the Materialists upheld perception and probably what could be directly inferred from it (v. *supra*, 93, 94) as the only means of knowledge. It is true that even in the Vedic tradition when it came to a matter of deciding between the testimony of sight and hearing, the decision was in favour of the former (v. *supra*, 69) and the Maitri

Upaniṣad takes the stand that perception was the most reliable means of knowledge (*v. supra*, 69), but it was the Materialists who underlined the importance of perception even to the extent of discarding other means of knowledge. The Buddhists seem to have been influenced by the Materialists in their emphasis on perception, although perception here is both sensory as well as extrasensory. ‘Who would believe’ it is said, ‘that this earth and the majestic mountain Sineru would be consumed by fire, *except on the evidence of sight*’ (ko saddhāta ayan ca pathavī Sineru ca pabbatarāja ḥayhissanti ti . . . āñatru dīṭhapadei, A. IV.103).

(738) The Buddhist theory of truth (*v. supra*, 596) also makes it clear that truth and therefore knowledge is objective, as telling us the nature of ‘things as they are’ (yathābhūtā). The knowledge of things as they are consists in knowing ‘what exists as “existing” and what does not exist as “not existing”’, (santam vā atti ti ñassati asantan vā nattu ti ñassati, A. V.36). ‘Knowing things as they are’ it is said, ‘wherever they are, is the highest knowledge’ (etad anuttariyam . . . ñāñānañ yadidam tathā tartha yathābhūtānam, A. V.37). What is taught by the Buddha is claimed to be objectively valid: ‘Whether the Tathāgata preaches the dhamma to his disciples or does not preach it, the dhamma remains the same’ (desento pi Tathāgato sāvakānañ dhammañ tādiso va adesento pi hi dhammo tādiso va, M. I.31).

(739) The importance of eliminating subjective bias and of getting rid of habits of mind that cause people to fall into error is often stressed.

It was the Sceptics who paid the greatest attention to this subject. The first school of Sceptics said that truth cannot be arrived at and it was always a subjective factor such as attachment (chando), passion (rāgo), hate (doso), or repulsion (pañigho), which makes one accept a pro-position as true (*v. supra*, 159). We have already seen that the Buddha’s attitude to the debate (*v. supra*, 688) was similar to that of the Sceptics, most of whom avoided debate because of the vexation that it caused (*v. supra*, 338). We similarly see the influence of the above doctrine of the Sceptics where it is said that there are ‘four ways of falling into injustice’ or untruth (agati-gamanāni, A. II.18), namely out of attachment (chanda-), hatred (dosa-), ignorance (moha-), and fear (bhaya-); the arhat or the ‘ideal person’ in Buddhism is not misled in any of these four ways (D. III.133). The difference from Scepticism is that this does not result in Buddhism in total scepticism with regard to the possibility

of truth. One’s emotions, whether it be one’s likes or dislikes, can distort the truth and the Buddha warns his disciples: ‘If others were to speak ill of me, the Dhamma and the Order, do not bear any hatred or ill-will towards them or be displeased at heart . . . for if you were to be enraged and upset, will you be able to know whether these statements (criticisms) of others were fair or not?’¹ On the other hand, ‘if others were to speak in praise of me, my Dhamma or my Order, you should not be happy, delighted and elated at heart . . . for if you were to be happy, delighted and elated, it will only be a danger to you . . .’² The Buddha himself claims to be neither pleased at the praise of others nor displeased at their abuse. He encourages his disciples to develop this same attitude (tatra ce . . . pare Tathāgatān akkosanti . . . tatra . . . Tathāgatassa na hoti aghāto . . . tatra ce . . . pare Tathāgatān sakkaroni . . . na hoti ānando . . . Tasmātiha . . . tumhe ce pi pare sakkareyyum . . . tatra tumhehi na aghāto . . . karaniyā, M. I.140). When Sāriputta, his own disciple, says in praise of him: ‘I have such faith in the Exalted One that I do not think that there ever has been, nor will there ever be a recluse or brahmin who has greater understanding and knowledge than the Exalted One’, he quietly rebukes him with the remark, ‘have you examined the minds of the perfectly enlightened Exalted Ones of the past . . . the future . . . or my own mind in the present?’ To this Sāriputta replies that he has not. The Buddha thereupon remarks, ‘then why have you uttered a statement so grand, bold, made a categorical claim and uttered a lion’s roar to the effect that “I have such faith . . .” This incident displays the basically objective attitude of the Buddha, who demanded that for statements to be significant and true, they must

¹ Mañap vā . . . pare avaṇap bhāseyyūp dhammasa vā avaṇap bhāseyyūp Saṅghassa vā avaṇap bhāseyyūp, tatra, numhetu na aghāto appacayo na cetaso anabhiaddhi karaniyā . . . tatra ce tumhe assatha kupta vā anuttamana vā api nu tumhe paresañ subhāsiñ dubhāsiñ alāneyyātā ti? D. I.3.

² Mañap vā . . . pare avaṇap bhāseyyūp dhammasa vā avaṇap bhāseyyūp Saṅghassa vā avaṇap bhāseyyūp tatra tumhehi na ānando na stomanasañ na cetaso ubbilāvitarati karaniyāp . . . tatra ce tumhe assatha ānandino sunāna ubbilāvita tumhan yev’assa tēna antarāyo, loc. cit.

³ Evam pasanno abhan bhante Bhagavatī, na cānu na ca bhavissati na c’etanahi vijñati añño samano vā brāhmaṇo vā bhīyo bhīnñātā, D. I.99.

⁴ Kintu nu . . . ye te ahesunū atītā addhānan arahanto Sammāsambuddhā, sabbe te Bhagavanto cetasa ceto paricca viditā . . . kintu pana abhan te etanahi . . .

⁵ Atīta kiñ caranī te ayañ . . . ulāñ āśabhi vācā bhāśā, ekamso gabito, sīhanādo nadito, evampasano abhan . . . , D. III.100.

be based on evidence that warrants their assertion and not on the grounds of our subjective prejudices.

(740) The impact of desire on belief is clearly recognized in Buddhism. One of the causal statements made is that 'on account of desire there is clinging' (*Tanhpaccayā upādānam*, M. I.261). This 'clinging' is described as four-fold, viz. clinging to sense-pleasures (*kāmupādānam*), to rituals (*silabbatupādānam*), to metaphysical beliefs (*dīrthupādānam*) and to soul-(or substance-) theories (*attavādūpādānam*). We are here only concerned with the latter two. This means that we believe in certain metaphysical theories and soul- or substance-theories because we are impelled by our desires to believe in them.¹ These desires are analysed as three-fold, viz. the desire for sense-gratification (*kāma-tanhā*, M. I.48, 299; III.250), the desire for personal immortality (*bhava-tanhā*, loc. cit.) and the desire for annihilation (or the desire for power?).² *vibhava-tanhā*, loc. cit.). These specific desires are not correlated with any particular beliefs in the Pāli tradition, but most probably it would have been thought that those whose desire for personal immortality (*bhava-tanhā*) was strong would have believed in 'a theory of personal immortality' (*bhava-dīrthi*, A. I.83), while those who had a strong desire for annihilation (*vibhava-tanhā*) would have believed in an 'annihilationist (Materialist) theory' (*vibhava-dīrthi*, M. I.65). The beliefs in soul and substance thus not only have their origins in our linguistic habits (*v. supra*, 133, 533) but is also rooted in a craving in us to believe in them. The acceptance of a causal impact of our desires on our beliefs did not, however, result in scepticism with regard to the possibility of knowledge, since according to the Buddhist theory, causation was not deterministic (*v. infra*, 764) and desires therefore did not necessitate all our beliefs. The stress laid on the importance of eliminating subjective bias is therefore probably due to a realization of this impact of desire on belief. The objectivity that should be achieved in introspection after attaining the fourth jhāna is described as follows:

¹ Cp. Stebbing, *op. cit.*, pp. 404-5. 'there seems to be a deep-rooted tendency in the human mind to seek what is identical, in the sense of something that persists through change... Hence the search for an *underlying* entity, a persistent stuff, a substance...'. Both interpretations are possible since 'vibhava' means both 'power' and 'annihilation' in the Nikāyas (*s.v.* PTS. Dictionary). The latter is the usual interpretation given in the commentaries (see Dialogues III.208). At D. I.32, we find vibhava- used as a synonym of uchedha- (annihilation) and vināśa- (destruction); sato sattrassa uchedan vināśam *vibhavet*.

'Just as one person should objectively observe another, a person standing should observe a person seated or a person seated a person lying down, even so, should one's object of introspection be well-apprehended, well-reflected upon, well-contemplated and well-penetrated with one's knowledge'.¹ This emphasis on the importance of getting rid of our prejudices and habits of mind, which make us fall into error reminds us of Bacon's 'idols', which according to him interfere with the objectivity of our thinking.

(741) We may next inquire as to what means of knowledge constitute this alleged objective 'knowledge and vision' (*ñānadassana-*) or 'knowing and seeing' (*jānāti passati*). We may dismiss verbal testimony since the above 'seeing' was sharply distinguished from it (*v. supra*, 736) and we have ample evidence (*v. supra*, Chs. IV and VIII) that it was not considered a genuine means of knowledge. We may also dismiss reasoning in the sense of tarka- (indirect proof, or *a priori* proof) as an unsatisfactory means of knowledge according to Buddhism. 'This is probably the reason why 'the dhamma' is said to fall outside the scope of *takka-* but be verifiable by the wise' (dhammo... atakkāvacaro ... Panditavedāniyo, M. I.167). Since comparison or *upamā* is also not recognized as a means of knowing (*v. supra*, 730), we are left with perception (normal and paranormal) and inference based on perception (in the sense in which this was understood by the second group—group (2)—of Materialists, *v. supra*, 94). By examining the terminology and descriptions of knowledge in the light of the claims of knowledge, we find that it was these means of knowledge, which are denoted by the phrase '*jānāti passati*' and the word *ñānadassana-*'.

(742) We have already observed that the phrase '*jānāti passati*' was used to denote the knowledge derived from perception on the part of the Materialists (*v. supra*, 721) and the yogic intuition of the Mystic (*v. supra*, 719). If we take the words for 'seeing' we find that they are used in the Nikāyas to denote normal as well as extrasensory perception. Thus at A. III.208 (cp. 299) the word '*dīrtham*' is used for what is 'observed' by sight;² at Ud. 68, '*dīrtha-*' is used to denote what is

¹ Seyyathā pi ... anno vā aññātā paccavekkhavya, tito vā nisinnātā paccavekkhavya, nisinnō vā nípannātā paccavekkhavya, evam eva ... paccavekkhanāmittam sugrahitañ hoti sumanasiñatañ stiñadharitañ supativeddham patñaya ...

² A. III. 27.

³ 'Api nu tumhehi *dīrtham* vā sutan vā ayati puriso pāñcātipāñam patñaya ... tam enāpī rājano graheryā hanant.

'perceived'¹ by the touch of blind men. At It. 58, 'dīptiha' is used to refer to what is 'seen'² by the Buddha by means of extrasensory perception. It is necessary to note that 'dīpti-' (Belief) is sharply distinguished from dīptiha-in the sense of what is perceptually observed, e.g. dīpti-gatan 'ti etam apantam etam Tathāgatassā. Dīptam etam Tathāgatena, M. I.486). The Niddesa which belongs to the Nikāyas, commenting on the verb 'addakkhi' which means 'he-saw' says it could mean 'he saw with his telepathic knowledge . . . retrocognitive knowledge . . . his human eye or divine eye' (paracitta-ñāṇena vā addakkhi, pubbenivāśānussatiñāṇena vā . . . mansacakkhunā vā . . . dibhena cakkhunā . . . Nd. I.323). This means that 'see' may denote normal or paranormal (extrasensory) perception. Likewise dāssana- is used for 'visual perception' (A. III.325) as well as in a wider sense of 'perception' which includes both sensory and extrasensory perception (e.g. āsavā dāssanā pahātabbā, M. I.7). Ñāṇa-dāssana-, as we saw (*v. supra*, 719) was used generally to denote the knowledge derived from extrasensory perception. When the Buddha says that 'there arose in him the knowledge and insight that Uddaka Rāmaputto had died the previous night' (ñāṇañ ca pana dāssanam udapādi; abhidosañkālakato Uddako Rāmaputto ti, M. I.190), we have to presume that this knowledge and insight was had by means of extrasensory perception, although the Comy. tries to make out that omniscience is here intended.³

(743) It may be observed that ñāṇa-dāssana- is also used to denote the knowledge of salvation which is normally distinguished from it and is called the knowledge and insight of salvation' (vimutti-ñāṇadāssana-) as opposed to 'the knowledge and insight of things as they are' (yatībhūta-ñāṇadāssana-) (*v. supra*, 724), e.g. 'there arose in me the knowledge and insight that my salvation is unshakable, that this is the last birth and that there is no further birth' (ñāṇañ ca pana me dāssanam udapādi; akuppā me vimutti, ayam antīmā jāti naṭhi dāni punabbhavo, M. I.167; III.162). Ñāṇa-dāssana- in this sense is equivalent to *āññā* (final knowledge), a term which is exclusively used to denote this knowledge of final salvation (e.g. idha bhikkhu aññāp byākaroti, M. III.29; aññaya nibbutā dhīrā, S. I.24; sammadañña vimutti, M. II.43).

(744) The psychology of perception in the Nikāyas has been studied by Dr Sarathchandra, who is impressed by the empiricist approach

¹ *Dīpti* . . . jaccandhehi hatthi. ² *Dīpti* . . . maya satta apāyam upapanna. ³ Ñāpan ca pana me ti maya sabbānurāññap udapadi, MA. II.186.

to the subject found here. He says that 'what is most interesting in the analysis of mind contained in this literature is its empiricist approach and the fact that this approach produced results which are strikingly similar to those produced by modern psychologists using introspective methods . . . I believe that these are the first speculations putting forward a naturalistic view of mind and the closest in the ancient world to present-day psychological theories'.¹ The *raison d'être* of this new theory of perception according to Dr Sarathchandra is that Buddhism having cast aside the current conceptions about the soul, had to advance an alternative hypothesis to explain such functions of the senses as seeing, hearing, smelling or tasting which, in the Upaniṣadic philosophy, were activities of the Ātman residing in the respective sense-organs' (*op. cit.*, p. 3).

(745) In our opinion, this explanation puts the cart before the horse. It is not that Buddhism casts aside the concept of the soul and then evolves a completely new theory of perception altogether but that the approach of Buddhism results on the one hand in the elimination of metaphysics and on the other in the retention and development of some of the empiricist findings in the Upaniṣadic theories of perception. Let us illustrate this. The Buddhist account gives a strictly causal explanation of the origin of sense-cognition without recourse to any of the Upaniṣadic metaphysical concepts. Visual cognition, for example, results from the presence of three conditions (1) an unimpaired internal sense-organ of sight (ajihattikam . . . cakkhu aparibhinnam hoti, M. I.190), (2) external visible forms entering into the field of vision (bhāra ca rūpa āpātham āgacchanti, *loc. cit.*), and (3) an appropriate² act of attention on the part of the mind (tajjo ca samannāhāro hoti, *loc. cit.*). When these conditions are satisfied, it is said that 'there is a manifestation of this kind of perception' (viññāna-bhāgassa pātubhāvo *M. I.190*).

¹ *Buddhist Psychology of Perception*, The Ceylon University Press, Colombo, 1958. Introductory Note, p. viii. This was originally presented as a Ph.D. thesis, viz. The Psychology of Perception in Pali Buddhism with special reference to the theory of *bhāvanā*, Ph.D. (London), 1948.

² Tajāsa ti tadañurūpasse, i.e. tajā- means appropriate to it, MA. II.229. Sarathchandra says that 'samannāhāro' here can refer to either 'an automatic act of sensory attention or a 'deliberate act directed by interest' (*v. op. cit.*, p. 21). He prefers the former and adds that 'the Sanskrit is preserving the original meaning of the term' (*op. cit.*, p. 22) but the Sāññambha Sutta (quoted by him) merely has 'tajā- manasi-kāraṇa pratiñā', i.e. on account of the reflection resulting from it (*v. ed. N. A. Sastri, Adyar, 1959*, p. 15; *Madhyamaka Vṛtti*, ed. Poussin, p. 567).

not, *loc. cit.*) All the above conditions, it is said, must be satisfied for the production of the above result. If condition (1) is satisfied but not (2) and (3), or if conditions (1) and (2) are satisfied but not (3), the result will not take place (*v. M. I.190, lines 20 to 28*). All this is in accordance with the Buddhist causal theory (*v. infra*, 766) but nevertheless the elements of the above hypothesis are traceable to the Upaniṣads and this Dr Sarathchandra (*op. cit.*, pp. 21, 22) does not seem to have noticed. Taking the ten sensory and motor organs together the Kauśīrati Upaniṣad points out that 'the material elements cannot exist without the cognitive elements nor the cognitive elements without the material elements and from either alone no form would be possible'.¹ Except for the fact that the 'cognitive elements' are here metaphysically conceived as the agents of the sensory functions, there is a recognition of the mutual causal dependence of sensible objects and their respective cognitions. Likewise the importance of attention for sense-cognition is recognized in the Upaniṣads where it is said, 'my mind was elsewhere, I did not see; my mind was elsewhere, I did not hear, for with the mind does one see and with the mind hear'.²

(746) While we have rendered *vijñāna-* in the above passage (*i.e.* M. I.190) as 'perception' Sarathchandra translates it as 'sensation' (*op. cit.*, p. 21) and has a theory about it. He says that *vijñāna-* in these contexts has been often 'interpreted to mean cognition' (*op. cit.*, p. 4) but that it meant 'not full cognition, but bare sensation, a sort of anoetic sentience' (*loc. cit.*); later he says that '*vijñāna* in the earliest texts was almost synonymous with *satiñā*' (*op. cit.*, p. 16). This interpretation is based on the analysis of a single context (M. I.191, 192) and the alleged confirmation of this sense from the Abhidhamma (*op. cit.*, pp. 4, 25). Sarathchandra promises to 'analyse the various meanings of *vijñāna*' (*op. cit.*, p. 4) but this promise is not fully kept (*v. op. cit.*, pp. 16-21) since he has failed to discuss those contexts in which *vijñāna-* and the verbal forms of *vi + vijñā* have a distinctly cognitive connotation.

(747) Let us examine some of these contexts. The sense of 'knowledge' for *vijñāna-* is quite clear where it is said that 'the Tāthāgata should be examined in order to know' (*vijñānāya, lit.* for the knowledge of),

¹ Yaddhi bhūtamātrā na syur na prajñamātrā syur, yad vā praññāmātrā na syur na bhūtamātrā syuh, na hy anyatarato rūpam kūcana sidhyet, 3.8.

² Anyatra manā abhivāyam nādarśam, anyatra manā abhivāyam nāśrauśam iti manasāḥ eva paśyati, manasā śroti, Brh. 1.5.3.

whether he is perfectly enlightened or not'.¹ Defining *vijñāna-* it is said that 'one discriminates (by means of it), therefore is it called knowledge' (*vijñānāti ti . . . tasnā vijñānanāti vuccati, M. I.292*); what does one discriminate—one discriminates 'the pleasurable from the painful and the neutral' (*kiñ ca vijñānati: sulhan ti pi . . . dukkhan ti pi . . . adukkhamasulhan ti pi, loc. cit.*). *Paññā*, a term which means 'understanding' and has a clearly cognitive import is placed on a par with *vijñāna-*. It is said that 'the states of *pañña* and *vijñāna* are intermingled; it is not possible to analyse and specify the difference—what one understands, one knows and what one knows, one understands' (*yā ca paññā yañca vijñānam īme dhammā saṃpaṭṭhā no visamaṇsaṭṭhā, na ca labbhā imesañ dhammānañ vijñānañ vijñānañ vijñānañ nānākaraṇañ paññapetuṁ*. *Yam pajānāti tam vijñānāti, yan vijñānāti tam pajānāti*, M. I.292). It will be seen that *vijñānāti* is used synonymously with *pajānāti*, a word which is employed to denote the 'cognizing' of the four truths.² A difference between the two words is, however, mentioned—'*paññā-* is to be cultivated and *vijñāna-* comprehended; this is the difference' (*paññā bhāverabbā vijñānātā paññeyyāt, idam nesāt nānākaraṇa*, M. I.293). In other words, *vijñāna-* seems to be the general term for 'cognition', while *paññā* is more or less restricted in connotation to the cognition of spiritual truths. In a Sutta, which says that 'man is composed of six elements' (*chadhātu' yam . . . puriso, M. III.239*), the statement is made that 'it is with *vijñāna-* that one understands something' (*tena vijñānena kiñci jānāti, M. III.242*). This is in fact a continuation of the sense in which we find the word used in the Upaniṣads (*v. supra*, 70).

(748) The context on which Sarathchandra bases his interpretation of *vijñāna-* reads as follows: *cakkhuñ ca paṭicca rūpe ca uppajjati cakkhu-vijñānam, tiṇṇam sangati phasso, phassapaccayā vēdanā, yamp vēde tiṇṇam, saññāti, yan saññāti tam vitakketi . . .* We may translate this as follows: 'Dependent on the eye and forms arises visual perception, the concurrence of the three is contact, dependent on contact is sensation, what one senses one recognizes and what one recognizes one thinks about . . .' Sarathchandra's argument is that 'knowledge comes later' (*op. cit.*, p. 4) in the above process. This interpretation assumes that there is a temporal succession in the above states; *vijñāna-* is assumed to be a state occurring earlier than even *vēdanā* or *saññā*.

¹ Tathagate samanvesanā kātabbā, samanvāsānudho vā no vā iti vijñānāya ti, M. I.317.

² *Pajānāti pajānāti ti . . . kiñ ca pajānāti, idam dukkhan ti pajānāti . . .* M. I.292.

(*v. sañjānāti*) and hence it is 'bare sensation' or 'anoetic sentience'. But this interpretation is arbitrary since it is possible to argue that sensation (*vedanā*) and the rest arise simultaneously along with contact (*phassa*) and not in temporal succession. This is in fact how the Comy. construes it, saying 'on account of that contact, there arises dependent on contact, hedonic experience, etc. (*vedanā*), in a *co-nascent manner*' (*tan phassam paticca sahajātādīvaseva phassapaccayā vedanā uppajjati*, MA. II.77).

(749) Dr Sarathchandra also appeals to the Abhidhamma in support of this meaning of *viññāṇa*: 'In the Abhidhamma, *viññāṇa*- is defined as bare consciousness or sensation as yet undiscreted by the selective activity of the mind. It is the awareness of the presence of objects. It does not produce knowledge of any sort' (*op. cit.*, p. 25). In support of this he quotes two statements from the Comy. to the Vibhaiga (i.e. VbhA. 405 and 321: *op. cit.*, p. 25, fn. 1 and 2). Neither of these statements in our opinion supports his conclusion. The Vibhaiga, it may be noted, enumerates the 'five kinds of sense-cognition' (*pañcā-viññāṇan*) in the section and chapter dealing with knowledge (*v. nānāvibhaṅga, nānāvarthu*, p. 306). Now the Vibhaiga states that 'with the five sense-cognitions one does not apprehend anything¹ other than what enters their sensory field' (*pañcā viññāṇehi na kañci dhammāpi pañivijjānāti . . . añnatra āpāthamatā*, Vbh. 321). Sarathchandra has quoted only part of this passage (from the Comy.) leaving out the other part. Naturally, it appears to mean the opposite of what it says. It is the same with the other quotation (VbhA. 405). When stated fully it reads: 'Even a very learned person does not apprehend a single act of good or evil other than the visual objects, etc., which come into his field of vision. Visual cognition here is mere visual perception. Auditory cognition, etc., (consists of) mere hearing, smelling, tasting and touching'.² In the light of the above evidence we can hardly agree with Sarathchandra's theory. We may take the 'six kinds of *viññāṇa*' (*cha . . . viññāṇakāya*, M. I.53, 259; III.216, 281) spoken of in the Nikāyas as comprising the five kinds of sensory perception and internal perception or introspection (*manoviññāṇan*, *loc. cit.*).

¹ This is suggested even at M. I.99, where the five constituents are said to be present in a visual perception.

² The Comy. explains, 'One does not comprehend anything good or evil (kusalañ akusalān vā na pañjānāti, VbhA. 405).

³ Supāñcito pi puriso jhāperiyā apāthagatān rūpādīni añnam kusalākusalāsu ekadhamman pi pañcāhi viññāñehi na pañivijjānāti. Cakkhuviññānam pan'etha dassanamattan eva hotu.

(750) As we have seen, in addition to normal perception, there is a recognition of paranormal¹ or extrasensory² perception, as a valid means of knowledge. The theory behind this was that when the mind is cleansed of its 'impurities' (*upakkilesa*), or defilements, it acquires these faculties (*v. supra*, 729, 730). 'When the defilements of the mind are eliminated and the mind is prone to dispassion and is developed by dispassion, it becomes supple as regards the things verifiable by higher knowledge' (... *cetaso upakkileso palino hoti nekkhammāni-nam c'assa cittāp hoti nekkhamma-paribhāvitāp cittāp kammaniyāp khāyati abhiññā sacchikarañyesu dhammesū ti, S. III.232). The defilements (*upakkilesa*) of one who is engaged in developing the higher mind (adhicittāp anyuttasa) are said to be three-fold, gross (*olārikā*), medium (*majjhimikā*), and subtle (*sukhummā*). The gross defilements consist of misconduct with regard to body, speech or mind (*kāya-duccaritāp, vacīp, mano*); the medium defilements are sensuous thoughts (*kāmavikāka*), thoughts of destruction (*vyāpāda*), and ill-will (*vilinśā*); the subtle defilements consist of attachment to one's race (*jāti*), country (*janapada*), egotism (*avaññāti*). Spiritual thoughts alone remain (*dhammavitakkā avassant*); when these defilements are got rid of, the mind is stayed within (*cittāp ajhattāp sanitthi*) and he directs it (abhiññāmeti) in the exercise of the six forms of higher knowledge (A. I.254, 255). These experiences are had 'after attaining the supreme perfection of equanimity and mindfulness' (*anuttaram upekkhaśatiparisuddhi* *āgama*, M. I.367), which is characteristic of the fourth jhāna.³ While we may be inclined to suspect the veridical character of these experiences, it was probably believed that 'since the mind was clear and cleansed' (*citte parisuddhe parityodāte*, D. I.76) in this state, it was possible to have a clearer insight into the nature of things by means of this knowledge, than by normal perception.*

(751) Poussin has emphasized the importance of '*abhiññā*' (higher knowledge) in Early Buddhism.⁴ Demiéville has made a comparative study of 'retrocognitive knowledge' (*pubbenivāsānussatiñāpa*) as mentioned in the Pāli Nikāyas and the *Āgama* (Chinese) literature.⁵ *Asikkanta-mānasaka*, *lit.* going beyond the human, D. I. 82, in this context, it is used only of *dibba-cakkhu*.

¹ Later in Indian thought we find the use of *atindriya-pratyakṣa*, *lit.* extra-sensory perception.

² C.P. Upekkhaśatiparisuddhi catutthajhānañ, M. I.22; *v. S. Lindquist, Siddhi und Abhinnā*, Lund, 1935, p. 78.

³ 'Le Bouddha et les Abhinnā' in *Muséon*, 1935, pp. 335-342.
⁴ 'Le Mimoire Des Existences Antérieures' in BEFEO, Vol. 27, pp. 283-98.

The most thorough study so far is by Lindquist who has made a comparative analysis and examination of the concepts of siddhi (P. iddhi) and abhiññā, as they occur in the Pali Buddhist and Brahmanical literature, especially *Yoga*.¹ He has occasionally compared this material with Western parallels and studies bearing on them. We shall, therefore, not go over trodden ground but confine ourselves to those aspects of abhiññā (higher knowledge), which concern the epistemology of Buddhist thought.

(752) The word abhiññā, as the PTS. Dictionary states² (*s.v.*), has an 'older wider meaning of special supernatural power of apperception and knowledge-to-be-acquired by long training in life and thought'. Later, it exclusively means one of the six powers (*v. infra*), all of which are mentioned in all strata of the Pali Canon. They are claimed to have been attained by the Buddha (M. I.69) as well as by his disciples (S. II.217, 222). It is said that 'out of five hundred monks, sixty have attained the six-fold higher knowledge'.³ The six are as follows:

1. iddhiyidha-, i.e. psychokinesis (levitation, etc.)
2. dibbasoradhatu, i.e. clairaudience
3. cetopariyāñāna-, i.e. telepathic knowledge
4. pubbenivāśāntusaratiññā-, i.e. retrocognitive knowledge
5. dibbacakkhu, i.e. clairvoyance; also known as cūtūpapātāññā (D. I.82), knowledge of the decease and survival of beings.
6. āsavakkhayāññā-, i.e. knowledge of the destruction of defiling impulses.

Of these, the first is strictly not a cognitive power in the sense of a 'knowing that' (*v. supra*, 727). It consists according to the Visuddhīmægga in various manifestations of the 'power of will' (adhipitħāññā iddhi) in jñāna (*v. Vm. 405*) and have been dealt with at length by Lindquist (*op. cit.*, pp. 12-65). The sixth too is partly a case of 'knowing that'. Of the second (*v. Lindquist, op. cit.*, pp. 72-4), it is said that 'with one's clairaudience, clear and paranormal, one hears two (kinds of) sound, human and divine, far and near' (so dibbāya sotadhātuyā visuddhāya arikkantamānusikāya ubho sadde sunāti, dibbe ca mānuse

ca, ye dūre santike ca, D. I.79; M. II.19). This implies not only the alleged ability to perceive sounds even at a distance without the intervention of the physical media of hearing but the claim to be able to appreciate the sounds of non-human spirits. It is an expansion of auditory perception (without the medium of the sense-organ) both in extent as well as in (what may be called) depth. The Buddha is said to have heard the brahmin Bhāradvāja's conversation with the wandering ascetic Māgandiya at a distance by means of this faculty (M. I.502). Sunakkhata confesses to Oṭṭhaddha that just three years after following the training of the Buddha he has the ability (in jñāna) of 'seeing celestial figures . . . though he cannot hear their voices'.⁴

(753) The other four forms of abhiññā, it will be noticed, are called specific forms of knowledge (ñāna-). Lindquist has not given the definition of 'the (paranormal) knowledge of another's mind' (ceto-pariyāññā-) as it appears in the Pali Canon⁵ and has also failed to see that two different kinds of telepathy are spoken of in these texts. Ceto-pariyāññā corresponds to manahparyāya-jñāna- (Ard. Mag-manapajjavāññā-) in Jainism. According to the earliest account of this faculty it would appear that by means of it one would know only the general state of the mind of another. It is said, 'he comprehends with his mind the mind of other beings and individuals as follows: he knows that a passionate mind is passionate, (likewise) he knows a dispassionate mind, a mind full of hatred and free from hatred, ignorant and devoid of ignorance, attentive and distracted, exalted and unexalted, inferior and superior, composed and not composed, emancipated and not emancipated'.⁶ This is compared to observing one's face in a mirror (ādase) or a pan of water (udakapatre) and noticing whether there is a mole or not (sakanikam vā . . . akaniktañ tī jāneyya, D. I.80). This description seems to imply that only the general character of another's mind is known in telepathy. But in the same stratum of thought it is said that 'one can read the mind, the states of mind, the thoughts and the trains of thought of other beings and individuals' (. . . parasatāñnap para-

¹ Dibbāni hi kho rūpāni pasāni piyārūpāni . . . no ca kho dibbāni siddāni supūjāni, D. I.152.

² So parasatāñnam parapuggalānam cetāñ ceto paricca pajāñāti—saragam vā cittam saragāñ cittam ti pajāñāti, vitaragam vā cittam . . . sadosam vā cittam . . . virodosam vā . . . samoham . . . vitamoham . . . sankhittam . . . vikkhittam . . . mahaggatam . . . amahaggatam . . . sautaram . . . anuttaram . . . samāhitam . . . asamāhitam . . . vimuttam . . . avimuttam . . .

³ Op. cit., pp. 75-7.

⁴ S. Lindquist, *Siddhi und Abhiññā*, Lund, 1935; cp. S. Lindquist, *Die Methoden des Yogs*, Lund, 1932, pp. 165-87.

⁵ Cp. G. C. Pande, *Studies in the Origins of Buddhism*, University of Allahabad, 1957, p. 37.
⁶ Pāncannam bhikkhusaññap . . . satphi bhikkhū chalabhiññā, S. I.191.

puggalānaṃ cittam pi adisati cetasikam pi... vitakkitam pi... vicāritam pi..., D. I.213). At M. II.169, the Buddha claims to know by this means 'a specific thought' (parivitakkam) in the mind of a brahmin student. In the Anguttara Nikāya (A. I.170, 171) it is said that one can know another's mind (ādesanā-pañihāriyam) in both the normal and paranormal senses in one of four ways, viz. (i) by observing external signs (nimittena) (*v. supra*, 153), (ii) by getting information from others or from a mediumistic source, (iii) by listening to the vibration (vippahā-saddamp) of the thoughts (vitakka-) of another as he thinks and reflects (vitakkayato vicārayato), and (iv) by comprehending with his mind the mind of another and observing how the mental dispositions are placed in the mind of a particular individual (mānasorūpikārā pañilitā imassa cittassa antarā), on the part of one who has attained the state of concentration free from cogitative and reflective thought (avitakkam avicāraṇaṃ samādhīn). It will be noticed that (iii) and (iv) here represent two types of telepathy—*indirect telepathy*, had in normal consciousness where the 'thought-vibrations' of the other person are received and interpreted and *direct telepathy* had in jñāna. The Jain texts likewise distinguish between two kinds of telepathy; the Sthānāga Sūtra speaks of *prāmati* and *vipulamati* as the two types,¹ but the nature of the distinction is not clear.²

(754) The other three kinds of higher knowledge are of special concern to Buddhism since it is by means of them that 'the three-fold knowledge' (tisso vijjā) is attained (*v. infia*, 801). Demiéville deplores the lack of an original and well-established Buddhist theory on the memory of previous existences (*op. cit.*, p. 298) but the Pāli Nikāyas are apparently not interested in accounting for this memory by a theory but in merely stating that it is a faculty that can be evoked. It is said that as one directs one's mind, when it is supple and pliant after attaining the fourth jhāna (*v. Lindquist, op. cit.*, p. 78), 'he recalls his manifold past existences, one birth, two... for many periods of world evolution and dissolution as follows, "I was in such a place with such a personal and family name, such a status, having such and such food, such and such experiences and such a term of life. Dying there I was born in such and such a place; there too I had such a name... Dying there I was born here". Thus he recounts his manifold previous

existences in all their aspects and details'.³ This is compared to a person going on a journey from village to village being able to recall the details of his journey (D. I.81).

(755) Clairvoyance (*v. Lindquist, op. cit.*, pp. 82-8) is directed towards gaining a knowledge of the decease and survival of beings and acquiring an understanding of karma: 'With his clear paranormal clairvoyant vision he sees beings dying and being reborn, the low and the high, the fair and the ugly, the good and the evil, each according to his karma...'.⁴ It is also by its means that one sees contemporaneous events beyond the ken of normal vision. Thus the Buddha claims to see the group of five monks dwelling in Benares in the deer-park of Isipatana (M. I.170) or Vejukāṇḍaki Nandamāta giving alms to monks led by Sariputta and Moggallāna (A. III.336). Anuruddha, who is considered the chief among those disciples who had attained clairvoyance (A. I.23), was believed to have the power of 'seeing a thousand worlds' (saṭṭasampū lokanām voloketi, M. I.213). This faculty resembles Jain *grāhi* (*v. supra*, 241) with the difference that the latter makes the vision of things possible irrespective of the time factor as well (*v. Tatia, op. cit.*, p. 61).

(756) With the last, i.e. the knowledge of the destruction of the defiling impulses, he is able to verify the Four Noble Truths as well as the origin and cessation of the defiling impulses: 'He knows "this is the truth of suffering", "this is the cause of suffering", "this is the cessation of suffering" and "this is the path leading to the cessation of suffering", "these are the defiling impulses", "this is the cause of the defiling impulses", "this is the cessation of the defiling impulses" and "this is the path leading to the cessation of the defiling impulses".'⁵

(757) Along with perception, both normal and paranormal, seems to have gone inference (anumāna). The word 'anumāna' occurs apparently

¹ So arekavīhāra pubbenivāsānam anussari—seyyadidam ekam pi jām dve pi jāayo ... aneke pi samvatta-vivata-kappe. 'Anutṭasim evam-nāmo evam-gotto evam-vāno evam-ākāro evam-sukkha-dukkhapatisarvē evam-āyarparyanto. So tato cuto amutra upapādin. Taccāpasi evam-nāmo... So tato cuto idhūpapano' ti iti sākāraṇ sauddesap aneka-vihārap pubbenivāsānam anussari, D. I.82.

² So dibbena cakkhunā visuddhena atikkantamānakena satte passati cavanāne upapajjānāne hūne pañipe suraṇe dubbaṇe sugate duggate yathā-kamnūpaga

³ *v. Tatia, op. cit.*, p. 66.

⁴ It will be seen that the interpretations of these two terms by Umasvati (*op. cit.*, p. 66) and Pūjyapada (*op. cit.*, p. 68) are different.

⁵ So 'ayam dukkhan' ti yathābhūtān pajānāti, 'ayam dukkhasanudayo' ti... 'ayam dukkha-nirodho' ti... 'ayam dukkhanirodhangamūpatipāda' ti... 'ime-āśava' ti... 'ayam āśava-samudayo' ti... 'ayam āśava-nirodho' ti. 'ayam

in the sense of 'inference' despite Mrs Rhys Davids' statement that 'anumāna apparently does not occur at all' in the Pitrakas (v. E.R.E., Vol. 8, p. 133, fn. 4). In the Anumāna Sutta (M. I.95 ff.), the principle is laid down that one should not do unto others what one does not wish others to do unto you. This is said to be based on the knowledge that what is generally disliked by oneself is likely to be disliked by others as well; this knowledge is said to be due to inference: 'Here one should oneself infer (*anuminitabham*) as follows: "An evil person who is swayed by evil thoughts is disagreeable to and disliked by me; now if I were to be evil and swayed by evil thoughts, I too would be disagreeable and disliked by others".'¹ This embodies the following two inferences:

- (i) I dislike an evil person.
- X (i.e. any person other than me) is like me (as a person).
- Therefore, X (probably) dislikes an evil person.²
- (ii) X dislikes an evil person (conclusion of (i)).
- I am an evil person.
- Therefore, X dislikes me.

(758) We also meet with the term 'anvaye nānām' (S. II.58, D. III.226, Vbh. 329) meaning 'inductive knowledge' in both the Nikāyas as well as in the Abhidhamma. By this is meant the inferential (inductive) knowledge that a causal sequence or concomitance observed to hold good in a number of present instances would have taken place in the (unobserved) past and will take place in the future. In the Saṃyutta Nikāya are described a number of causally correlated phenomena such as that 'with the arising of birth there is the arising of decay and death, and with the cessation of birth there is the cessation of decay and death', etc. (Jātisamudayā jārāmarañasamudayo jātinirodhā jārāmarañanirodho . . ., S. II.57). Knowing these causal correlations or sequences is called 'the knowledge of phenomena' (dhamme-nānām, S. II.58). Then it is said, 'This constitutes the knowledge of phenomena; by seeing, experiencing, acquiring knowledge before long and delving

¹ Tatra . . . attāna āva attānañ evārap anuminitabham: yo . . . puggalo pāpiccho pāpikānam icchānam vasañgato, ayāp me puggalo appyo amanāpo; ahāp . . . pan' assan pāpiccho pāpikānam icchānam vasañgato, ahāp p'assan paresan appyo amanāpo ti, M. I.97.

² This is an inductive inference from one particular instance to another; cp. A.J. Ayer, *The Problem of Knowledge*, Penguin Books, 1957, p. 72, 'The inference may be from particular instances to a general law or proceed directly by analogy from one particular instance to another'.

into these phenomena, he draws an inference (nāyāp neti) with regard to the past and the future (atīrāṅgate, loc. cit.) as follows: 'All those recluses and brahmans who thoroughly understood the nature of decay and death, its cause, its cessation and the path leading to the cessation of decay and death did so in the same way as I do at present; all those recluses and brahmans who in the future will thoroughly understand the nature of decay and death . . . will do so in the same way as I do at present—this constitutes his inductive knowledge (idam asa anvaye nānām, loc. cit.).'¹

(759) These inductive inferences are based on a belief in causation,² which plays a central rôle in the thought of the Pāli Canon. It would be desirable to study this concept of causation in the Pāli Canon before we examine the use made of inductive reasoning in it.

(760) In the Rgveda there is a conception of order in the universe but not of a causal order, though we can trace the origins of the activity view of causation to the primitive animistic beliefs.³ Explanations were given by assuming the existence of wills behind natural phenomena. The conception of rta (the course of things) comes closest to a conception of a natural physical order (v. *supra*, 12) but rta itself was considered to be the law of Varuna.⁴ There was no doubt the search for first causes in trying to explain the origin of the cosmos, but often these were anthropomorphically conceived (v. *supra*, 5). In the Brāhmaṇas the order of the universe was mechanical but magical.⁵ In the Aitareya Aranyaka, where the origin of the world is traced to Water, we find the earliest use of two words for cause and effect, namely mūla (*lit.* root) and tila (*lit.* shoot) (v. *supra*, 64). Similarly, we find mūla and śunga (*lit.* shoot) used for cause and effect respectively in the Chāndogya

¹ Idamassa dhamme nānām; so iminā dhammena dīptena vidiṭena akalikena pattraṇa Parivṛgghena atīrāṅgate nāyāp neti: ye kho keci atītan addhānañ samāṇā vā brāhmaṇā vā jārāmarañap abbhāñampu, jārāmarañasamudayañ . . . jārāmarañanirodhañ . . . jārāmarañanirodha-gāminūm patipidam . . . seyyathā-pāhaṇ erarabi . . . ye hi pi keci anāgatam addhānañ samāṇā vā brāhmaṇā vā jārāmarañap abbhāñissanti . . . seyyathā-pāhaṇ etarabi ti, idam asa anvaye nānām.

² v. A. J. Ayer, *The Problem of Knowledge*, p. 72, 'In all such reasoning we make the assumption that there is a measure of uniformity in nature; or roughly speaking that the future will in the appropriate respects, resemble the past'.

³ v. Stobbing, *op. cit.*, p. 293.

⁴ v. Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I, p. 78 f.

⁵ Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I, pp. 99 ff.

Upanisad, viz. 'understand this (body) is an effect which has sprung up, for it could not be without a cause' (*taraitacchūgām upatitam... vijānhi nedam arūpam bhavisyati*, 6.8.3). In the same context is mentioned a causal series: Being caused Heat, Heat Water, Water Food and Food the Body (Ch. 6.8.4). In the Kātha Upanisad (1.3.10, 11), there is a gradation of things starting with the senses (Indriya-) and ending with the Person (Puruṣa) but this cannot be regarded as a causal series although it resembles to some extent the Sāṅkhya series.¹

(761) The first true conceptions of natural causation seem to have arisen amongst the Ajivikas, who were preoccupied with the problems of time and change (*v. supra*, 198, 208). We find two mutually opposed theories of change among them, Indeterminism or yadṛcchāvāda (*v. supra*, 199) and Strict Determinism or niyatīvāda (*v. supra*, 198), both of which are mentioned in the Śvetāśvatara Upanisad (1.2). The former maintained that all events were fortuitous and the latter that they were rigidly determined.

(761A) Another theory which was prevalent at this time was the theory of 'inherent Nature' (svabhava-, Svet. 1.2; *v. supra*, 211). According to the Sarvadarśanasangraha, it was adopted by the Materialists and was opposed to Indeterminism: 'If one says some things happen owing to chance, this is not right since it arises from inherent nature for it is said—fire is hot, water is cold and wind is even to the touch; by whom is this designed; it is fixed by inherent nature.'² Its relations with Determinism are not clear, but in common with it, human effort was considered to be of no avail: 'since everything is due to inherent nature, effort is useless.'³ This svabhāvavāda did away with animistic, anthropomorphic, theistic and indeterministic explanations of events and tried to account for the changes which took place in terms of the inherent constitution of things. In doing so, it recognizes minor uniformities of nature,⁴ e.g. fire is hot. In giving natural explanations and recognizing minor uniformities (though not a general causal order

of events) it paves the way for the idea of universal causation. We also noticed that causal arguments which presuppose a concept of causation were being used at this time particularly by the niyatīvādins (*v. supra*, 206) but it is not possible to identify a theory of causation with any of the non-Buddhist schools during this period.

(762) It is with Buddhism that we, for the first time, meet with a clear-cut theory of causation in the history of Indian thought.

(763) Causation as understood in Buddhism stands midway between the Indeterminism of yadṛcchāvāda and the Strict Determinism of niyatīvāda. The Buddhists seem to have coined the term *adhicca-samuppanna-* to denote the concept of yadṛcchā. These Indeterminists (*adhicca-samuppannikā*) are said to be of two types on epistemological grounds, (1) those who base their theory on (jhānic) observation, and (2) those who base their theory on reasoning (D. I.28, 29). The former, it is said, learn to recollect their past with their retrocognitive vision 'up to the moment of the arising of consciousness but not further' (*sāñcuppādañc annusarati, tato parañc nānusarati*, D. I.28, 29) and argue as follows: 'I did not exist before, but now not having existed, have come into existence' (*ahamp hi pubbe nāhosiñ, so'mhi etarahi ahutvā sattatāya parinato, loc. cit.*). We see from this description the indeterminism of the theory—the belief that an event takes place with no relation to its past. The P.T.S. Dictionary derives the etymology of the term from Skr. **adhi*tya > P. *adhicca* (from *√dhr*, to bear, support) but it appears more likely that this word was coined on the analogy of *paticca-* (in *paticca-samuppāda*, *paticca-samuppanna-*) in order to distinguish this concept from the latter. If so, the term is derived from *adhi*+*Vṛt*+(t)ya (gerundive) meaning 'having come on top of' as compared with *prati*+*Vṛt*+(t)ya meaning 'having come on account of'.

(764) The Buddhist theory likewise differed from Strict Determinism (niyatīvāda) in holding that 'the effort of the individual' (*atta-kāra-*) was sometimes a factor in causal processes and this was not strictly determined. The proof of this was the empirical fact that we feel free to act and exercise our effort, called our 'initiative' (*ārabhabhadhru*) in many situations¹ (A. III.337, 338). At A. I.173–5, three non-causationist

¹ Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. II, p. 250, referring to this passage in the Kātha Upanisad, Radhakrishnan says, 'Yet this is the earliest account of cosmic evolution which seems to have been utilized by the Sāṅkhya thinkers.'

² Alāśmitap syād iti cer—na tad bhadrām svābhāvikā eva tad upatretē tad svābhāvīt tad vyātiśītih, ed. Abhyankar, 1951, p. 23.

³ Svābhāvīkam sarvam idān ca yasmād ato'pi mogno bhavai pravayat,

⁴ *Buddhacarita*, 9.58, Ed. Johnston, Vol. I, p. 102.

* Stibbing, *op. cit.*, p. 259.

theories are criticized. One of these was a determinist theory which held that everything that happens is 'due to what one did in the past' (*pabbekatahetu*, *v. supra*, 211); the other was a theistic form of determinism, which held that everything was 'due to the creation of God' (*issara-nimmānahetu*) (*v. supra*, 211). The third theory that is criticized here is that everything happens 'without cause or reason' (*ahetu-apacayā*); this could be a reference to an indeterminist (*adhicca-samuppama-*) theory or to the determinism (*niyativāda*) of Pūraṇa Kassapa (*v. supra*, 199). Buddhism was also opposed to the quasi-determinism of svabhāvavāda (*v. supra*, 211).

(765) The words expressing causation in the Pāli Canon are too many to be recorded. As Stebbing says 'most transitive verbs except those that express emotional attitudes express causation' (*op. cit.*, p. 260). Buddhaghosa gives a list of synonyms meaning 'cause': 'paccaya', 'hetu', 'kāraṇa', 'nidāna', 'sambhava', 'pabhava', etc. . . have the same meaning though the words are different'.¹ These are among the words frequently found denoting a 'cause' in the Pāli Canon; we may add the word 'upanisā'² (S. II.30, 31) to this list. Hetu and paccaya are the commonest and are used synonymously and together to denote 'cause' in the Nikāyas (M. I.444, 516; A. IV.15r; S. IV.68, 69) but in the Abhidhamma Piṭaka, hetu is only the first of twenty-four paccayas (conditions) and denotes the psychological motives of an action.³ The necessity for this distinction and change in meaning is foreseeable in the examples given of causation in the Nikāyas.

(766) We have already seen that in the account given of the causal genesis of sense-perception, three conditions were considered to be individually necessary and together sufficient for the production of the effect (*v. supra*, 745). To take a case of natural physical (biological) causation, it is said that if 'the five kinds of seed' (*pāñcabhajjātāni*)—the cause—are to 'sprout, grow up and attain maturity' (*yuddham virūḍham vepullam āpajeyyam*, S. III.54)—the effect, three conditions have to be satisfied, viz. (1) the seeds have to be unbroken, not rotten, not destroyed by the wind or sun and fresh (*akhandāni apūṭīni avāṭātapaṭṭatāni sārādāni*, *loc. cit.*), (2) they must be well-planted (*sukhasayitāni*,

¹ Paccayo hetu kāraṇam nidānam sambhavo pabbhavo ti adī artho ekampyyajjanato nānām, Vm. II.532.

² Cp. Spūlūfārthabhidharmakosayākhyā, Vol. I, p. 188, 'hetuh pratyayo nidānam kāraṇam nūmittam lingam upanisad iti pariyāyah.'

³ *v. Nyanatiloka, Guide Through the Abhidhamma Piṭaka*, p. 118.

loc. cit.), and (3) they must have the benefit of the earth and water. It is said that conditions (1) and (2) without (3) do not bring about the result, nor (1) and (3) without (2) but only when all three conditions are satisfied. The total cause thus consists of several conditions, each of which has a different relationship to the effect and is, therefore, a different type of condition. What the Paṭṭhāna does is to analyse and define these various conditions.¹ Sometimes the relationship between cause and effect may be one of mutual dependence, in which case we would prefer not to talk of a cause or effect for there is no priority of the cause. Thus one of the relationships subsisting between 'the psychophysical individual' (*nāmarūpa*) and his 'consciousness' (*cittinājāgam*) is such that 'the psychophysical individual is dependent on the consciousness' (*vīñānapaccayā nāmarūpam*, D. II.56) and 'the consciousness is dependent on the psychophysical individuality' (*Nāmarūpapaccayā vīñānām*, *loc. cit.*). This relation is defined in the Paṭṭhāna as 'the condition of mutual dependence' (*aññamañña-paccaya*)².

(767) Buddhaghosa commenting on the word *samuppāda* (*Paticca-samuppāda*=causation) says that the word denotes the presence of a plurality of conditions and their occurrence together (in bringing about a result): 'Samuppāna- means when arising, it arises together, i.e. co-ordinately, not singly nor without a cause' (*uppajjanāno ca saha samā ca uppajjati na ekekato na pi ahetuto ni samuppāpano*, Vm. 521).

(768) Causation in Early Buddhism is not subjective and is not a category imposed by the mind on phenomena. Its objectivity is emphasized: 'Causation is said (to have the characteristics of) objectivity, necessity, invariability and conditionality' (*rathatā avitathatā aññāñāñātā idappaccayatā ayuṭapuccai . . . paticcasamuppādo*, S. II.26). The Commentary explains these terms as follows: "Objectivity", etc., are synonymous of what is characteristic of causation. As those conditions alone, neither more nor less, bring about this or that event, there is said to be "objectivity"; since there is no failure even for a moment to produce the events which arise when the conditions come together, there is said to be "necessity"; since no event different from (the effect) arises with (the help of) other events or conditions there is said to be "invariability"; from the condition or group of conditions,

¹ *v. Nyanatiloka, op. cit.*, pp. 118–127, for an account of these various relations as defined in the Paṭṭhāna.

which give rise to such states as decay and death, etc., as stated, there is said to be "conditionality".¹

(769) That a causal sequence or concomitance occurs independently of us and that all we do is to discover this, is implied in the following description of causation: 'What is causation? On account of birth arises decay and death. Whether Tathāgatas arise or not, this order exists namely the fixed nature of phenomena, the regular pattern of phenomena or conditionality. This the Tathāgata discovers and comprehends; having discovered and comprehended it, he points it out, teaches it, lays it down, establishes, reveals, analyses, clarifies it and says 'Look!'" (Katano ca paccasamuppādo² Jātīpacca�ā . . . jarāmaranā; uppādā vā Tathāgatānā anuppādā vā Tathāgatānāp thūta va sā dhatu dhammatthitā dhammaniyāmā idappacca�ā. Taŋ Tathāgato abhisambujjhati abhisameti; abhisambujjhitya abhisametvā ācikittati deseti paññapeti paññapeti vivarati vibhajati uttanikaroti passatha ti cāha, S. II.25).

(770) This causal cosmic order (*v. sā . . . dhatu dhammatthitā . . . idappacca�ā, loc. cit.*) was known as the dhamma-dhatu, which is claimed to be thoroughly comprehended (suppiṭividdhā, M. I.296) by the Buddha. Its causality is denoted by the term 'dhammatā' which literally means 'the nature of things'. Thus it is said, 'it is in the nature of things' (dhammatā) that the absence of remorse is present in a virtuous person. A person who has no (feelings of) remorse need not determine in his mind that joy should arise in him. It is of the nature of things (dhammatā) that joy arises in a person who lacks remorse. A person who is joyful need not determine in his mind that delight should arise in him. It is of the nature of things that delight arises in a joyful person.³ Here by the term 'the nature of things' (dhammatā) are meant the causal psychological processes. But as we have seen, causality is not

confined to psychological processes. We mentioned an example of the operation of the causal process in the organic world (*v. supra*, 766). Likewise, when it is said that among the causes of the failure of rain are the disturbances of temperature and pressure (wind) in the upper atmosphere,⁴ we notice an attempt to give a physical causal explanation of the phenomenon of rain (although mythical and ethical reasons for rain are also mentioned in this context).

(771) Those occurrences which are causally connected are considered to have the following relation, namely that (1) 'whenever A is present, B is present' (imasmīni sati idam hoti, Ud. 2; M. I.264), and (2) 'whenever A is absent, B is absent' (imasmīni asati idam na hoti, Ud. 2; M. I.264). This means that B does not occur unless A is present and occurs only when A is present. Thus a one-one correlation is established between the conditions constituting the cause and their effect. This is a scientific view of causation as opposed to the practical common-sense view.⁵ (1) and (2) constitute the two main principles of causal determination as stated in the Pali Nikāyas. From the above abstract formula may be distinguished the concrete formula, which has reference to the world of change. From the arising of A, B arises; from the cessation of A, B ceases' (imass' uppāda idam uppajjati . . . imassa nirodhā idam nirujjhati, Ud. 2, M. I.263, 264; S. II.70).

(772) We find many applications of this formula. We have already noticed the explanation of psychological and physical processes (*v. supra*, 770) in terms of causation. We likewise find a causal explanation given of the origin of consciousness in order to reject the belief in an unchanging substratum of consciousness⁶ (M. I.256-60). Similarly, we find a causal account of the genesis of the five constituents, we cling to.⁵ Causal explanations are offered to repudiate the theory that

¹ *v. . . imē vassasa antarayā . . . upari ākāse tejodhātu pakuppati tena uppāna meghā patīvagacchanti . . . puna ca parāp . . . upari ākāse vāyodhātu pakuppati, tena uppāna meghā patīvagacchanti, A. III.243.*

² *v. Stebbing, op. cit.*, p. 264. "The practical agent, however, is content with a relation that is determinate only in the direction from cause to effect; wherever X occurs, E occurs. But the scientific investigator wants to find a relation that is equally determinate in either direction, that is, he seeks a one-one relation: wherever X occurs, E occurs, and E does not occur unless X has occurred."

³ *v. Stebbing, op. cit.*, p. 319.

⁴ C. O. H. de A. Wijesekera, 'Vedic Gandharva and Pali Gandhabba' in UCR, Vol. 2, p. 93.

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⁵ *Paccasamuppanā kho panime pañcupādanakkhandā . . . M.I.191.*

everything is strictly determined by our own actions in the past (S. IV.230), to disprove the belief that moral degradation and purity is due to fortuitous circumstances (S. III.69), and to show that the experience of pleasure and pain was not due to the work of metaphysical agents (S. II.38), etc.

(773) These general applications of the causal principle have in turn to be distinguished from the special application in what is called 'the Chain of Causation' after Burnouf.¹ This has been practically the only aspect of causation in Buddhism discussed by many scholars.² They have thus given a distorted view of the rôle of causation in these texts. Keith says that 'the chain of causation is essentially an explanation of misery; it tells us nothing regarding physical causes . . .'.³ He concludes that 'to assign to Buddhism faith in the uniformity of the causal process or of nature is absurd' (*op. cit.*, p. 113), but it will be seen that this latter observation is without basis in the light of the evidence that we have adduced so far. Keith has failed to take sufficient note of the general formula of causation (*v. supra*, 771) or the two principles of causal determination, the mention both of psychological as well as of physical causal processes (*v. supra*, 770) and the conception of the cosmos as a causally ordered whole (*v. supra*, 770) in the Pāli Nikāyās.

(774) To discuss the problems raised by this 'Chain of Causation' and its treatment at the hands of scholars would divert us from our task. We shall therefore confine ourselves to making a few observations pertinent to our purpose. Almost all scholars have said that the purpose of this 'Chain' is to explain misery.⁴ This is only partly true. From the evidence of the texts, it appears to have been used primarily to explain rebirth and karma without recourse to the metaphysical ātman-hypothesis of the Eternalists and without falling into the other extreme of Materialism. The Eternalists of the Upaniṣads explained rebirth and karma by assuming a self-identical soul which passed on from existence to existence as the agent of all actions and the recipient of reactions

¹ *v. Thomas, History of Buddhist Thought*, p. 58.

² Kern, *Manual of Buddhism*, pp. 46–9; P. Oltramare, *La Formule Bouddhique des Deux Causes*, Geneva, 1909; Poussin, *Histoire des Deux Causes*, Gant, 1913; Thomas, *History of Buddhist Thought*, pp. 58–70, 78–80; Stcherbatsky, *The Central Conception of Buddhism and the Meaning of the Word 'Dharma'*, London, 1923, pp. 28–31.

³ *Buddhist Philosophy*, p. 112.

⁴ *v. Thomas, History of Buddhist Thought*, p. 58, 'The Formula is held to expound the two truths of the origin of pain and the cessation of pain'.

(Cp. Maitri, 3:1; Śvet. 4:12). As an Empiricist (*v. infra*, 793) the Buddha could not posit the existence of a soul. At the same time he could not, like the Materialists, deny the continuity of the individual after death and the responsibility of the individual for his actions. 'The *raison d'être* of the 'Chain of Causation' lies therefore mainly in the fact that it gives a causal account of the factors operating in maintaining the process of the individual and thereby of suffering. This is clear from the following statement: 'In the belief that the person who acts is the same as the person who experiences . . . he posits Eternalism; in the belief that the person who acts is not the same as the person who experiences . . . he posits Materialism. *Avoiding both these extremes* the Tathāgata preaches the doctrine in the middle. On ignorance depends our volitional acts (sankhārā)¹ . . . In this manner there arises this mass of suffering'.² Another purpose for which the 'Chain' was employed was to substitute an empirical causal explanation of the (relative) origin and development of the individual in place of an explanation in terms of metaphysical first causes or final causes. Thus, after enumerating the causal process of the genesis and development of the individual, the Buddha says: 'Would you, O monks, knowing and seeing thus probe (*itt. run behind*) the prior end of things . . . or pursue (*itt. run after*) the final end of things?' (api nu tumhe bhikkhave evam jānatā evam passanā pubbantan vā pajñihaveyyātha . . . aparantān vā ādhāvareyyātha, M. I.265). In the face of this evidence it is surprising that many scholars (Kern, Jacobi, Pischel, Schayer) should have tried to explain this 'Chain' as a 'kosmische Emanationsformel', comparing it with the Sāṅkhya series. In fact it is expressly implied that 'ignorance' (avijjā) is not a first cause. 'The first beginning of ignorance is not known (such that we may say), before this there was no ignorance, at this point there arose ignorance' . . . but that ignorance is causally conditioned can be known' (purimā . . . koti na paññāyati avijjā 'ito pubbe avijjā nāhosi, atha pacchā sambhavi' ti . . . Atha ca pana paññāyati 'idappaccayā avijjā' ti, A. V.113).

¹ For a detailed discussion of the meaning of this term, *v. K. N. Jayatilleke, Some Problems of Translation and Interpretation I*, UCR, Vol. 7, pp. 213–23.

² So karoti so pajñisamvediyati ti . . . sassatam etāpi pareti. Añño karoti añño pajñisamvediyati ti . . . uchedam etāpi pareti. Ete te . . . ubho ante anupagamma majjhena Tathāgato dhammāpi deseti; avijjapaccayā saññhāra . . . evam etassa kevalassa dukkhandhassa nirodho hoti ti, S. II.20, 21.

³ *v. Thomas, History of Buddhist Thought*, p. 79.

(775) From the use made of causation in the Nikāyas, one could see that causal empirical explanations were everywhere substituted (e.g. theories of perception, knowledge, consciousness, etc.), for prevalent metaphysical theories. What about the theory of causation itself? Was it metaphysical or empirical? A comparison with some of the theories of causation in the Hindu philosophical schools is not without value for this purpose, in order to see more clearly where the Buddhist theory stood. We may list these theories as follows:

1. Šaktivāda (the theory that the cause is a kind of force)—Pūrva Mimāṃsa.
 2. Saṅkāraṇavāda = Vivartavāda (the theory that everything has Being as its cause and is a manifestation of Being)—Vedānta.
 3. Saṅkāryavāda (the theory that the effect is contained in the cause)—Saṅkhyā.
 4. Asaṅkāryavāda = Ārambhavāda (the theory that the effect is not contained in the cause and is something new)—Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika.
- (776) Of these the Šaktivāda, which resembles an Activity theory¹ of causation, is criticized in the BHS. text, the Saṅkāstamba Sūtra. Here it is said that although the 'element of heat' (tejodhātuh) is a causal factor in making a seed grow, it does not do this out of its own will: 'It does not occur to the element of heat, "I shall bring this seed to maturity", contained in the cause and is something new)—Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika.
- (777) Although the Saṅkāryavāda, which is an Entailment theory² holding that the cause necessarily brings about its effect, which is contained in it and the Vedāntic Saṅkāraṇavāda are not mentioned as

such, we meet with foreshadowings of these two theories in pre-Buddhist thought. In the Aitareya Āranyaka, where it was said that Water was the cause and the world the effect (*v. supra*, 760), we find the statement, 'whatever there is belonging to the son, belongs to the father; whencever there is belonging to the father, belongs to the son',³ meaning by 'father' and 'son' cause and effect respectively. This seems to imply both that the effect (son) is contained in the cause (father) and that the cause (father) persists in the effect (son). This resembles the Saṅkāryavāda. Similarly in the thought of Uddalaka we found that Being (sat) was the ultimate substance, which manifested itself in the variety of the forms of nature (*v. supra*, 25); this is analogous to the Saṅkāraṇavāda. Now it seems to be this kind of belief of theory, which implies the presence of the effect in the cause or the immanence of the cause in the effect, that is criticized in the Pottapāda Sutta (Dīghanikāya). Here in the causal sequence 'milk, curds, butter, ghee, etc.', it was pointed out that one should not consider 'milk' to persist in 'curds' or 'curds' to exist in 'milk' in some mysterious manner (*v. supra*, 534), this is the kind of claim made in the above two theories. One may observe that according to the Saṅkāryavāda, 'the oil exists in the sesamum, the statue in the stone, the curd in the milk'.⁴ The Saṅkāryavāda, the least metaphysical theory, was in fact later confounded with the causal theory of the Buddhists.⁵

(778) The Buddhist theory is therefore empirical since it spoke only of observable causes without any metaphysical pre-suppositions of any substrata behind them. It closely resembles the Regularity theory⁶ except for the fact that it speaks of the empirical necessity (avitathatā, *v. supra*, 768) of the causal sequence or concomitance and does not seem to hold that all inductive inferences are merely probable (*v. supra*, 758). At the same time it is necessary to note that the Buddhist theory of causation was not deterministic (*v. supra*, 764), since it included mental decisions among the causal factors and these were not considered to be strictly determined. Thus, it is said that 'a person who knows and sees things as they are, need not make an effort of will (saying), "I shall become disinterested"; it is of the nature of things that a person who knows and sees becomes disinterested'. But

¹ *v. A. C. Ewing, The Fundamental Questions of Philosophy*, pp. 169-72.

² *v. Ewing, op. cit.*, pp. 162-9.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Aitareya Āranyaka* 2.1.8.1; SBE, Vol. 1, p. 212.

⁵ *v. Das Gupta, A History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. 1, p. 257.

⁶ *v. Ewing, op. cit.*, pp. 160-2.

⁷ *Dhammata esā . . . yan na cetanā karapīyā nibbindati*, A. V. 313.

elsewhere it is said that if a person 'being ardent gains knowledge and insight, is pleased and satisfied with his knowledge and insight and because of it praises himself and looks down on others'¹ (M. I.195), he would not progress on to the next stage of his spiritual development (*loc. cit.*). So what is 'in the nature of things' (dhammata) is only a probability and not a necessity, when psychological factors are involved.

(779) It is evident that causation plays a central rôle in the Nikāyas. It is claimed to be the truth about the universe discovered by the Buddha in the final stage of his enlightenment (Ud. I. 1; Vin. I.1, 2). It is expressly identified with the dhamma: 'He who sees (the nature of) causation, sees the dhamma (i.e. the teaching) and he who sees the dhamma sees (the nature of) causation' (yo Paṭiccasamuppādaṃ passati so dhammanī passati, yo dhammanī passati so paticcasamuppādaṃ passati, M. I.191). A stanza of great antiquity found both in the Pāli and the BHS literature reads as follows:

Pāli: ye dhammā hetupabbhavā tesamp. hetum Tathāgato āha,
tesāñ ca yo nirodhā evanqvādi Mahāsamaṇo.²
Buddhist Sanskrit: ye dharmā hetuprabhavā hetum teṣām
'Tathāgato' vadat,

teṣāñ ca yo nirodhā evanqvādi Mahaśrāmanah.³

I.e. the Great Recluse says that the Tathāgata has spoken of the cause of things, which arise from causes and also of their cessation. Besides, it is said that the recluse Gotama in preaching his doctrine makes statements which are 'meaningful' (sappāthikāryam, M. II.9) and 'causal' (sanidānāp, *loc. cit.*). Apart from this, there is much inscriptive evidence for a widespread belief in causation in the Buddhist world.⁴

(780) In the light of the above evidence, we cannot subscribe to Thomas' belief that in Buddhism causation was never applied as a 'universal philosophical principle',⁵ to a similar view of Keith to which

... Appamatto samāno nāgadassanaap. ḫādheti. So tena nāgadassanena
atattamo hōti paripūṇasamkappo. So tena nāgadassanena atān'nikampseti
param vābhetti, *loc. cit.*⁶

¹ The Lankāvatāra Sūtra, Ed. Narjito, p. 44; Aryapratiyasamutpāda Sūtra, printed in Arya Śālistambā Sūtra, ed. Sāstri, p. 26.

² V. S. Konow, *Corpus Inscriptionum Indicarum*, Vol. 2, Part I, 1929, pp. 152 ff.
H. Johnston, 'The Gopalgur Bricks', JRAS, 1938, pp. 549 ff.; B. C. Law, 'The Formulation of the Pratyasamutpāda', JRAS, 1937, pp. 290 ff.

³ *Life of the Buddha*, p. 199.

we have already referred (*v. supra*, 773) nor with R. E. Hume's remark that 'neither Buddha nor the Buddhist writings had any interest in problems of ... scientific causation'.⁷ Kern's criticism that in the 'Chain of Causation' 'the difference between *post hoc* and the *proper hoc* is utterly ignored'⁸ is invalid, since the mention of the two principles of causal determination shows an awareness of the difference between coincidental and causal sequences. Thomas' observation that to say that 'birth is the cause of old age' is 'like calling day the cause of night'⁹ is the kind of objection that has been levelled against the Regularity theory even in its modern form.¹⁰

(781) Mrs Rhys Davids has said that 'the only general principle of thought put forward in Europe which harmonizes with Buddhist axioms is that "Principle or Law of Sufficient Reason" for which certain logicians notably Leibniz claimed equal rank with the three named above, namely that "nothing happens without a reason why it should be so rather than otherwise". This comes very near to the idappaccayāta (this is conditioned by that) of Buddhist causality'.¹¹ This is a very misleading suggestion for the two have nothing in common. It is true that according to Leibniz's law of sufficient reason 'nothing happens without a reason',¹² but the reason is best known to God, who creates the best of all possible worlds, in which whatever happens necessarily contributes towards making it the best. This is the sufficient reason for all contingent truths and it lies in (the goodness of) God, who chose out of his free will to create this world in preference to every other possible world, which was relatively less perfect.¹³ Since the knowledge of these reasons involves an infinite analysis of possible facts, in the light of their contribution to the goodness of possible worlds (and/or comp possibility¹⁴), the reasons cannot usually be known by men.¹⁵ This is an attempt to explain things in terms of final causes.¹⁶

¹ Miracles in the Canonical Scriptures of Buddhism' in JAOS, Vol. 44, p. 162.

² *Manual of Indian Buddhism*, p. 47. ³ *History of Buddhist Thought*, p. 62.

⁴ Stebbing, *op. cit.*, p. 282.

⁵ B. Russell, *The Philosophy of Leibniz*, p. 32.

⁶ R. L. Saw, *Leibniz*, Penguin Books, London, 1954, p. 36.

⁷ Russell has suggested that in an esoteric account of his philosophy, Leibniz tries to account for existence by purely logical considerations, with no mention of God or creation, *v. A History of Western Philosophy*, p. 617.

⁸ R. L. Saw, *op. cit.*, pp. 325, 33.

⁹ Russell, *The Philosophy of Leibniz*, p. 34. 'Thus the law of sufficient reason, as applied to actual existents, reduces itself definitely to the assertion of final causes....'

It will be seen that this conception is theistic, metaphysical and relates to final causes. It is, therefore, utterly opposed to the conception of empirical causation as we find it in Buddhism.¹

(782) Mrs Rhys Davids hailed the appearance of the causal theory of the Buddhist texts for the first time in Indian thought as an evolutionary moment in the history of ideas in one of her earlier works.² She distinguished between the 'formula of causation in general'³ from the 'Chain of Causation' in her article on 'Paticcasamuppada' in the ERE.⁴ But when she changed her views about what constituted the message of original Buddhism and the methodology of discovering this, we find her anxious to dismiss causation as playing a very minor rôle in Early Buddhism.⁵ She tries to make out that the causal theory was a contribution of the monk Kappina, suggests the flimsiest of evidence for this and ends up by admitting the weakness of her own surmise.⁶ She then tries to play down the importance of causation by suggesting that 'Gotama was a Way-manderer, not Cause-manderer' (*op. cit.*, p. 146), that the applied formula . . . was not included in the list of sayings adduced as a final charge to his men by the dying Founder' (*op. cit.*, p. 152) and such considerations, none of which contradict or explain the important place that causation has in the Pāli Canonical texts. Her whole theory has to be dismissed on methodological grounds. She starts with certain *a priori* assumptions as to what Original Buddhism ought to have taught, picks out what appears to support her views (after a good deal of misinterpretation at times) and dismisses the great bulk of the material as monkish editing. When a statement occurs too frequently it is discarded as a 'stereotyped phrase'.⁷ If it occurs rarely, it is likewise rejected when it does not special (*The Philosophy of Leibniz*, p. 30), the former applying to possible existents and the latter to actual existents (pp. 30, 36). He says that the former is 'a form of the law of causality asserting all possible causes to be desires or appetites' (p. 30). Even this conception of causality is opposed in Buddhism (*v. supra*, 776).

¹ Russell speaks of two principles of sufficient reason, the general and the special (*The Philosophy of Leibniz*, p. 30), the former applying to possible existents and the latter to actual existents (pp. 30, 36). He says that the former is 'a form of the law of causality asserting all possible causes to be desires or appetites' (p. 30). Even this conception of causality is opposed in Buddhism (*v. supra*, 776).

² *Buddhism*, Williams and Norgate, London, 1912, pp. 105, 106.

³ 'Paticcasamuppada', ERE, Vol. 9, p. 672.

⁴ We find this distinction drawn even in *Sākyā or Buddhist Origins*, London, 1931, p. 152, where she speaks of 'the abstract statement' and 'the concrete application'.

⁵ 'Op. cit.', p. 143, 'Save for the opening lines, I do not see that these verses, imputed to Kappina, strengthen my surmise, that in him we have a man chiefly responsible for Sākyā becoming, in repute, a religion based on causation'.

⁶ *Sākyā or Buddhist Origins*, p. 156, 'Further, the prose rejoinder of Sariputta is a stereotyped phrase occurring elsewhere in the Piṭakas'.

agree with her assumptions or what they imply.¹ On the basis of such a method of purely imaginative reconstruction, there is no limit to the number of largely speculative theories, which can be claimed to be the original message of Buddhism. For this reason, such speculations are of little value for scholarship, since no objective methodological criteria and rules of interpretation are adhered to.

(783) Inductive inferences in Buddhism are therefore based on a theory of causation. These inferences are made on the data of perception, normal and paranormal. What is considered to constitute knowledge are direct inferences made on the basis of the data of such perceptions. All the knowledge that the Buddha and his disciples claim to have in 'knowing and seeing' (*v. supra*, 741), except for the knowledge of Nirvāna, appears to be of this nature. For reasons of space we cannot examine all the doctrines of Buddhism in order to see whether they could be explained on this basis. Nor is this necessary, for we are concerned only with the epistemological foundations of the thought of the Canon. We shall therefore merely illustrate by taking a few samples, how the doctrines of Buddhism may be considered to be epistemically derived from direct inferences based on perception, normal or extrasensory.

(784) Let us first take some examples of direct inferences based on the data of normal perception:

- (1) The statement that 'on account of birth there is decay and death' (jātipacca� . . . jarāmaraññ, S. II.25) is an empirical generalization based on the observation (by perception) that all those who are known and seen to be born eventually grow old and die. From the observed cases the inductive inference (anvayañāpa-) is made that all those who are born, whether in the past or in the future, grow old and die.
- (2) The statement that 'all conditioned things are impermanent' (sabbe saṅkhāra anicca, M. I.228) is a similar empirical generalization. Quoting this example, Professor Wijesekera has observed that 'this is not given as a result-of metaphysical inquiry or of any mystical intuition but as a straightforward judgment to be arrived at by investigation and analysis. It is founded on unbiased thought and has a purely empirical basis'.²

¹ *v. op. cit.*, p. 156, 'Further, the verse found in inscriptions on ruins at Benares and elsewhere occurs nowhere else in the Piṭakas'.

² O. H. de A. Wijesekera, *The Three Signs*, Kandy, 1960, pp. 2, 3.

(3) When it is asked whether the Buddha holds that the statement of grief, lamentation, mental agony, sorrow and anxiety arise from and originate from attachment' (piyajātikā . . . sokaparidevadukkha-domanassupāyāśa piyappabhalavikā, M. II.108), he says 'yes' (evam etan, *loc. cit.*) and adds that 'it should be understood in this way' (tad aminā p'etanp . . . pariyāyena veditabbam, *loc. cit.*). He then enumerates a series of observed historical instances of people in Sāvatthi, who because of their deep attachment to their loved ones, were given to grief when they died and lost their senses. He also recounts a case where a person killed his betrothed and committed suicide in the hope of re-uniting with her in the hereafter, when she professed not to love him.¹

(4) The statement that 'among human beings there aren't the usual characteristics, which constitute species' (n'atthi manussesu lingam jātīmayaṇ puthu, Sn. 607) or in other words that the human race was biologically one species, is based on a keen observation of nature.² It is said that the grasses, trees, worms, moths, ants, four-footed creatures, serpents, fishes, birds have 'characteristics that constitute species' (lingam jātīmayaṇ, Sn. 607-6) and that therefore there are 'different species' (anñamāṇā jātiyo, *loc. cit.*) among them. But this is not the case with human beings, who do not have such characteristics in respect of their hair, head, ears, colour, etc. (*loc. cit.*); the difference among men is said to be only nominal (vokāraṇ ca manus-su samaññaya pavuccati, Sn. 61).

(785) Statements were not only justified on the basis of empirical evidence but were rejected as false when they conflicted with what was empirically observed. Thus the statement held by certain recluses and Brahmins to the effect that 'so long as a person is young one is endowed with intellectual capacity . . . but this is lost with old age' (yāvad evayāṇ bhavaṇ puriso daharo . . . tāvad eva paramapāṇī-veyattiyena samannāgato hoti yato . . . ayam . . . vayo anuppato . . . atha tamhā paññāvayatīyā parihayatī ti, M. I.82) is said to be incorrect. In support of this the Buddha points to his own example and to 'four centenarians' (cattīrō . . . vassasatāñikā, *loc. cit.*) in the Order who are endowed with the highest intellectual capacity despite their old age. Likewise, the proposition held to be true by certain recluses

¹ Atha kho sā iñthi sāmīkṣap erad avoca: . . . ahañ ca tan na icchamī ti. Atha kho so puriso tam iñthiñ dvidhā chevā attānap uppātesi. ubho pecca bhavisatāñ ti, M. II.109, 110.

² For a detailed account of this argument, v. G. P. Malalasekera and K. N. Jayatilleke, *Buddhism and the Race Question*, UNESCO, 1958, pp. 35-7.

and brahmins to the effect that 'all those who kill living creatures experience pain and sorrow in this life itself' (yo koci pāñcāñ atimāpeti, sahbo so diññ'eva dharmme dukkhā domanassam, pañcasamvediyati, S. IV.343) is said to be false since some people are honoured in this very life if they kill the king's enemies (*loc. cit.*).

(786) We find at the same time that many of the doctrines of Buddhism are claimed to be inductive inferences based on the data of extrasensory perception. In this respect, extrasensory perception is treated at the same level as normal perception and it is considered possible to make both valid and erroneous inferences on this data (*v. infra*, 790). It may be asked whether the claims to extrasensory perception belong to the mythical and miraculous element in the Canon and whether these claims were actually made by the Buddha and his disciples. There is reason to believe that these claims were actually made. There is no doubt that yoga-practices prevailed among the thinkers of the Middle and Late Upaniṣads, the Jains, some of the Ājivikas and the Buddhists. Claims of this kind were common to all these schools. They are not considered miraculous but the result of the natural development of the mind in the Buddhist texts (*v. supra*, 724) and have a close connection with the central doctrines of Buddhism (*v. infra*, 797). Some of these experiences such as ante-natal retro-cognition¹ have been claimed by people under deep hypnosis.² For others such as telepathy and clairvoyance, it is believed that there is a certain amount of experimental data which tends to confirm the existence of such faculties.³ We have reason therefore to believe that genuine claims were made about having these experiences. The other question is whether these experiences were veridical or delusive. This falls outside the scope of our study and we do not propose to examine it here.

¹ Cp. a similar but less explicit claim attributed to Pythagoras, *v. Kirk and Raven*, The Presocratic Philosophers, p. 223.

² *v. Th. Flournoy* (Professor of Psychology, University of Geneva), *Des Indes à la Planète Mars*, Geneva, 1899; W. McDougall, *An Outline of Abnormal Psychology*, Sixth Edition, London, 1948, p. 510 ff.; sp. Charles A. Cory (Associate Professor of Philosophy, Washington University), 'A Divided Self in Journal of Abnormal Psychology', Vol. XIV, Boston, 1919-20, pp. 282, 283; cp. also Ian Stevenson, *The Evidence for Survival from Claimed Memories of Former incarnations*, Thamesmouth Printing Co. Ltd., Essex, 1961, and C. J. Duessse, *The Belief in a Life after Death*, Illinois, 1961, p. 241-259.

³ *v. J. B. Rhine*, *New Frontiers of the Mind*, Penguin Books, 1950; cp. by the same author, *The Reach of the Mind*, London, 1948; also, R. Tischner, *Telepathy and Clairvoyance*, London, 1925.

(787) Prominent among the doctrines derived as an inductive inference on the basis of the data of extrasensory perception, is *karma* as taught in the Pāli Canonical texts. There is said to be a general as well as a specific correlation between the kind of life led in this world and one's state of survival. Now it is said that 'the decease and survival of beings is to be verified by one's (clairvoyant) vision' (*sattānampucūpapato ... cakkhūna sacchikaraṇīyo*, A. II.183). But with this clairvoyant vision one is also said to notice a correlation between the character of a person and his state of survival: 'He sees some beings endowed with bodily, verbal or mental misconduct, who reproach the holy men, hold false views and act in accordance with false views born in a state of decline, in an unhappy condition, in a state of downfall and a lower state at death on the dissolution of the body; and (he sees) other beings, who are born in a happy state, in a heavenly world at death on the dissolution of the body'.¹ It is this correlation between good character and a happy state after death, and bad character and an unhappy state after death that is called *karma*. For a person who has this clairvoyant vision is said 'to know how these beings fare according to their karma' (*yathākannāpage satte pajānāti*, loc. cit.).

(788) In the *Mahāsihanāda Sutta*, Majjhima Nikāya, the Buddha claims to test this in a way analogous to the testing of an hypothesis. The Buddha says that he first examines by means of his telepathic powers the mind of a certain individual in order to gauge the general tone of his character. From this knowledge in the light of the karma-hypothesis he expects the individual to be born in a certain state after death. At a later time he observes this individual with his clairvoyant perception to see in what state he has survived and finds that the prediction made in accordance with the above hypothesis is confirmed, thus verifying the truth of the hypothesis. The text reads as follows: 'Here I observe with my mind the mind of a certain person as follows: "This person so conducts himself, behaves in such a way and follows such a path that at death on the dissolution of the body he would be born in an unhappy state . . . ; at a later time I observe him by means of (my) clear paranormal clairvoyant vision, surviving in the unhappy

'So . . . passati . . . ime . . . satā kāya-duccariteṇa samanagata vaco . . . mano.' . . . ariyānaṃ upavādakā mūcchā-dīptikā mūcchā-dīpti-kannamāsamādāna. Te kāyassa bheda parāp marana apayam duggetipū vīpūtāpi nīrayānūpapāna. Ime vā pāna . . . satā kāyasucariteṇa samanagata vaci' . . . mano.' . . . lokān upapāna ti. D. I.82.

state and experiencing extremely unpleasant sensations. Just as if someone with sight were to observe a pit full of coals, without flames or smoke . . . and a tired person walking on the only road leading to this pit and say, "this person surely walks and moves in such a way and follows such a road that he will fall into this pit"; at a later time he would see him fallen into that pit of coals experiencing extremely painful sensations'.¹

(788A) The Buddha criticizes the Jain ascetics for not personally verifying the truth or falsity of their *karma*-theory. He approaches some Jain ascetics who were practising self-mortification in the belief that self-induced suffering was an expiation of past sins, which became exhausted as a result (M. I.92, 93). He finds that the theory on which these practices were based, was accepted on the basis of the omniscience of their teacher, but was not individually verified by them. He asks them the following questions to all of which the Jain ascetics gave negative answers. Do you know 'whether or not you existed in the past' (*ahuvān'eva mayaṇ pubbe, na nāvuvānā ti*, M. I.93)? Do you know 'whether you did or did not do any evil karma in the past' (*akārām'eva mayaṇ pubbe pāpaṇ kannmar, na akārāmā ti*, loc. cit.)? Do you know 'what kind of evil karma you did in the past' (*evarūpaṇ vā pāpaṇ kannām akārāmā ti*, loc. cit.)? Do you know 'what amount of suffering (due to sin) has been spent, what amount remains to be spent and what amount of suffering was altogether necessary (for expiation)' (*ettakāmā vā dukkhaṇ nījīṇaṇ ettakāmā vā dukkhaṇ nījaretabbaṇ etrakāmā vā dukkhaṇ nījīṇe sabhaṇ dukkhaṇ nījīṇaṇ bhavissati*, loc. cit.). The example of the Jain ascetic was apparently contrasted with the personal verification of his past karma on the part of the disciple of the Buddha (see, however, *infrā*, 798, 799).

(789) The correlations worked out between different kinds of acts

¹ Idāham . . . elaccaṇ puggalāṇ evan cetāśa ceto paricca pajānāni: tathā' yāp puggalo patipanno tathā ca iriyāt tān ca magegap samārūpā yathā kāyassa bheda parāp marana duggetipū . . . upapajjissatā ti; tam enāp passāni apārena samayena dibbena cakkhūna viśuddhena arikkantamānusakena . . . duggetipū . . . upapānūp ekantadukkhā tipnā kāpula vedāna vedyānānāp. Seyyathā 'pi . . . aīgārakāsu . . . pñ angārānāp vītacikānāp vītadūmānāp, atha puriso aīgāractheyā . . . kihano . . . ekāyānena maggeṇa tam eva aīgārakāsuṇ pñidhāyā, tam enāp cakkhūna puriso disvā evan vadeyya: tathā' yāp bhavaṇ puriso patipanno tathā ca iriyāt tān ca maggaṇ samārūpā yathā imāp yeva aīgārakāsuṇ āgāmissatā ti; tam enāp passeyā apārena samayena tassa aīgārakāsuṇ patitap ekantadukkhā . . . vedāna lokap upapāna ti. M. I.74.

and the expected consequences in a subsequent human existence are presumably to be verified in the same manner. Some of these correlations are as follows: (1) a person who kills living creatures (*pāṇātipāti*, M. III.203) ... tends to be short-lived (*appāyuka-sampvattaniko*, *loc. cit.*), while a person who refrains from killing living creatures (*pāṇātipāta pañivirato*, *loc. cit.*) ... tends to be long-lived (*dīghāyukasampvattaniko*, *loc. cit.*), (2) a person who harms creatures (*sattinap-vihethakajātiko*, M. I.204) ... tends to be sickly (*bavhābadhasampvattaniko*, *loc. cit.*), while a person who refrains from harming creatures (*avileṭhakajātiko*, *loc. cit.*), (3) a person who is angry and irritable (*kodhano* ... *upāyāsabhalo*, *loc. cit.*) ... tends to be ugly (*dubbanasampvattaniko*, *loc. cit.*), while a person who is not so, tends to be beautiful (*pāśadikasampvattaniko*, *loc. cit.*), etc.

(790) However, it is said that some of the inferences based on one's clairvoyant vision may be invalid. The *Mahākammavibhaṅga Sutta*, Majjhima Nikaya, takes the following four examples:

- (1) The first is that of a recluse or brahmin who attains a state of mental concentration, in which he sees with his clairvoyant vision a certain person who has misconducted himself born in an unhappy state after death. On the basis of this experience he forms the following conclusions, viz. (i) there are evil acts (*atthi* ... *pāpakkāni kammāni*, M. III.21), (ii) there is an evil consequence for misconduct (*atthi duccaritassa vipako*, *loc. cit.*), (iii) that all those who kill living creatures, steal, etc. ... are born in an unhappy state after death (*yo... pāṇātipāti adinnādāyi*... *sabbho so... param maranā*... *duggatim...* *uppajjati*, *loc. cit.*), (iv) that those who assert (1), (ii) and (iii) are right and the others wrong (*ye evaṃ jānanti, te sammā jānanti. Ye affidhā jānanti, micchā tesam nāqan ti*, *loc. cit.*). It is said that 'what he has himself known, himself seen, himself experienced' (*sāmāṇi nātām sāmāṇi dīrthāṇi sāmāṇi vidiṭāṇi*, *loc. cit.*) he dogmatically claims to be 'the only truth, all else being false' (*idam eva saccāṇi mogham aññāṇi*, *loc. cit.*).
- (2) The second example is that of a person who similarly attains a state of mental concentration, but sees with his clairvoyant vision a person who has done evil in this life born after death in a happy state. He comes to conclusions which are diametrically opposed to those of (1), viz. (i) there are no evil acts, (ii) there is no evil consequence of misconduct, (iii) that all those who kill living creatures, steal, etc. ...

are born in a happy state after death, and (iv) that those who assert (2) (i), (ii) and (iii) are right and the others wrong.

(3) and (4) Two other examples are given to illustrate the other two possibilities, namely, that of a person who sees a person of good conduct born in a happy state and in an unhappy state respectively.

(791) In the course of this Sutta, it is pointed out that the Buddha does not deny the validity of the claims to have observed what they did claim to observe (M. III.212-15; e.g. *Yāñ ca kho so evam āha: apāñamp-puggalāṇ addasāñ idha pāṇātipātim adinnādāyip ... param maranā ... sugatim ... upapannan ti*—*idam assa anujānāmi*, i.e. I grant his claim to have seen an individual who kills and steals, born after death in a happy state). But he denies the validity of some of the inferences made on the basis of these experiences. It is shown, for example, that all four generalizations made from a single instance are mistaken, e.g. *yāñ ca kho so evam āha: yo kira bhū pāṇātipāti ... sabbho so ... duggatim ... uppajjati ti*, *idam assa nāujānāmi*, i.e. I do not approve of his claim that all those who kill ... are born in an unhappy state. This shows a realization of the fact that one cannot make generalizations on the basis of one (or a few) instances.¹ But at the same time, the general rule that good acts tend to make one's future state of survival happy and vice versa is not denied for the apparent exceptions (2 and 4) are explained as due to the performance of good or evil deeds, as the case may be, sometime or another in one's past lives (cp. *pubbe vāssa tam kārāñ hoti ... pacchā vā*, M. III.214, 215) or due to a change of heart at the moment of death (*maranākāle vāssa hoti ... loc. cit.*).

(792) Not only, therefore, does Buddhism not give a theistic or metaphysical interpretation to these experiences, but considers it necessary that we draw the right inferences from them in the same sense in which it was necessary for us to be right about our inferences from sense-experience.

(793) We have tried to show that perception (normal and paranormal) and inductive inference are considered the means of knowledge in the Pāli Nikāyas. The emphasis that 'knowing' (*jānam*) must be based on 'seeing' (passam) or direct perceptive experience, makes Buddhism a form of Empiricism. We have, however, to modify the use of the term somewhat to mean not only that all our knowledge is derived from

¹ *r. Stibbing, op. cit.*, p. 247.

value. For when he attained enlightenment he immediately thinks of preaching to these two, saying that they were 'wise, intelligent and with little defilements ... and were likely to comprehend his teaching very soon' (paññito ... medhāvī ... apparajakkhaśādiko ... so īmāṇ dhammaṇi khippam eva ājāniṣati ti, M. I.169, 170). His enlightenment is not considered to be a mysterious single act of intuition but the discovery by means of the developed natural faculties of the mind of the cause and cessation of suffering (Ud. 1-3). Knowledge of salvation is had only as the final phase of a gradual process of discipline and not in a sudden act of intuition: 'I do not say that one can win the final knowledge at the very beginning; it is had from a gradual discipline, a gradual mode of action and conduct' (nākamp ādikera' eva anupubbapatiṭṭadā anūnādhanā hoti, M. I.479, 480).

(797) The method of verification of the Four Noble Truths is stated in detail in a number of similar passages which recur throughout the Nikāyas. Briefly, it consists in the practice of the virtuous life (ariyena silakkhandhena samannāgato, M. I.346) followed by the restraint of the senses (indriyaśāmpāra-, loc. cit.), the development of mindfulness (satipaṭṭhāna, loc. cit.), and the elimination of the five impediments (pañcānivaraṇe pādāya, M. I.347). This results in the possibility of attaining the first up to the fourth jhāna, in which there is 'a perception of equanimity and mindfulness' (upekkhāsatipariśuddhi, loc. cit.). In this state there would be manifested the six-fold higher knowledge (abhiññā, v. *supra*, 727). Of the six only three are necessary for the saving knowledge. The first is retroognition with which he verifies the fact of pre-existence (v. *supra*, 754). The second is clairvoyance, with which he verifies the fact of karma (v. *supra*, 755). The third is 'the knowledge of the destruction of the defiling impulses' (asavāṇam khayañāna, M. I.348). With this he verifies the Four Noble Truths (loc. cit.). As he thus knows and sees, his mind is emancipated from the inflowing impulses of sensual gratification, personal immortality and ignorance; along with this emancipation arises the knowledge that emancipation has been attained.¹ The above stages are often described as the stages of moral excellence (sila-, M. I.145), mental concentration (samādhi, loc. cit.), spiritual knowledge (paññā, loc. cit.), emancipation (vimutti, loc. cit.) and the knowledge and vision of emancipation (vimuttīñānaddassana-, loc. cit.).

¹ Tassa evamp jānato evam passato kāmāśavā pi . . . bhavaśavā . . . avijjasavā pi citraṇa vimuccati, vimuttasmiṇ vimutram iti nākamp hoti, M. I.348.

(798) Not everyone, however, was capable of verifying the doctrine in this manner. We have seen that only sixty out of five hundred were capable of attaining the 'higher knowledge' (v. *supra*, 752). 'The rest' are said to be 'emancipated by knowledge alone' (. . . īare paññā-vimutti, S. I.191). The question is asked: 'Why is it that some monks gain the emancipation of the mind, while others have only emancipation through knowledge' (atha kiñcarah iḍh'ekacce bhikkhū cetovimutino ekacce paññāvimutino ti, M. I.437). The reason given is that it was due to the 'difference in their faculties' (tesamp . . . indriya-vimuttiāṇa, loc. cit.).

(799) The mention of this kind of emancipation raises a number of questions. It meant that the doctrine was not fully verified by the disciple but was accepted on trust, even if the conviction of emancipation was real and directly experienced. The doctrine of rebirth and karma and the greater part of the theory of Buddhism would have had to be accepted on faith by such a person since he did not have within him or develop the power of verifying them. This explains the conception of the saint with faith (saddhā) in the Pāli Canon (v. *supra*, 674 f.). Such a person need attain only the first jhāna (M. I.435; A. IV.422; A. V.343) after which he reflects that the five constituents in it are 'sorrowful . . . empty and devoid of substance' (dukkhato . . . suññato anattato samanupassati, M. I.435). So he turns his mind away from these states (so tehi dhammehi cittam pativāpeti, loc. cit.) and directs it to the element of immortality (amarātaya dhatuyā cittam upasamāharati, M. I.436) thinking 'this is peaceful and excellent namely the cessation of all processes, the abandoning of all limitations, the elimination of desire, dispassion, cessation, Nibbāna. Established on that he attains the destruction of the inflowing impulses'.¹

(800) We may next turn to the question of the limits of knowledge. Is knowledge unlimited in scope? Is omniscience possible? Is it the case that certain things cannot be known? These questions appear to have been posed at a time when Scepticism was rife.

(801) It is important to note that what the Buddha claimed was 'a three-fold knowledge' (tiśo vijjā). He does so in a Sutta in which he disclaims omniscience in the sense of knowing all at once all the time:

¹ Etamp santam etam paññāt yadiḍam sabbasatkhārasanatho sabbipadhipatinissaggo raphalakkhayo virāgo nirodho nibbānan ti. So taṭṭha tīṭhito āsavāṇap-khayam pāpūṇati, M. I.436.

(pp. 102 ff.). In the parable of the Sīṃpā leaves, the Buddha takes a handful of leaves in his hand and what he knew but did not teach is like the leaves in the forest (S. V.437). This means that he claimed to know much more than he taught but he did not claim omniscience. Nor does he in the Nikāyas deny omniscience in the sense of knowing everything but not all at once. Yet it is clear that according to the earliest accounts in the Nikāyas, the Buddha did not claim (an unlimited) pre-cognitive knowledge. In the Pāsādika Sutta, Dīgha Nikāya, it is said, 'It is possible that other heretical teachers may say "the Recluse Gotama has a limitless knowledge and vision with regard to the past but not with regard to the future" . . ."'. The Buddha goes on to explain that 'with regard to the past the Tathāgata's consciousness follows in the wake of his memory' (atītān-adhānam . . . ārabbha Gotama has a limitless knowledge and vision with regard to the past but not with regard to the future" . . ."'. The Buddha goes on to explain that 'with regard to the past the Tathāgata's consciousness follows in the wake of his memory' (atītān-adhānam . . . ārabbha Tathāgatassa satānusāri viññānam hoti, loc. cit.). He recalls as much as he likes (so yāvataṃ ākākhāti tāvatakam anussarati, loc. cit.). 'With regard to the future the Tathāgata has the knowledge resulting from enlightenment that "this is the final birth . . ."'.¹ This appears to be an admission that the Buddha did not claim to have (at least an unlimited) precognitive knowledge of the future. This fits in with his disbelief in Strict Determinism (*v. supra*, 764).

(802) This very statement in which he claims only 'a three-fold knowledge' would have thus left the door open for speculation as to what the real extent of his knowledge was. At another place, the Buddha is credited with the statement: 'those who assert that the Recluse Gotama denies that there is any recluse or brahmin who was omniscient or all-seeing, are not stating the truth and are falsely accusing me of saying what is not true'.² He then says that what he stated was that 'there is no recluse or brahmin, who would know and see everything all at once'.³ This means that it is possible for someone to know everything but not all at once. This is in fact the sense in which omniscience is ascribed to the Buddha in the Milindapañha

(803) While the Aggi-Vacchagotta Sutta mentioned that the Tathāgata had a three-fold knowledge, we find it mentioned in one place in the Anguttara that 'there are six intellectual powers of the Tathāgata' (cha yināni . . . Tathāgatassa Tathāgatabalāni, A. III.417). The six constitute, in addition to the three-fold knowledge, the following: (i) 'the Tathāgata knows, as it really is, what is possible as possible and what is impossible as impossible' (... Tathāgato yāhanā ca thānato aṭhānān ca aṭhānato yathābhūtaṃ pajānati, loc. cit.), (ii) 'the Tathāgata knows as it really is, the effects according to their conditions and causes, of the performance of karma in the past, present and future' (... Tathāgato aṭṭānāgatapaccuppannānām karmasa-mādānānām thānaso hetuso vijākam yathābhūtaṃ pajānāti, loc. cit.), and (iii) 'the Tathāgata knows, as it really is, the corruption, perfection and arising from contemplative states of release, concentration and

¹ Ye te evam āhaṇsu: Samāṇo Gotamo sabbānū sabbadassāvī, aparisenap nāpadassanap patijānāti: carato ca me nīphato ca suttasa ca jāgarasa ca satamp samītāp nāpadassanap paccupatpītan ti, na me te vuttavādino, abbhācikshanti ca pana man te asata abhūtenā ti, M. I.482.

² Tevijjō Samāṇo Gotamo ti . . . byākaramāno vuttavādī c'eva me assa na ca maṇip abhūtena abbhācikshayyā, loc. cit.

³ Ye te evam āhaṇsu: Samāṇo Gotamo evam āha: nāthī so samāṇo vā brāhmaṇo vā yo sabbānū sabbadassāvī aparisenap nāpadassanap patijānissati; n'etapū thānāp vijāti ti; na me te vuttavādino abbhācikshanti ca pana maṇip te asata abhūtenā ti, M. II.127.

⁴ Nāthī so samāṇo vā brāhmaṇo vā yo sakid eva sabbān nāssati sabbān dakkhīti n'etapū thānāp vijāti ti, loc. cit.

¹ Thānāp . . . vijāti yap aṇoññihivā . . . evam vadeyyūp-Āññāp. kho addhānaṃ ārabhabha Samāṇo Gotamo aṭṭākāp nāpadassanāp pāṇipet, no ca kho anāgatāp . . . D. III.134.

² Anagatā ca kho addhānaṃ ārabhabha Tathāgatassa bodhijāp nāpan uppajjati

³ —Ayam antīna jāti . . . loc. cit.

attainment' (३०८) Tathāgato jñānavimokkhasamādhisamāpattiṇāpajānāti, loc. cit.).

(804) The knowledge of possibility and impossibility is illustrated at great length in the Vibhaṅga (335-8). Some of the impossibilities seem to be logical, e.g. 'it is impossible for two universal monarchs to be born simultaneously in the same world' (athānām etan . . . yanekissā lokadhātuyā dve rājāno cakkavatī uppajjeyyuṁ, Vbh. 336). Others are causally impossible, e.g. 'it is impossible for a good consequence to arise for one whose conduct is evil' (athānām etan . . . yan kāyaduccaritassa ittho . . . vipāko nibbatteyya, Vbh. 337).

(805) 'The ten (intellectual) powers' (dasa . . . balāni, M. I.71) of the Tathāgata mentioned in the Nikāyas and the Vibhaṅga (335-4) add the following four to the above list of six: (i) 'the Tathāgata knows, as it really is, the mode of life leading to all states (of survival)' (Tathāgato sabbatthagāminīpātipadaṇīyathābhūtāpajānāti, loc. cit.), (ii) 'the Tathāgata knows, as it really is, the world with its various and diverse elements' (Tathāgato anekadhātunāñdhātulokam yathābhūtāpajānāti, loc. cit.), (iii) 'the Tathāgata knows, as it really is, the various predilections of beings' (Tathāgato saññānāñādhimutrikatāpajānāti, loc. cit.), and (iv) 'the Tathāgata knows, as it really is, what goes on in the senses and faculties of other beings and individuals' (Tathāgato parasattānāpaparupugrāñānam indriyaparopariyattāpajānāti, loc. cit.). Despite the apparent progress from three to six and six to ten, it is difficult to say that there is genuine change in the conception of the intellectual powers of the Buddha. The seven powers added to the list of three are commonly attributed to the Buddha throughout the Nikāyas and it is difficult to say that the transition from three to ten represents a change in stratum.

(806) But the position is different, as we pointed out (*v. supra*, 649) in the Patisambhidāmagga, where we notice that the Buddha is credited with 'knowing all the future' (sabbapāññāgataṇījanāti, P. 131) and is omniscient (*v. supra*, 649).

(807) We may next turn to the problem of the unanswered (avyākataṇī) questions. The list is enumerated in paragraph 378 (*v. supra*, 378). Professor Murti has translated avyākataṇī as 'the Inexpressibles': 'The Inexpressibles (avyākata, Skt. avyākṛtavastuṇi) occur in very many dialogues. They are invariably enumerated as fourteen and

practically in the same order'.¹ This translation is not literally correct. Vyākaro is used of answering or explaining a question (*i.e.* PTS. Dictionary); vyākata-, the past passive participle would therefore mean 'explained, answered' and the negative form a-vyākata-, 'unexplained, unanswered'. Dr Murti is also not correct in saying that these questions are 'invariably enumerated as fourteen'. Only ten questions are mentioned in the Pali Canon² and it is in the Buddhist Sanskrit literature that the list is extended to fourteen.³ The Pali citations mention only two possibilities with regard to the duration and extent respectively of the universe, while the list of fourteen mentions four possibilities.

(808) The problem is on what grounds these questions were unanswered. Were they in principle answerable though left unanswered? If so, were they unanswered because the Buddha did not know the answers to them (Scepticism, Naïve Agnosticism) or was it because although he knew the answers, they were not relevant to the central problems of religion (Pragmatism). Or on the other hand, were they in principle unanswerable? If so, were the solutions beyond the grasp of the human intellect, transcending the limits of knowledge (Rational Agnosticism) or were the questions (logically) meaningless and therefore not admitting of an answer (Logical Positivism). We may exhibit these alternatives in a table on the following page.

(809) The above possibilities have not been carefully distinguished by scholars in their endeavour to explain why the Buddha set aside these questions. The above alternatives need not, however, be mutually exclusive for the following situations are possible, (i) that some questions were set aside for some reasons and others for other reasons, (ii) that on some interpretations the questions were answerable and on others not, (iii) that the Pragmatist solution need not necessarily imply that the Buddha knew the answers. It is possible that the Buddha did or did not know the answers or that the questions were unanswerable but that he still adopted the Pragmatist attitude to them. Let me call this the Pragmatist solution in the weak sense.

(810) Now solution (i) has been given by Keith. He combines with this the Pragmatist solution in the weak sense. It has also been suggested by Jacobi that Buddhism was influenced by the Sceptic's


¹ T. R. V. Murti, *The Central Philosophy of Buddhism*, London, 1955, p. 36.

² v. D. I.91; M. I.426, 484-5; S. III.257; A. II.41.

³ v. Murti, *op. cit.*, p. 36, fn. 2.

attitude to these questions, which is also the same as (1).¹ Keith says: 'It is quite legitimate to hold that the Buddha was a genuine agnostic, that he had studied the various systems of ideas prevalent in his day without deriving any greater satisfaction from them than any of us today do from the study of modern systems, and that he had no reasoned or other conviction on the matter'.² He is silent, not merely because knowledge of these matters does not tend to Nirvāna, but

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because men hold various opinions regarding them.³ 'This leads clearly to the conclusion that agnosticism in these matters is not based on any reasoned conviction of the limits of knowledge; it rests on the two-fold ground that the Buddha has not himself a clear conclusion on the truth on these issues, but is convinced that disputation on them will not lead to the frame of mind which is essential for the attainment of Nirvāna.'⁴ In other words, the Buddha was a Naïve Agnostic who did not know the answer to these questions.

¹ v. SBE, Vol. 45, p. xxviii.

² *Ibid.*, p. 45.

³ *Buddhist Philosophy*, p. 63.

(811) But Keith's solution that the Buddha rejected these questions out of ignorance is not only not supported by the texts but appears in fact to be contradicted by them. Keith's statement that the Buddha was silent regarding these questions 'because men hold various opinions regarding them' is not true. The Buddha certainly says that men hold various views regarding these questions, which result in violent controversy (Ud. 67, v. *supra*, 377) but he does not say that he left them unanswered because of this. Keith gives three references in support of his explanation of the silence of the Buddha—'Udāna', p. 11; SN. V.437; DN. i.179' (*op. cit.*, p. 44, fn. 3). Of these instances, the subject is not even discussed at *Udāna*, p. 11 and DN. i.179 (i.e. D. I.179). SN. V.437 (i.e. S. V.437) suggests the very opposite of what Keith is saying, since it is stated here (the parable of the Simṣapā leaves, v. *supra*, 802) that the Buddha knows much more than he has taught and he has not taught certain doctrines out of pragmatist reasons. Mālinī-kyaputta put the question directly to the Buddha in regard to his failure to answer these questions, 'it is the honest (*lit.* straightforward) thing to say, "I do know or see this" if it is the case that one does not know or see this' (ajanato kho pana apassato etad eva ujukamp hoti yadiam: na jānāmi na passāmī ti, M. I.428). The fact that the Buddha did not answer this question may also be considered as evidence against the correctness of solution (1) since we would otherwise have to say that the Buddha was dishonest and was evading the issue.

(812) There is a superficial similarity between the attitude of the Sceptic and that of the Buddha towards these questions. Sañaya like the Buddha refuses to give a definite answer to four of the ten

⁴ The word 'abhisāññāya' occurs at D. I.191 and abhisāññāya elsewhere (e.g. M. I.431).

⁵ Na b'ete . . . atta-sañhi, na dhamma-sañhi, na ādibrahmacariyakā, na nibbida, na virogāya, na nirodhāya, na upasamaya, na abhisāññāya ('. . . abhisāññāya), na sambodhāya, na nibbāna-saṃvartī, D. I. 191; M. I.431;

S. V.437.

'unanswered questions'.¹ But this is said to be 'due to his stupidity and ignorance' (mandarā momihattā, D. I.27) unlike in the case of the Buddha. The very fact that Scepticism was distinguished from Buddhism points to the difference of the Buddhist solution.

(814) The parables of the arrow (*v. supra*, 603) and Simṣapā leaves appear to support solution (2). The parable of the arrow seems to imply indirectly that questions regarding who shot the arrow, etc., can in principle be answered though they are irrelevant for the purpose of a cure. The parable of the Simṣapā leaves (*v. supra*, 802) states that what the Buddha knew but did not preach was comparable to the leaves on the trees of the Simṣapā forest, while what he taught was as little as the leaves in his hand; it is said that he did not teach the rest because it was irrelevant for our purpose. The statement that if the soul was identical with the body or different from it, then the religious life would be impossible,² implies that the theses 'the soul is the same as the body' and 'the soul is different from the body' were both in a sense known to be false. But it is possible that these statements were considered to be false only on one interpretation and not on the strict interpretation (*v. supra*, 478) that was given to them. Likewise, one cannot read too much into the parable of the arrow; and the parable of the Simṣapā leaves does not necessarily imply that the ten questions were meaningful ones to which the Buddha knew the answer. There is, therefore, no decisive evidence in support of solution (2).

(815) The third solution has been suggested by Beckh³ and offered by Murti, who sees in these questions a parallel with the Kantian antinomies. Murti says, 'The similarity of the avyākṛta to the celebrated antinomies of Kant... cannot fail to strike us'.⁴ 'The formulation of the problems in the thesis-antithesis form is itself evidence of the awareness of the conflict in Reason. That the conflict is not on the empirical level and so not capable of being settled by appeal to facts is realized by Buddha when he declares them insoluble. Reason involves itself in deep and interminable conflict when it tries to go beyond phenomena to seek their ultimate ground.'⁵ The similarity in fact

¹ I.e. 'does the Tathāgata exist after death?' (hoti Tathāgato param maraññā, D. I.27) in accordance with the four possibilities.

² Tapī jvāpi tapī sañcāra tū vā... dīptibhā sati... aśītāpi jīvāpi antīpi sañcāra tū vā... dīptibhā sati brahmamacarijīvāso na hoti, S. II.65.

³ *Buddhismus*, Berlin und Leipzig, 1919, Vol. I, p. 120.
⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 38.

extends beyond the subject-matter and 'the formulation of the problems in the thesis-antithesis form'. We have seen that both the theses and anti-theses were proved to be true by the debaters at that time (*v. supra*, 378 ff.). Besides, with regard to the problem of the origin of things, the Buddha clearly recognized that no empirical answer was possible since the earlier we went back in time there was a possibility of going back still farther and no ultimate origin of 'phenomenal existence' (samsāra) could be found empirically (*v. supra*, 10774).

Was this because the universe had no beginning in time (like a negative infinite series, viz. -1, -2, -3, etc.) or because the origin could not be discovered by extending one's paranormal memory backwards because of its remote ancestry in the past? The BHS literature seems to have adopted the former alternative in turning anamatagga- into anavarāga- i.e. 'without beginning or end' (S.v.: BHS. Dictionary). If we confine ourselves to the Pāli Nikāyas there seems to be a recognition of the limitations of empiricism and of the impossibility of discovering the truth about this question by empirical investigation.

(816) While this rational agnostic solution remains a possibility with regard to the problem of the origin, duration and extent of the universe, the other six questions appear to have been discarded on the grounds that they were (logically) meaningless, as we have already shown (*v. supra*, 474 f., 478 f.). This clearly resembles the solution of the Logical Positivist of such questions (*v. supra*, 476 f.).

(817) It is necessary, however, to draw a distinction between the solution of the Logical Positivist and that of the Buddhist. The Buddhist while saying that is meaningless to ask whether one exists in (hoti), does not exist in (na hoti), is born in (upapajjati), is not born in (na upapajjati) in Nirvāṇa, still speaks of such a transcedent state as realizable. The meaninglessness of these questions is thus partly due to the inadequacy of the concepts contained in them to refer to this state. This is clearly brought out in a verse in the Suttanipāta. The Buddha was asked the question: 'The person who has attained the goal—does he not exist or does he exist eternally without defect; explain this to me well, O Lord, as you understand it?' The Buddha explains: 'The person who has attained the goal is without measure; he does not have that with which one can speak of him'.⁶ The

¹ Athangato so, uda vā so nattī, udāhu ve sassatī arogo, tapī me munī sādhu viyākaro hi, tathā hi te vedito esa dharmo, Sn. 1075.

² Athangatassa na pannānam athi, yena napī vajju tapī tassa nattī, Sn. 1076.

transcendental cannot be empirically described or understood (*v. supra*, 48c) but it can be realized and attained. The Tathāgata freed from the conception of form, sensation, ideas, dispositions and consciousness is said to be 'deep, immeasurable and unfathomable, like the great ocean' (gambhiro appameyyo dappariyogalo seyyathā pi mahā-muddo, M. I.487). Whereof one can speak of him—that he does not have' (yena nañ vajju tarp tassa natti, Sn. 1076) and hence one has to be silent. In this respect alone it resembles the Positivist's outlook: 'Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent'.¹ This attitude has, however, to be distinguished from Agnosticism.² It was not that there was something that the Buddha did not know, but that what he 'knew' in the transcendent sense could not be conveyed in words because of the limitations of language and of empiricism.

¹ L. Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, 1933, 7, p. 189.

² This does not mean that the theistic interpretation is the correct one; cp. S. Radhakrishnan, 'To me the silence is not a proof either of denial or agnosticism ... Silence is on occasions the only language of true worship ... Our thoughts of God are always images though they may not be Graven images', ('The Teaching of Buddha by Speech and by Silence', *The Hibbert Journal*, Vol. XXII, pp. 350 ff); cp. also R. L. Slater, *Paradox and Nirvāna*, Chicago, 1950, p. 121.

APPENDIX I

(818) Criticizing Oldenberg's view that the Upaniśadic concept of Brahman (neuter) becomes in Buddhism the God Brahma,¹ Thomas says, 'the idea of Brahna (neuter) in the old Upaniśads is said to have been hypostatized in Buddhism into a personal God Brahna. But this rather implies that the older philosophical idea had been known to the Buddhists and this has been transformed into a much less philosophic conception. We have no evidence that Early Buddhism even knew it' (History of Buddhist Thought, p. 90). Of the Tevijja Sutta, Thomas says: 'The Tevijja Sutta, the discourse on the three-fold knowledge, the Vedas, undertakes to discuss the value of sacrifice and the brahmans are represented as holding that it leads to life in the Brahna world. But the Brahna world as described belongs purely to the Buddhist conception of the universe. It is a definite region above the heavens of sense pleasure . . .' (op. cit., p. 86). Thomas' conception seems to be that the neuter Brahman is 'the chief conception' (op. cit., p. 87, fn. 1) of the Upaniśads and likewise that the Brahmaloka in the Brāhmaṇas and Upaniśads was a state attainable on earth and not a place to be reached after death. Our contention is that the idea of a personal Brahna and of Brahmaloka as a place is the dominant conception of both the late Brāhmaṇas and the Early Upaniśads and that the Tevijja Sutta is criticizing these beliefs and not the impersonal concepts which dominate the Middle and Late Upaniśads. We have already shown how Brahna (masc.) is used along with Brahman (neuter) in the Brāhmaṇas and the Early Upaniśads, which do not strictly distinguish them in usage and where the personal concept prevails and is even carried over to the Late Upaniśads (*v. supra*, 269).

(819) It is the same with the concept of the Brahmaloka. It is the highest world in the Brāhmaṇas. In the Kauś. Br. (20.1) the world of

